Over the past few days I've come across three articles that have delved into our credit expansionist policies and why they cause our economies to be cyclical and have lent some reason for the chaos of 2008. I thought it would be useful to share with the rest of the P&N crew. By no means am I an expert in economics so I hope that those with a better understanding can chime in with some useful commentary.
Paulson's interview with FT.com
Cliffs
Soros's opinion on the financial crisis
Cliffs
The jigsaw piece that provides a backdrop for these two articles:
http://www.economicsjunkie.com/credit-expansion-policy/
Cliffs (+commentary)
Whew such a long post...I'll edit it later. Hope it was useful.
Paulson's interview with FT.com
Cliffs
- Rising emerging markets (particularly China and oil exporters) are production-oriented, and have higher levels of savings (budget surpluses) while the majority of the Western world is consumption-oriented and have budget deficits funded by credit. This has created global economic imbalances.
- High levels of savings by emerging countries fund our budget deficits (China is holds vast amounts of US treasury notes) but have put downward pressure on interest rates and consequently risk spreads (the former is easily seen, the latter likely results because lower interest rates make risky investments more attractive (the intuition I'm thinking would be that with a constant 2% risk premium, at interest rates of 2%, the risky asset offers double the return over the risk-free, and is much more attractive than at interest rates of 10%, where the 12% return on the risky asset is only 20% more than the risk-free) and drive down their equilibrium risk premia
- These imbalances thus created the credit bubble that burst recently (September?)
Soros's opinion on the financial crisis
Cliffs
- The U.S. economy has been cyclical since the second world war, with cycles ranging from 4 to 10 years. Soros believes the current crisis is not only the end of the latest cycle but the end of a 'super-boom' era where the previous booms and busts were but fluctuations about an upward trend line.
- The previous financial crisis were overcome, particularly since the 1980s, by liquidity/credit injections and economy stimulations by the Fed.
- Free market ideology provided sound (or apparently sound) reasoning for such intervention: in words well put by soros, "common interest is best served by allowing participants to pursue their self-interest".
- Globalisation, where production was shifted outside US at places where it could be undertaken more cheaply, pushed the US to a consumption-oriented economy and accordingly led to budget deficits (US current account deficit in 2006 was 6.2% of GNP) that must inevitably funded by credit that is sourced from the savings of production-oriented economies like China.
- The key problem now is inflation (due to the Fed flooding the money supply to pay for TARP and current and future stimulus packages) and a depreciation in the dollar. A devaluation of the dollar will devalue US treasuries and cause yields to increase. This will go against the Fed's goal to keep yields low in order to stimulate the economy. This will prevent a credit expansionist policy to pull the US out of this recession. In layman's words, we can't afford it and we need to tighten our belts (reduce consumption and increase production through a recession "we had to have").
- Soros's finishes poignantly and touches upon the very points Paulson makes in his interview:
Although a recession in the developed world is now more or less inevitable, China, India and some of the oil-producing countries are in a very strong countertrend. So the current financial crisis is less likely to cause a global recession than a radical realignment of the global economy, with a relative decline of the US and the rise of China and other developing countries.
The danger is that the resulting political tensions, including US protectionism, may disrupt the global economy and plunge the world into recession or worse.
The jigsaw piece that provides a backdrop for these two articles:
http://www.economicsjunkie.com/credit-expansion-policy/
Objectives of Credit Expansion
Credit expansion is the activity where the authority or the business producing money (be it by mining gold or by printing paper money and making it legal tender by force) channels additional currency into the market by purchasing merchant bills, government bills or bonds or other credit instruments. In a monetary system based on gold there exist strict limits for money producers when it comes to credit expansion, due to the natural scarcity of the precious metal. In a system based on paper money (fiat money) there are no natural limits on the amount of additional curreny printed and used to purchase credit instruments.
The effect of credit expansion is that the interest rate charged for additional credit instruments drops.
Credit expansion is the policy that central banks pursue. It is broadly accepted as a measure to make society prosperous.
When the Federal Reserve Bank lowers the discount rate it really begins purchases of bills and bonds on the market, until the interbank interest rate is at its desired level. The lowering of the discount rate by itself has no effect because banks hardly ever draw upon this source of money.
It is its declared objective to make credit abundant. New credit channeled into the system is said to spur business activity, capital becomes inexpensive, entrepreneurs can borrow more money for investments, commerce flourishes and soon all of society is permeated by the magical boon that the additional credit boom bestows upon it. Everyone is supposed to enjoy all the products and services they have been longing for under the stingy policy of tight credit.
This idea is based on the substantially flawed assumption that capital can be created out of nothing. Capital can only exist if factors of production are available for use. Every investment necessitates the use of factors of production that turn out more or more valuable products after a roundabout process rather than consuming fewer or less valuable products immediately. Factors of production can only exist if people have generated savings. Savings are generated if one forgoes immediate consumption for the prospect of future consumption. Foregoing present consumption can only be feasible if a person considers the future remuneration he gets in return more valuable than the immediate consumption he sets aside. This is what is called time preference. Time preferences are expressed on the market in the form of interest rates. (Terms explained: capital, factors of production, interest, value, money)
This causality ensures that market interest rates always provide an indication of the availability of factors of production and individuals' time preferences. While prices give entrepreneurs an indication as to what products are desired or needed, interest rates provide a measure as to when they are desired or needed. It creates an environment where entrepreneurs have an incentive to fulfill demands based on value judgments and time preferences at any given point in time.
The Effects of Credit Expansion
It is now necessary to examine what the process of credit expansion entails. The central bank that creates money does not own any capital, it does not create factors of production. The only thing it channels into the market is pure fiat money, money that is enforced via legal tender laws.
Before examining the purchase of credit instruments it makes sense to take an intermediary step and look at the simple purchase of consumption goods. For example, if it were to purchase bread with the newly printed money, its governing board could decide to supply the bread to all its officials. They will be able to enjoy the bread while its price rises and bread will not be available to other would-be buyers who would have purchased it at a lower price that would have represented their value preferences. While on the market people can only buy things if producing things in return, and while all transactions are based on voluntary exchange and value judgments, the central bank does not act under these constraints. It skews the natural price of bread that would usually be based on voluntary value preferences and supply and demand. The result of this will be that entrepreneurs' judgment of value preferences will be skewed. Because it suddenly appears more profitable than before they will begin producing bread instead of another commodity that is located higher on the actual value scale of the actors in the market. The outcome is precisely that consumers on the market are not supplied with products as their voluntary value preferences mandate. What happens instead is that the supply of surplus bread is triggered by an arbitrary action on the part of a few central bank officials.
(As a side note: It is commonly understood that this inflationary purchase of present goods by printing money would be an unacceptable procedure of government arbitrariness. It was the method used by kings and emperors to subtly tax the populace and enriching themselves.)
The equivalent, however, occurs in the sphere of time preference if the central bank purchases bills or other credit instruments on the market. Providing a loan to someone is nothing but the obtainment of future goods. People demanding capital on the open market issue credit instruments such as merchant bills, governments issue government bonds and bills. The credit instruments purchased by the central bank will go up in price after each additional purchase, interest rates drop. Other providers of capital on the market whose time preferences were matched by the credit instruments offered will abstain from obtaining the corresponding credit instrument. Now the central bank has withdrawn future products from the market that would have gone to those who were outbid by it in the process of purchasing the loan contracts. They were not able to enter into a transaction that would have represented their time preferences. On top of that, the interest rates for the loan contracts purchased drop below the market rate that represents actual time preferences. This entails that the entrepreneurs' assessment of time preferences is skewed. They think that present goods against future goods are valued less than actual voluntary time preferences warrant. Those roundabout projects, that were not being embarked upon, because interest rates indicated time preferences in favor of less roundabout projects (whose goods would be consumable earlier) now appear to be feasible. Entrepreneurs begin embarking upon more roundabout projects that yield a produce in the farther future. At the same time they set aside those less roundabout projects which the market interest rates would have induced them to begin, had the credit expansion not taken place. The result is now precisely that consumers are again not supplied with products as desired as per their time preference.
The Credit Boom
Since no additional capital has been created via real savings, prices for factors of production used for the longer term will rise. The stock market, it being the main market for factors of production, will see a price increase, primarily in those stocks for companies whose projects yield a later produce. In particular, a lot of companies incorporate, that are currently not producing anything yet, nor plan to produce immediately, but are rather aiming to turn out goods a few years down the road, after spending time on roundabout research and production processes. As a tendency, the labour force of society becomes employed in roundabout long-term projects.
The Credit Crunch
The labour force, however, at the same time represents the bulk of the consumers whom those products are intended to be produced for. But their time preferences have not changed in reality. While being employed in very roundabout projects and processes, they still desire present goods over future goods more strongly than the entrepreneurs expected based on their assessment of interest rates. After the credit expansion is completed, consumer spending and saving habits will not be in line with those expectations. They demand more present products than are available and hence bid up their prices. Due to their shortage, an overall tendency towards rising prices for present consumption goods, such as food and gasoline, ensues. Market interest rates will now readjust in accordance with real time preferences again, based on savings generated. They will move up to the market level again. Incorporation of companies with overly roundabout projects will decline. Some entrepreneurs, who are in the middle of overly roundabout projects will not immediately realize this. They will keep employing resources in these projects. However, when they announce their new earnings expectations they will have to take the true time preferences into consideration. The products that were expected to be turned out in the farther future are not demanded by the consumers as expected. They will have to let the owners of the factors of production, the capitalists, know that their capital will not yield the return expected. This will cause a downward pressure on the prices of those factors of production used for overly roundabout processes. Correspondingly the prices for shares in such companies decline. They will be sold at prices that reflect true time preferences again. However, the time that resources have been employed in overly roundabout projects has been wasted. The true yield of their produce did not match the capitalists' expectations. The capitalists have suffered a loss.
Some of the factors of production can be easily channeled into new lines of production, in particular the factor labour. Others however, those which are fixed and specific to one particular project and are merely half finished may be forever lost, in particular this will be the case for huge construction or manufacturing projects that involve the erection of factories, machinery, etc. which have turned out to be useless.
Depending on the amount of surplus credit channeled into the market and depending on the duration of the credit expansion, the repercussions can be anything between mild and disastrous.
If this process of readjustment is not hampered with, the problems caused by the credit expansion will be within limits. The market will quickly recover, albeit, at a level that is less desirable than where it could have been at without credit expansion.
Conclusion
The objective of credit expansion, namely to ensure that more capital is generated in order for the market to provide more of what consumers demand, fails. In fact, it has the opposite effect. It skews the entrepreneurs' judgment and makes them align resources to produce products that consumers are not demanding and makes them use factors of production for processes that turn out products later than consumers are demanding them while withdrawing them form those production processes that would have been in compliance with consumers' time preferences.
Historical Relevance
The policy of credit expansion has been pursued by governments time and time again. It has become prevalent in the United States under President Woodrow Wilson after the inauguration of the Federal Reserve Act during the Christmas Holiday of December 1913. Since then, it has caused major credit booms and crunches in the form of stock market and real estate booms and subsequent crashes and economic booms and subsequent recessions. In particular this has been the case in the years of 1929, 1987, and 2001. It has always precipitated precisely the effects outlined above. Its workings and effects have been fully explained by this theory of the business cycles. No one has ever refuted the correctness of this theory.
Yet, to date economists and politicians appear completely riddled as to what causes booms and crashes. It is claimed to still be a matter of discussion amongst experts. It has been attempted to impute it on humans' greedy nature and natural exuberance. Whenever a crisis emerges the greatest supposed experts, central bank representatives, and politicians call in meetings and try and regulate the market to stave off the impending crunch. They forget or don't have the intellectual capacity to understand that it has been their own policy that has caused the crisis in the first place. As long as the central banks keep pursuing this policy, there is no need to be surprised when the next credit crunch occurs.
Cliffs (+commentary)
- Interest rates, the price of credit, factor into two important decisions, the capital expenditure decision by producers (when interest rates are high producers will prefer to invest in projects that offer cash flows in the shorter term and conversely will be more open to long-term investments when interest rates are low. This flows on from basic DCF analysis) and the consumption decision by consumers (when interest rates are high consumers will prefer to delay consumption and will be more inclined to save whereas when interest rates are low consumers will prefer to consume now than save).
- When the currency is fiat based, increases in the money supply through credit expansionist policies are not accompanied with real increases in the economies net worth: when the Fed prints money, the productive capacity of our economy is unchanged. In gold (or other resource) backed monetary systems this nominal increase in the money supply is limited.
- Wealth is not created by credit expansionist policies. The debate is whether government intervention in credit markets is value maximising. The argument against (and the point of the whole article) is that artificial non-market control over the interest rates (e.g. low interest rates in the Greenspan era) skews the aforementioned decisions made by producers and consumers towards investment in long-term projects and present consumption respectively. These two decisions are asynchrous with each other because, in the absence of global markets, a gap is created between the higher demand for current consumption and the lack of investment in productive capacity to satisfy current and near-term consumption (since producers shift capital to long roundabout projects). The divergence is also corrected by 'credit crunches' where producers investing in long-term projects realise the demand for these projects is not as envisioned because consumers are focused on present consumption and will suffer losses on these investments and scale back production. Interest rates rise because the risk premiums associated with production return to their true levels. Consumers will bid up prices of present goods and will also scale back consumption and will save more due to higher (and more attractive interest rates). Upto now globalisation has prevented this divergence from being too significant as emerging countries like China and India fulfill our current consumption needs. However, this creates economic imbalance (as discussed by Paulson above) as wealth flows out from our consumption-oriented economies to production-oriented economies.
The counterargument to this is that the US is investing in the long-term future and its present consumption will be funded by the wealth to be created in the future. In itself, this argument is perfectably acceptable. However, the reason for the financial crisis lies in that artifical control over interest rates in sub-optimal from a total economy standpoint, producers are being skewed to investments that they would otherwise not make and consumers are skewed to consumption that they would not otherwise make (the wasteful consumption we see today). This goes precisely agaisnt the free market ideology espoused by our government. The sub-optimality will cause us to overpay for present consumption when we buy from emerging markets (live beyond our means) that will not be able to funded by our long-term projects because their true returns will be lower than expected. This falls in line with Soros's 'superboom' logic - we finally cannot afford to live beyond our means and our credit expanisionist policies will no longer work (or work as effectively as desired).
Whew such a long post...I'll edit it later. Hope it was useful.