Counterinsurgency was discredited after Vietnam. What's changed?

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yllus

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The counterinsurgency strategy employed in Vietnam is, as far as I am aware, considered a failure. I've just spent a half hour perusing Petreaus's COIN manual written in 2006 and I didn't see anything highlighting the differences between it and the 1970s vintage. Does anyone have the knowledge base to share why success is considered more likely now?
 

nextJin

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The counterinsurgency strategy employed in Vietnam is, as far as I am aware, considered a failure. I've just spent a half hour perusing Petreaus's COIN manual written in 2006 and I didn't see anything highlighting the differences between it and the 1970s vintage. Does anyone have the knowledge base to share why success is considered more likely now?

Because the politics are a hell of a lot different now, to win a war much less fight you have to have the will of the people. I have had few conversations on war with my father who served two tours in nam and the shit he told me was absolutely insane compared to what I saw in Iraq. The soldiers/marines in vietnam were seriously held back and from what I gather were at times even told not to engage if you are fired upon (on the fob). So it was not just COIN (or that version of it) it was also the politics, ROE, etc.
 

yllus

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Because the politics are a hell of a lot different now, to win a war much less fight you have to have the will of the people. I have had few conversations on war with my father who served two tours in nam and the shit he told me was absolutely insane compared to what I saw in Iraq. The soldiers/marines in vietnam were seriously held back and from what I gather were at times even told not to engage if you are fired upon (on the fob). So it was not just COIN (or that version of it) it was also the politics, ROE, etc.

So what specifically has changed? COIN is acknowledged to incorporate the political element (in fact, in his manual Petreaus says political concerns are primary over military ones) so my original question encompasses that.
 

nextJin

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So what specifically has changed? COIN is acknowledged to incorporate the political element (in fact, in his manual Petreaus says political concerns are primary over military ones) so my original question encompasses that.

A lot like I said the political environment is completely different we do not have a criminal in office, tens of thousand Americans are not coming home in body bags, huge resentment here at home and a military being forced to not actually win.
 

Farang

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Jul 7, 2003
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Your questions is interesting so I did a little research and found this:
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/the-vietnam-war-guide-to-afghanistan/

As you can see, one issue is people question your premise that the Vietnam strategy was a failure. The Washington Times says we won the war, but Congress undermined that victory by cutting aid at a crucial time. If military leaders today feel the same, they may not feel the need to have major differences in strategy.
 

superccs

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Just like modern medicine the point is no longer to cure the problem or win the war, just to make the most money off the afflicted and cause the most annoyance.
 

Lemon law

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In all due respect to Farand who does offer some insights, there are many crucial differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan.

1. American, the big winner of WW2 was flush with success and had a booming economy. But the only real snake in that garden of Eden, was new power alignment in the world and the resulting cold war. The big losers in WW2 were in fact the former European colonial powers who sailed back to S.E. Asia to reclaim their former colonies and found they were no longer wanted. As for the USSR, they had already grabbed most of Eastern Europe and swiftly set up puppet communist governments. And Mao in China had toppled the old government and had taken China, the most populous nation on earth, to the communist side of the the equation. In terms of nukes, both Russia and China had them early on to counter the USA, but the USA had the air force delivery systems and Russia had almost nothing in terms of bombers at the time. That all changed in 1957 when the USSR launched Sputnik. As the USA woke up next morning and realized we were on the wrong side of the missile gap. As the specter of global thermonuclear war delivered by ICBM's became very real. As America hit the PANIC BUTTON. Especially since the Russian economy was growing faster than our economy at the time.

2. In terms of wars, to some extent large set piece battles between major powers like WW2 became an obsolete concept. But in general. armed conflict became ever more frequent. First the Brits lost India which became neutral, the French faced revolution in Algeria while hanging on by their fingernails in Vietnam, but the first real example of communist expansion was in North Korea as the North promptly over ran South Korea. As the first real proxy war post WW2 started. As the USA and a UN coalition of other nations landed troops and starting pushing the North Koreans back to their borders. Had the USA and the UN stopped at that, history may have been different, but somehow North Korea needed to be punished for their aggressions as MacArthur pushed steadily North, into North Korean territory with a goal of the North Korean capital. And instead, in the flat footed surprise of the century the USA found the entire massive Chinese army coming at them. The US retreat started then and didn't stop until the UN armies were pushed back even further South of where they started. And as the Korean war dragged on and on, until it ended in a basic stalemate, the principle was somewhat established, the " free world " had to deter communist aggression. As no land borders changed in Korea. At the same time, the USA faced a crisis of confidence, as the French army got defeated in South Vietnam, from a popular peoples uprising mostly centered in North Vietnam. Even if that uprising was not financed or abetted by Russia or China. The problem then was not that the remaining French puppet did not try to take over, the problem was and remained that they had almost zero support from the bulk of the people in South or North Vietnam. And worse yet that cabal did not care, as they ran South Vietnam for only their own benefit. As for the bulk of the South Vietnamese people, they did what they always did, namely try to eke out a living rice farming. Meanwhile back near US borders, a similar peoples rebellion toppled the totally corrupt Baptista government and suddenly Castro was only 90 miles off shore of the Continental USA. At first the USA was unsure how to react, but when Castro nationalized the banana and sugar industries that had historically exploited the Cuban people, the romance was over. And then to add injury to insult, Cuba allowed Russia to set up missile bases only 90 miles from us. Never mind the fact the "free world" had missile bases even closer to the USSR and in far many more places, it was more than the USA could stand.

So we in the USA were itching for a spot to make our stand against communist aggression and Vietnam became that spot. We may debate, had JFK lived, would he have sucked in, but when LBJ became President due to assassination. Vietnam became the spot to make our stand as they LBJ ego would accept nothing else. At first that escalation was small as the USA began Bombing North Vietnam. As the resultant justification in the domino theory began. As the domino theory stated, if we in the USA allow Vietnam to fall, all of the other South East Asian nations like Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and Laos will fall to the commies one by one. As China told us we could try the bombing, but if the USA put a boot on North Vietnamese soil, their army would intervene to push us out. As a little bombing did not work, LBJ redoubled our efforts, and soon we had 500,000 ground troops in Vietnam that did nothing but alienate the South Vietnamese people. As the USA was soon sending US draftees in droves who understood nothing about how to fight or win an insurgency war in a totally foreign country. As soon mothers and fathers all over the USA got those telegrams that their son had lost their life fighting for our country. I can remember some weeks when 300 or more US parents got their notice their sonny boy would soon come home in a box.
As an initially popular war became suddenly unpopular fast, with a huge component of that was the draft. And as the ego in the Vietnam transferred from LBJ to Nixon, at least Nixon ended the draft to buy off part of the opposition. Meanwhile the US bombing of North Vietnam continued unabated and with zero results. Until Nixon, the morally bankrupt fool destabilized all of South east by putting US ground troops in other South-east Asian nations which backfired big time. Then when Nx0n got re elected in 1972, he adopted the McGovern peace plan, called it peace with honor, which allowed us to sail home defeated while we cried yippe we won.

As for the ole domino theory, not one South Asian country went hard core communist, but all the surrounding South Asian nations became destabilized. Cambodia had its killing fields, Burma went into a military dictatorship its finally starting to end. As for Vietnam, its population is increasing at a rapid rate, its at peace, yet it never been able to join the other Asian tiger economies.

But still, Vietnam was a blow to the American psyche, all that blood, treasure and effort bought us nothing. And even if America can do anything and
put a man on the moon, but could not win in Vietnam or win the heart and minds of rice farmers whose technology had not changed in a thousand years.

I submit there was a lesson we in the USA should have learned in Vietnam and somehow we have failed to learn that lesson even today. As the USA has lost every military occupation since and for the same exact reasons. As we pretend the government are the people, if we control the government, we control the people. In Vietnam that was a giant mistake, as the South Vietnamese government was a small group of ex-colonial officials that controlled a small and poorly motivated military. As the South Vietnamese government didn't care about their people in any way, and the South Vietnamese people didn't much care what that pack of thieves were doing either. As the US had a top down strategy, and the insurgency never makes that mistake. As they have a bottom up strategy, control that people, treat them with some respect and sometimes tough discipline. And then the insurgency can even tax them. But the insurgency has a direct and even more important, a permanent connection with the people the US military almost always lacks.

Now to avoid the mistakes of Vietnam by allowing the war to get too big and bloody, we screw our own pooch even worse. As we come in to all new quagmires with guns blazing, lordie we are in love with shock and awe, as the existing government will be toast within a week. But just when winning the war is over, and the harder job of winning the peace starts, we are woefully unprepared and that is where the USA always loses. Because the the military occupation has to replace the old government, provide basic law and order, often it needs to even feed the people, and replace basic infrastructure. And that takes a lot of troops. Instead we are far too tardy as we get beat by the very anarchy we tow in our own wake. Meanwhile the insurgency can form up in as little as a week as they get ever more popular as a function of the ineptness of the military occupation.

Its the same mistake we in the USA make every time. As we take the same losing strategy and apply it to our next military occupation, and then can't figure out why it never works.
 
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cybrsage

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The increase in technology of our weapons also allows us to use pinpoint strikes to take out enemy leaders without having to bomb an entire city to do it. Makes a war less painful on the civilians and more painful on the actual bad guys.
 

manimal

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The increase in technology of our weapons also allows us to use pinpoint strikes to take out enemy leaders without having to bomb an entire city to do it. Makes a war less painful on the civilians and more painful on the actual bad guys.

Kinder gentler wars


sure



War is only painless to those delusional enough to thirst for it.
 

yllus

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The increase in technology of our weapons also allows us to use pinpoint strikes to take out enemy leaders without having to bomb an entire city to do it. Makes a war less painful on the civilians and more painful on the actual bad guys.

Technology may let us drop bombs more precisely, but I don't see how or why it would have made our intelligence any better.

As far as I can tell the West faces the same problem the U.S. faced in Vietnam - our intel comes from Afghanis, and just like in Vietnam I bet they abuse the hell out of that and kill as many innocents that they stand to gain from having disappear as actual militants.
 

yllus

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Now that General Petraeus isn't so much the golden boy, people seem to be much more willing to criticize COIN.

TIME.com - Exit Petraeus — and His Famous Military Doctrine

...

Even before he was sworn in as CIA director in September 2011, Petraeus was bending the rules of his own doctrine in Afghanistan. He reversed McChrystal’s counterinsurgency-inspired limits on air strikes, which can cause heavy civilian casualties, and bombed the hell out of the Taliban. He also oversaw a steep increase in Special Forces raids and armed drone strikes. Petraeus brought that attitude to the CIA, fighting to expand the spy agency’s drone fleet so that it can more easily kill suspected terrorists from Pakistan to Yemen to North Africa.

Those sort of targeted assassinations aren’t quite the opposite of counterinsurgency. (That would be carpet bombing.) But they fly in the face of the doctrine in multiple ways. Drone strikes — which often kill unlucky civilians — enrage local populations in countries like Pakistan and Yemen and risk “damaging and counterproductive” effects for U.S. interests. At least one recent would-be terrorist who plotted to attack the U.S. said he was motivated by drone attacks in Pakistan. Counterinsurgency requires huge numbers of troops to protect and build relationships with local populations. Drone-based counterterrorism strategy requires few if any boots on the ground. Death is rained down anonymously, usually with no explanation or apology for collateral damage.

This is the new American strategy. Hearts and minds have been replaced by drones and SEALs. Working a tribal council is a less valuable skill than piloting a Predator. By the end of his career — in a country exhausted by war and slashing its budget — Petraeus had embraced that shift. He had lowered his profile too far to become the drone war’s public face. But to those watching closely, the Petraeus Doctrine had morphed into something different. Counterinsurgency was finished. Much like the general’s career.

HuffPo - Petraeus: Much Less Than Acclaimed

I do not want to dump on a general who has just been pushed off his pedestal by a jealous mistress. However, the nation deserves consolation -- the loss to America is much smaller than the media has made it out to be. General Petraeus has been depicted as a great military thinker -- a Ph.D. from Princeton! -- who came up with the strategy that won the war in Iraq. He famously replaced CT (counterterrorism) with COIN (counterinsurgency) which sought to win the hearts and minds of the local population -- in other words to help us, and turn against those who are fighting us.

Well, it did nothing of the sort. The turning point in Iraq actually came only after the surge, which increased our boots on the ground, and the Sunni Awakening, in which we bribed the tribal chiefs of several Sunni communities to work with us. It helped that they finally realized that they would be unable to bring back the Saddam regime during which they lorded over the Shia, and that they will have to learn to live in a country governed by a Shia majority. All the other stuff, the many scores of billions the U.S. spent on building schools and clinics (but not providing salaries for teachers and nurses), paving roads, digging wells and so on mainly enriched American contractors, but swayed few Iraqi minds. Indeed, Iraq is leaning ever more toward Iran and Iraqi fighters are helping sustain the Assad regime in Syria. We could not even persuade the Iraqi government to allow some of our troops to stay. Petraeus' COIN hardly flipped their hearts and minds.

When Petraeus moved to Afghanistan he brought COIN with him, where it fared even worse. The strategy suffered, among other things, from the fact that its goals were never clear. Some days it was viewed mainly as a way to gain intelligence. American troops were told to woo the locals by bringing soccer balls and candy to the kids, paving a road, or providing some other such goodie to the villagers in order to get them to spill the beans on al Qaeda and the Taliban. Sometimes COIN was interpreted as a mandate to become closely involved with the local population, learn their culture, respect their traditions, and follow their lead. And sometimes the goal was to turn Afghanistan into a Little America, with Western-style democratic elections, respect for human (and especially women's) rights and free markets.

It took ten years, half-a-trillion dollars, and thousands of lives (American and Afghan) to learn that none of these goals can be achieved. Reporting on the widespread anger she encountered while reporting in Afghanistan, Ann Jones concluded that Afghans, "know the difference between genuine apologies and bribes, true commitment and false promises, generosity and self-interest. And since the whole point of COIN is to gain the hearts and minds of 'the population,' those angry Afghans are a bad omen for the U.S. military and President Obama." Her general impression has been confirmed by opinion surveys showing that Afghans tended to blame the United States rather than insurgents for the rise in civilian casualties in the wake of the surge. These considerations, among others, all support the conclusion put forward by Gilles Dorronsoro, in a report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, wherein he concluded that, "the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy failed."

...
 
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werepossum

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COIN is in no wise discredited@#@# In any conflict both sides get a vote, and if one chooses to fight a guerrilla war, that's the war that will be fought@#@# In Vietnam in particular COIN was quite successful; by the end of 1967 the Viet Cong were largely finished as a fighting force, and @#@#@#pletely so after Tet which, in spite of achieving total strategic and near-total tactical surprise, failed miserably except in one province (Hue) and the American press@#@#

Vietnam's singular lesson is not the efficiency of COIN, but rather that war is inherently a contest of wills@#@#
 

EagleKeeper

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There is a large difference between a military occupation and a military winning the war.

To win the war; to have to adapt your methodology and ROE to be willing to actually win.

An occupation is what happens AFTER the battles have been one, the military arm of the enemy is defeated and is dependant on the politicians and the government that you are trying to support.

The US has not had that support from its politicians to handle an occupation. they expect the military to do it without the proper training, materials and a reasonable set of expectations and ROE.
 
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