Central and Eastern European Countries Issue Rare Warning for U.S. on Russian Policy

[PJABBER]

The level of concern about U.S. foreign policy, or maybe the apparent lack of one, has many smaller nations around the world extremely nervous. Countries that have fought to overcome Soviet domination in particularly are worried about what they see as a "realpolitik" policy of that sells out their interest in democracy and sovereignty.

While there are always ongoing realignments in national interest, I feel these countries do have a right be worried about a U.S. Administration that is bumbling along singing "Kumbaya" instead of dealing with the real world.

John Vinocur writes his commentary about a very moving letter to President Obama signed by 22 intellectuals and former national leaders from the region, including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa.

Eastern European Countries Raised Anxieties

July 21, 2009
Central and Eastern European Countries Issue Rare Warning for U.S. on Russian Policy
By JOHN VINOCUR
The New York Times

It?s a remarkable breach of convention when close and very dependent allies of the United States display their anxieties about being sold out to Russia by the country they regard as the guarantor of their sovereignty and independence.

That?s what an open letter to the administration of President Barack Obama from Central and Eastern Europe, signed by 22 intellectuals and former leaders from the region, including Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, boils down to ? a public expression of mistrust.

Released last Thursday, nine days after Mr. Obama?s speech in Moscow on Russian-American relations, the letter ? which has gotten a public endorsement from Poland and, according to an American observer, has the approval of several of the region?s current leaders ? makes plain an existential concern about what it regards the administration?s insufficient engagement in countering a ?revisionist Russia.?

The letter is emblematic of a widening gap: On one side, an American government whose friends fear could trade off their East European interests as a hinge for deals on Iran and nuclear disarmament. And on the other, people from the old Soviet bloc who take as an ominous matter Russia?s attempts to re-establish a zone of influence along its borders.

The letter?s frankness is twice rare: It comes from a region absolutely without objective interest or amusement in needling the United States. And, whatever its signatories have been told by way of reassurance in the last weeks ? like no U.S. sellout will occur ? the document still disseminates the notion that the Obama administration is messing up an important piece of foreign policy.

In stating its view of Russia?s threat to the region, the letter makes clear the accompanying discomfort it feels about ?a realist? America in 2009.

Of course, Mr. Obama?s Moscow speech did say ?states must have the right to borders that are secure and their own foreign policies.? But in much of Eastern and Central Europe, not quite a year after Russia?s invasion of Georgia, the president?s reference to international law doesn?t suffice as reassurance from and to the heart.

Little is certain in this changing relationship of old allies, the letter suggests. Rather, the signatories talk ? in terms of desire, not fait accompli ? of their hopes of finding a ?moral compass? and ?commitment? in U.S. policy.

They add emphatically that no one is more capable than the people of Eastern and Central Europe to recognize the signs of a compliant America or a principled one:

?We know from our own historical experience the difference between when the United States stood up for democratic values and when it did not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to ?realism? at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States used its power to fight for principle? during the Soviet era.

There?s no mention by the signatories of the president?s Moscow speech. But the American observer, familiar with the genesis of the letter, said it hardly could have overjoyed people who describe themselves as seeking ?a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow.?

These Europeans, in particular anti-Communist heroes of the stature of Mr. Havel and Mr. Walesa, can find dreaded signposts for a newly ?realist? America ? in this context, a contemptible word meaning willingness for compromise at democracy?s expense ? when the United States waters down the description of its essential role in winning the Cold War and ending the Soviet domination of their region.

This view holds that if the Americans don?t talk confidently about their victory, their obligation to defend it is diminished.

In Moscow, Mr. Obama seemed mostly to relativize the era.

He spoke of the Cold War almost as a disembodied time when ?American and Soviet armies were still massed in Europe, trained and ready to fight? across ?ideological trenches.?

Then, vaulting over the deaths, the dictatorships, the Berlin Wall and the economic collapse of the Soviet Union, he said, ?in a few short years, the world as it was ceased to be.?

There was no specific reference to the successful outcome of two generations of American policy, or to U.S. responsibility for defending its results.

For those Europeans under Soviet control for almost 50 years ? taking into account the president?s status as a guest in Moscow ? the omission and the speech?s aftertaste of moral equivalence had to be striking.

Especially since Mr. Obama, in his book ?The Audacity of Hope,? praised Ronald Reagan for his ?insistence there was no easy equivalence between East and West. In all this, I had no quarrel with Reagan. And when the Berlin Wall came tumbling down, I had to give the old man his due.?

(There?s more here: Compare the president?s Moscow reference to the ?Cold War reaching a conclusion through the actions of many nations? to Chancellor Angela Merkel?s version of events. Experiencing the Soviet empire?s implosion from the East German side of the wall, she has pointed to Mr. Reagan?s strength and said ?it was exactly this strength that led to the collapse of socialism and to Germany?s reunification.?)

This contrast, to some European eyes, involves a flexible, American ?realist? version of history. Rather than challenging the Russian leadership?s desire that the United States concede some legitimacy to a reasserted Russian zone of influence, it could reinforce it.

This week, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. is in Ukraine and Georgia (not signatories to the letter), and perhaps talking soothingly and supportively to them.

The trip?s double purpose, according an Associated Press account of a briefing by Mr. Biden?s national security adviser, is to build on the United States? relationship with these countries ? ?while,? the A.P. added, ?not annoying Russia.?

 

[PJABBER]

This is the letter that was written to Obama -

An Open Letter To The Obama Administration From Central And Eastern Europe

July 16, 2009
An Open Letter To The Obama Administration From Central And Eastern Europe
The following open letter to the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama appeared in the Polish newspaper "Gazeta Wyborcza" on July 16:

We have written this letter because, as Central and Eastern European (CEE) intellectuals and former policymakers, we care deeply about the future of the transatlantic relationship as well as the future quality of relations between the United States and the countries of our region. We write in our personal capacity as individuals who are friends and allies of the United States as well as committed Europeans.

Our nations are deeply indebted to the United States. Many of us know firsthand how important your support for our freedom and independence was during the dark Cold War years. U.S. engagement and support was essential for the success of our democratic transitions after the Iron Curtain fell twenty years ago. Without Washington's vision and leadership, it is doubtful that we would be in NATO and even the EU today.

We have worked to reciprocate and make this relationship a two-way street. We are Atlanticist voices within NATO and the EU. Our nations have been engaged alongside the United States in the Balkans, Iraq, and today in Afghanistan. While our contribution may at times seem modest compared to your own, it is significant when measured as a percentage of our population and GDP. Having benefited from your support for liberal democracy and liberal values in the past, we have been among your strongest supporters when it comes to promoting democracy and human rights around the world.

Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, however, we see that Central and Eastern European countries are no longer at the heart of American foreign policy. As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that U.S. policy was so successful that many American officials have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could "check the box" and move on to other more pressing strategic issues. Relations have been so close that many on both sides assume that the region's transatlantic orientation, as well as its stability and prosperity, would last forever.

That view is premature. All is not well either in our region or in the transatlantic relationship. Central and Eastern Europe is at a political crossroads and today there is a growing sense of nervousness in the region. The global economic crisis is impacting on our region and, as elsewhere, runs the risk that our societies will look inward and be less engaged with the outside world. At the same time, storm clouds are starting to gather on the foreign policy horizon. Like you, we await the results of the EU Commission's investigation on the origins of the Russo-Georgian war. But the political impact of that war on the region has already been felt. Many countries were deeply disturbed to see the Atlantic alliance stand by as Russia violated the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the territorial integrity of a country that was a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euroatlantic Partnership Council -all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders.

Despite the efforts and significant contribution of the new members, NATO today seems weaker than when we joined. In many of our countries it is perceived as less and less relevant - and we feel it. Although we are full members, people question whether NATO would be willing and able to come to our defense in some future crises. Europe's dependence on Russian energy also creates concern about the cohesion of the Alliance. President Obama's remark at the recent NATO summit on the need to provide credible defense plans for all Alliance members was welcome, but not sufficient to allay fears about the Alliance´s defense readiness. Our ability to continue to sustain public support at home for our contributions to Alliance missions abroad also depends on us being able to show that our own security concerns are being addressed in NATO and close cooperation with the United States

We must also recognize that America's popularity and influence have fallen in many of our countries as well. Public opinions polls, including the German Marshall Fund's own Transatlantic Trends survey, show that our region has not been immune to the wave of criticism and anti-Americanism that has swept Europe in recent years and which led to a collapse in sympathy and support for the United States during the Bush years. Some leaders in the region have paid a political price for their support of the unpopular war in Iraq. In the future they may be more careful in taking political risks to support the United States. We believe that the onset of a new Administration has created a new opening to reverse this trend but it will take time and work on both sides to make up for what we have lost.

In many ways the EU has become the major factor and institution in our lives. To many people it seems more relevant and important today than the link to the United States. To some degree it is a logical outcome of the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU. Our leaders and officials spend much more time in EU meetings than in consultations with Washington, where they often struggle to attract attention or make our voices heard. The region's deeper integration in the EU is of course welcome and should not necessarily lead to a weakening of the transatlantic relationship. The hope was that integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU would actually strengthen the strategic cooperation between Europe and America.

However, there is a danger that instead of being a pro-Atlantic voice in the EU, support for a more global partnership with Washington in the region might wane over time. The region does not have the tradition of assuming a more global role. Some items on the transatlantic agenda, such as climate change, do not resonate in the Central and Eastern European publics to the same extent as they do in Western Europe.

Leadership change is also coming in Central and Eastern Europe. Next to those, there are fewer and fewer leaders who emerged from the revolutions of 1989 who experienced Washington's key role in securing our democratic transition and anchoring our countries in NATO and EU. A new generation of leaders is emerging who do not have these memories and follow a more "realistic" policy. At the same time, the former Communist elites, whose insistence on political and economic power significantly contributed to the crises in many CEE countries, gradually disappear from the political scene. The current political and economic turmoil and the fallout from the global economic crisis provide additional opportunities for the forces of nationalism, extremism, populism, and anti-Semitism across the continent but also in some our countries.

This means that the United States is likely to lose many of its traditional interlocutors in the region. The new elites replacing them may not share the idealism - or have the same relationship to the United States - as the generation who led the democratic transition. They may be more calculating in their support of the United States as well as more parochial in their world view. And in Washington a similar transition is taking place as many of the leaders and personalities we have worked with and relied on are also leaving politics.

And then there is the issue of how to deal with Russia. Our hopes that relations with Russia would improve and that Moscow would finally fully accept our complete sovereignty and independence after joining NATO and the EU have not been fulfilled. Instead, Russia is back as a revisionist power pursuing a 19th-century agenda with 21st-century tactics and methods. At a global level, Russia has become, on most issues, a status-quo power. But at a regional level and vis-a-vis our nations, it increasingly acts as a revisionist one. It challenges our claims to our own historical experiences. It asserts a privileged position in determining our security choices. It uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe.

We welcome the "reset" of the American-Russian relations. As the countries living closest to Russia, obviously nobody has a greater interest in the development of the democracy in Russia and better relations between Moscow and the West than we do. But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. Today the concern is, for example, that the United States and the major European powers might embrace the Medvedev plan for a "Concert of Powers" to replace the continent's existing, value-based security structure. The danger is that Russia's creeping intimidation and influence-peddling in the region could over time lead to a de facto neutralization of the region. There are differing views within the region when it comes to Moscow's new policies. But there is a shared view that the full engagement of the United States is needed.

Many in the region are looking with hope to the Obama Administration to restore the Atlantic relationship as a moral compass for their domestic as well as foreign policies. A strong commitment to common liberal democratic values is essential to our countries. We know from our own historical experience the difference between when the United States stood up for its liberal democratic values and when it did not. Our region suffered when the United States succumbed to "realism" at Yalta. And it benefited when the United States used its power to fight for principle. That was critical during the Cold War and in opening the doors of NATO. Had a "realist" view prevailed in the early 1990s, we would not be in NATO today and the idea of a Europe whole, free, and at peace would be a distant dream.

We understand the heavy demands on your Administration and on U.S. foreign policy. It is not our intent to add to the list of problems you face. Rather, we want to help by being strong Atlanticist allies in a U.S.-European partnership that is a powerful force for good around the world. But we are not certain where our region will be in five or ten years time given the domestic and foreign policy uncertainties we face. We need to take the right steps now to ensure the strong relationship between the United States and Central and Eastern Europe over the past twenty years will endure.

We believe this is a time both the United States and Europe need to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. We also believe this is a time when the United States and Central and Eastern Europe must reconnect around a new and forward-looking agenda. While recognizing what has been achieved in the twenty years since the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is time to set a new agenda for close cooperation for the next twenty years across the Atlantic.

Therefore, we propose the following steps:

First, we are convinced that America needs Europe and that Europe needs the United States as much today as in the past. The United States should reaffirm its vocation as a European power and make clear that it plans to stay fully engaged on the continent even while it faces the pressing challenges in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the wider Middle East, and Asia. For our part we must work at home in our own countries and in Europe more generally to convince our leaders and societies to adopt a more global perspective and be prepared to shoulder more responsibility in partnership with the United States.

Second, we need a renaissance of NATO as the most important security link between the United States and Europe. It is the only credible hard power security guarantee we have. NATO must reconfirm its core function of collective defense even while we adapt to the new threats of the 21st century. A key factor in our ability to participate in NATO's expeditionary missions overseas is the belief that we are secure at home. We must therefore correct some self-inflicted wounds from the past. It was a mistake not to commence with proper Article 5 defense planning for new members after NATO was enlarged. NATO needs to make the Alliance's commitments credible and provide strategic reassurance to all members. This should include contingency planning, prepositioning of forces, equipment, and supplies for reinforcement in our region in case of crisis as originally envisioned in the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

We should also re-think the working of the NATO-Russia Council and return to the practice where NATO member countries enter into dialogue with Moscow with a coordinated position. When it comes to Russia, our experience has been that a more determined and principled policy toward Moscow will not only strengthen the West's security but will ultimately lead Moscow to follow a more cooperative policy as well. Furthermore, the more secure we feel inside NATO, the easier it will also be for our countries to reach out to engage Moscow on issues of common interest. That is the dual track approach we need and which should be reflected in the new NATO strategic concept.

Third, the thorniest issue may well be America's planned missile-defense installations. Here too, there are different views in the region, including among our publics which are divided. Regardless of the military merits of this scheme and what Washington eventually decides to do, the issue has nevertheless also become -- at least in some countries -- a symbol of America's credibility and commitment to the region. How it is handled could have a significant impact on their future transatlantic orientation. The small number of missiles involved cannot be a threat to Russia's strategic capabilities, and the Kremlin knows this. We should decide the future of the program as allies and based on the strategic plusses and minuses of the different technical and political configurations. The Alliance should not allow the issue to be determined by unfounded Russian opposition. Abandoning the program entirely or involving Russia too deeply in it without consulting Poland or the Czech Republic can undermine the credibility of the United States across the whole region.

Fourth, we know that NATO alone is not enough. We also want and need more Europe and a better and more strategic U.S.-EU relationship as well. Increasingly our foreign policies are carried out through the European Union - and we support that. We also want a common European foreign and defense policy that is open to close cooperation with the United States. We are the advocates of such a line in the EU. But we need the United States to rethink its attitude toward the EU and engage it much more seriously as a strategic partner. We need to bring NATO and the EU closer together and make them work in tandem. We need common NATO and EU strategies not only toward Russia but on a range of other new strategic challenges.

Fifth is energy security. The threat to energy supplies can exert an immediate influence on our nations' political sovereignty also as allies contributing to common decisions in NATO. That is why it must also become a transatlantic priority. Although most of the responsibility for energy security lies within the realm of the EU, the United States also has a role to play. Absent American support, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would never have been built. Energy security must become an integral part of U.S.-European strategic cooperation. Central and Eastern European countries should lobby harder (and with more unity) inside Europe for diversification of the energy mix, suppliers, and transit routes, as well as for tough legal scrutiny of Russia's abuse of its monopoly and cartel-like power inside the EU. But American political support on this will play a crucial role. Similarly, the United States can play an important role in solidifying further its support for the Nabucco pipeline, particularly in using its security relationship with the main transit country, Turkey, as well as the North-South interconnector of Central Europe and LNG terminals in our region.

Sixth, we must not neglect the human factor. Our next generations need to get to know each other, too. We have to cherish and protect the multitude of educational, professional, and other networks and friendships that underpin our friendship and alliance. The U.S. visa regime remains an obstacle in this regard. It is absurd that Poland and Romania -- arguably the two biggest and most pro-American states in the CEE region, which are making substantial contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan -- have not yet been brought into the visa waiver program. It is incomprehensible that a critic like the French anti-globalization activist Jose Bove does not require a visa for the United States but former Solidarity activist and Nobel Peace prizewinner Lech Walesa does. This issue will be resolved only if it is made a political priority by the President of the United States.

The steps we made together since 1989 are not minor in history. The common successes are the proper foundation for the transatlantic renaissance we need today. This is why we believe that we should also consider the creation of a Legacy Fellowship for young leaders. Twenty years have passed since the revolutions of 1989. That is a whole generation. We need a new generation to renew the transatlantic partnership. A new program should be launched to identify those young leaders on both sides of the Atlantic who can carry forward the transatlantic project we have spent the last two decades building in Central and Eastern Europe.

In conclusion, the onset of a new Administration in the United States has raised great hopes in our countries for a transatlantic renewal. It is an opportunity we dare not miss. We, the authors of this letter, know firsthand how important the relationship with the United States has been. In the 1990s, a large part of getting Europe right was about getting Central and Eastern Europe right. The engagement of the United States was critical to locking in peace and stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today the goal must be to keep Central and Eastern Europe right as a stable, activist, and Atlanticist part of our broader community.

That is the key to our success in bringing about the renaissance in the Alliance the Obama Administration has committed itself to work for and which we support. That will require both sides recommitting to and investing in this relationship. But if we do it right, the pay off down the road can be very real. By taking the right steps now, we can put it on new and solid footing for the future.

[Signed] by Valdas Adamkus, Martin Butora, Emil Constantinescu, Pavol Demes, Lubos Dobrovsky, Matyas Eorsi, Istvan Gyarmati, Vaclav Havel, Rastislav Kacer, Sandra Kalniete, Karel Schwarzenberg, Michal Kovac, Ivan Krastev, Alexander Kwasniewski, Mart Laar, Kadri Liik, Janos Martonyi. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Adam Rotfeld, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, Alexandr Vondra, Lech Walesa.

 

[bamacre]

Why they ever would depend upon us as an ally is beyond me.

The US always acts in their own interest, screw everyone else if need be.

 

[themusgrat]

It's generally in our interests to make sure nobody else grows too powerful, which is why we're a friend to the little guys. The letter was very well written and they do have good points. Particularly about the EU, it's getting out of control and it's only a matter of time before it becomes a great power in and of itself. Nothing is checking it. But that's something for another day.

 

[PJABBER]

Originally posted by: bamacre
Why they ever would depend upon us as an ally is beyond me.

The US always acts in their own interest, screw everyone else if need be.

Seems that way doesn't it? Hungary in 1956 comes to mind in that part of the world.

I know there are very strong ties between the populations of Eastern Europe and the emigrant populations in the U.S. Many, including my own family, came to the U.S. to escape oppression. But the ties remained.

The Reagan era arms race and foreign policy resulted in the collapse of the Soviet regime and the opportunity for countries in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe to regain democracy. By geography they are economically tied to Western Europe, Scandinavia and still to some extent to Russia. But their love for democracy and independence is inspired to a great extent by the American story.

Unfortunately, it seems the U.S. right now has lost its own way. And though it may not change the course of what will come, these foreign leaders are trying to give the Obama administration a wake up call.

 

[dphantom]

Originally posted by: PJABBER

Originally posted by: bamacre
Why they ever would depend upon us as an ally is beyond me.

The US always acts in their own interest, screw everyone else if need be.

Seems that way doesn't it? Hungary in 1956 comes to mind in that part of the world.

I know there are very strong ties between the populations of Eastern Europe and the emigrant populations in the U.S. Many, including my own family, came to the U.S. to escape oppression. But the ties remained.

The Reagan era arms race and foreign policy resulted in the collapse of the Soviet regime and the opportunity for countries in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe to regain democracy. By geography they are economically tied to Western Europe, Scandinavia and still to some extent to Russia. But their love for democracy and independence is inspired to a great extent by the American story.

Unfortunately, it seems the U.S. right now has lost its own way. And though it may not change the course of what will come, these foreign leaders are trying to give the Obama administration a wake up call.

Czechoslovakia 1968. So tied up in Vietnam, we could not stand up to the USSR when it invaded that country. I am concerned that we are comitted in SW Asia, we may see some of the same problems again and maybe already are aka NK, Iran and Russia.

 

[lupi]

So that's why he selected hillary; when his abysmal foreign policy fails he can just blame her.

 

[K1052]

Originally posted by: PJABBER

Originally posted by: bamacre
Why they ever would depend upon us as an ally is beyond me.

The US always acts in their own interest, screw everyone else if need be.

Seems that way doesn't it? Hungary in 1956 comes to mind in that part of the world.

I know there are very strong ties between the populations of Eastern Europe and the emigrant populations in the U.S. Many, including my own family, came to the U.S. to escape oppression. But the ties remained.

The Reagan era arms race and foreign policy resulted in the collapse of the Soviet regime and the opportunity for countries in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe to regain democracy. By geography they are economically tied to Western Europe, Scandinavia and still to some extent to Russia. But their love for democracy and independence is inspired to a great extent by the American story.

Unfortunately, it seems the U.S. right now has lost its own way. And though it may not change the course of what will come, these foreign leaders are trying to give the Obama administration a wake up call.

Intervening in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution would have run a very serious escalation risk. Europe and the US were correct not to.

 

[StageLeft]

being sold out to Russia by the country they regard as the guarantor of their sovereignty and independence.

Whatever gave them that idea? I think Georgia learned that lesson first hand. The US won't, nor should it, get into an actual shooting match with Russia over any of these nations.

 

[K1052]

Originally posted by: Skoorb

being sold out to Russia by the country they regard as the guarantor of their sovereignty and independence.

Whatever gave them that idea? I think Georgia learned that lesson first hand. The US won't, nor should it, get into an actual shooting match with Russia over any of these nations.

Georgia wasn't a NATO member. Russia going after one militarily would be an extremely bold bet that the alliance will fold rather than call, even the most hard core Soviets were unwilling to do that.

 

[yllus]

Appropriate NATO response to Eastern Europe: What do we get out of helping you, exactly?

 

[PJABBER]

Originally posted by: yllus
Appropriate NATO response to Eastern Europe: What do we get out of helping you, exactly?

These countries are NATO.

 

[alphatarget1]

Nobody in Eastern Europe (except maybe Russians) like Russia. Russia has been screwing them in the rear since the beginning of time.

 

[lupi]

Originally posted by: alphatarget1
Nobody in Eastern Europe (except maybe Russians) like Russia. Russia has been screwing them in the rear since the beginning of time.

Not really. The russians didn't manage to expand into their own significant being until late into the medieval period. Those doing the most screwing were those from western asia that migrated through areas of what is now russia along with the arab excursions from the mideast.

 

[alphatarget1]

Originally posted by: lupi

Originally posted by: alphatarget1
Nobody in Eastern Europe (except maybe Russians) like Russia. Russia has been screwing them in the rear since the beginning of time.

Not really. The russians didn't manage to expand into their own significant being until late into the medieval period. Those doing the most screwing were those from western asia that migrated through areas of what is now russia along with the arab excursions from the mideast.

That was a little exaggerated... Point taken. But most Eastern Europeans do not have fond memories of Russia/USSR.

 

[PJABBER]

But most Eastern Europeans do not have fond memories of Russia/USSR.

The countries in Eastern Europe have served as cross invasion points for expanding empires from all points of the compass (historically have been empires themselves,) have experienced being vassal states and now are again independent and democratic countries firmly aligned with Western values. They absolutely do not want to be subjugated and forced to live under foreign despots, particularly a resurgent Russia which may seek to absorb these countries as buffer states.

The sad part is they feel they are an integral part of Europe and as members of the European Union and NATO expect the co-defense treaties to apply, ie an attack upon one will be treated as an attack upon all. The current U.S. Administration, remember the U.S. is a member of NATO, apparently is not so committed and indirectly saying so in a variety of diplomatic forums, hence the cautionary letter.

 

[theeedude]

Russia is going to be their neighbor. Nothing they can do about that. They can continue to alienate it and trying to refight the Cold War, or they can engage it and slowly bring it into European institutions.
They should also grow some balls and stop relying on a nearly broke country on the other side of the earth as the only guarantor of their security. These are countries that are so used to being pawns on the geopolitical map, it's in their DNA by now. All they do is try to pit one side against the other and see who gives them better goodies, and throw tantrums like these, or Saakashvili's Ossetia adventure, to get some attention.

 

[lupi]

Originally posted by: PJABBER

But most Eastern Europeans do not have fond memories of Russia/USSR.

The countries in Eastern Europe have served as cross invasion points for expanding empires from all points of the compass (historically have been empires themselves,) have experienced being vassal states and now are again independent and democratic countries firmly aligned with Western values. They absolutely do not want to be subjugated and forced to live under foreign despots, particularly a resurgent Russia which may seek to absorb these countries as buffer states.

The sad part is they feel they are an integral part of Europe and as members of the European Union and NATO expect the co-defense treaties to apply, ie an attack upon one will be treated as an attack upon all. The current U.S. Administration, remember the U.S. is a member of NATO, apparently is not so committed and indirectly saying so in a variety of diplomatic forums, hence the cautionary letter.

Going even deeper, and one of the reasons they may be turning to the US, is that in addition to being the point of pillage from many of a force crossing from the east, the Europeans used them as a buffer shield to limit their exposure from those forces. Going so far as to establish buffer kingdoms offering the ruler the ability to govern whatever he could keep then standing back to watch from the sidelines. And while the eastern most borders did finally stabilize, in no small part due to the growth of russia, those further down in the balkans had to deal with this for a considerably longer time period.

 

[PJABBER]

Originally posted by: senseamp
Russia is going to be their neighbor. Nothing they can do about that. They can continue to alienate it and trying to refight the Cold War, or they can engage it and slowly bring it into European institutions.
They should also grow some balls and stop relying on a nearly broke country on the other side of the earth as the only guarantor of their security. These are countries that are so used to being pawns on the geopolitical map, it's in their DNA by now. All they do is try to pit one side against the other and see who gives them better goodies, and throw tantrums like these, or Saakashvili's Ossetia adventure, to get some attention.

Your opinion does not address the mutual cooperation and defense obligations of a wide variety of bi-lateral treaties and NATO as a mutual defense organization.

The Eastern European countries have been highly supportive of U.S. and NATO foreign policy and democratization efforts and have committed, and lost, troops to military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example. This support is from nations that have a fraction of the population and economic strength of the larger, not as supportive states of Germany and France.

The idea that these countries are pawns is laughable. Most have only been subjugated in the past as a result of military invasions and the imposition of totalitarian political and social systems (think fascism and communism.)

The amount of aid they receive, mostly as a result of being a part of the European Union (insignificant aid from the U.S.) is miniscule compared to the organic entrepreneurial growth and development they have experienced as independent democracies determined to be self-sufficient.

If anything, the imposition of European ideas of "greenness" have put them in highly vulnerable positions vis-à-vis the Russians, ie the required shut down of the Lithuanian Ignalina nuclear power plant which provided that Baltic country with 73 percent of its electricity in 2008. Shutting down the plant, which had made Lithuania a net exporter and provided some energy independence for the entire Baltic region, requires they be dependent on Russian sourcing of energy (natural gas, oil and electricity) until 2016 when a 350-kilometres long 700-1,000-megawatts interconnection from Lithuania to Sweden is built along with other interconnects.

 

[theeedude]

Originally posted by: PJABBER

Originally posted by: senseamp
Russia is going to be their neighbor. Nothing they can do about that. They can continue to alienate it and trying to refight the Cold War, or they can engage it and slowly bring it into European institutions.
They should also grow some balls and stop relying on a nearly broke country on the other side of the earth as the only guarantor of their security. These are countries that are so used to being pawns on the geopolitical map, it's in their DNA by now. All they do is try to pit one side against the other and see who gives them better goodies, and throw tantrums like these, or Saakashvili's Ossetia adventure, to get some attention.

Your opinion does not address the mutual cooperation and defense obligations of a wide variety of bi-lateral treaties and NATO as a mutual defense organization.

The Eastern European countries have been highly supportive of U.S. and NATO foreign policy and democratization efforts and have committed, and lost, troops to military action in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example. This support is from nations that have a fraction of the population and economic strength of the larger, not as supportive states of Germany and France.

The idea that these countries are pawns is laughable. Most have only been subjugated in the past as a result of military invasions and the imposition of totalitarian political and social systems (think fascism and communism.)

The amount of aid they receive, mostly as a result of being a part of the European Union (insignificant aid from the U.S.) is miniscule compared to the organic entrepreneurial growth and development they have experienced as independent democracies determined to be self-sufficient.

If anything, the imposition of European ideas of "greenness" have put them in highly vulnerable positions vis-à-vis the Russians, ie the required shut down of the Lithuanian Ignalina nuclear power plant which provided that Baltic country with 73 percent of its electricity in 2008. Shutting down the plant, which had made Lithuania a net exporter and provided some energy independence for the entire Baltic region, requires they be dependent on Russian sourcing of energy (natural gas, oil and electricity) until 2016 when a 350-kilometres long 700-1,000-megawatts interconnection from Lithuania to Sweden is built along with other interconnects.

It was a Chernobyl style reactor that the Soviets built for them. These countries are pawns. They have been subjugated long before fascism and communism were on the radar. Read up on history. Plus these Baltic countries are borderline apartheid states when it comes to treating ethnic minorities. I guess they saw what happened to Georgia when it tried to do some ethnic cleansing in Ossetia and Abkhazia, and now they are scared it will happen to them.

 

[PJABBER]

It was a Chernobyl style reactor that the Soviets built for them. These countries are pawns. They have been subjugated long before fascism and communism were on the radar. Read up on history. Plus these Baltic countries are borderline apartheid states when it comes to treating ethnic minorities. I guess they saw what happened to Georgia when it tried to do some ethnic cleansing in Ossetia and Abkhazia, and now they are scared it will happen to them.

Right about the type of reactor, the EU wants it shut down because it does not have a containment building surrounding it to manage any possible radioactive release. It is slated for closure at the end of this year.

Generally wrong, however, about the subjugation part, though the history is convoluted depending on the specific country under discussion.

Lots of European type problem history all around Eastern Europe, particularly the genocidal pogroms against the Jewish populations.

Totally wrong about the Baltics as apartheid countries. The geography is northern Europe, not South Africa. No blacks, just particularly cute blondes.

There is a small lingering population of Tartar descendants, about 10,000-15,000 Lipka Tatars in the former areas of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The majority of descendants of Tatar families in Poland can trace their descent from the nobles of the early Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Charles Bronson (Karolis Bucinskis) is probably the best known Lithuanian-American guy from this demographic.

Lipka Tatars

The most important minority, if you can consider it as such, is the non-Balt ethnic Russian population both forcibly and voluntarily relocated to the Baltics to Russify them.

According to official statistics, in 1920, ethnic Russians (most of them residing there from the times of the Russian Empire) made up 7.82% of the population in independent Latvia, growing to 10.5% in 1935. The share of ethnic Russians in the population of independent Estonia was about 4%, of which about half were indigenous Russians living in the areas in and around Pechory and Izborsk which were added to Estonian territory according to the 1920 Estonian-Soviet Peace Treaty of Tartu, but were transferred to the Russian SFSR by the Soviet authorities in 1945 . The share of ethnic Russians in independent Lithuania was even smaller, about 2%.

Immediately after the WWII, Stalin carried out a major colonization and de facto Russification campaign in what were now the three Baltic Soviet republics. Many of the Russians, along with a smaller number from other ethnic groups, who migrated from other parts of the USSR to the Baltic republics, arrived to rebuild their heavily war-damaged economies. Mostly they were factory and construction workers who settled in major urban areas, as well as military personnel stationed in the region in significant numbers due to the border location of the Baltic republics within the Soviet Union. Many military retirees chose to stay in the region, which featured higher living standards compared to most of the USSR.

Currently, in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, Russians make up 14.43% of the population, in Lithuania's third largest city Klaipeda 21.65%. Other Lithuanian cities, including the second-largest city Kaunas, have lower percentages of Russians, while in most small towns and villages there are very few Russians (with the exception of Visaginas town). In all, 6.3% of Lithuania's population are ethnic Russians.

Russians make up almost a half of the population of Riga, the capital of Latvia. In the second largest city Daugavpils, which already had a sizable Russian minority before the war, Russians now make up the majority. Today, about 29% of Latvia's population are ethnic Russians.

13 of Estonia's 15 counties are over 80 percent ethnic Estonian. In Estonia, most Russians live in Tallinn (36.86% of city's population) and the eastern cities of Narva (86.41% of its inhabitants) and Kohtla-Järve (69.68%). Overall, Russians make up 22.6% of Estonia's population.

As you can see, the Russians are a substantial and often problematic minority in 2 of the 3 Baltic republics, mainly because they have not been able to learn the local languages and thus become full citizens.

They are not subject to torture, internment or any of the other characteristics of apartheid South Africa and are instead urged to adapt to their new homelands and become full citizens.

 

[theeedude]

They are "problematic minority" because the Baltic states are not particularly interested in giving them citizenship rights, even if they were born in the country, because they would rather have them as second class minority. It's apartheid like policy. Just because they aren't subject to torture, does not make it non-apartheid. I don't think the word apartheid referred to torture. Torture was a means of enforcing the policy. Also, these are not their "new homelands" as you claim, these people lived there for decades or were born there. And the only think the ruling ethnic majorities are urging them to do is to leave by making them second class residents.

 

[K1052]

A lot of those Baltic states weren't too excited that the the Russians decided to appropriate their countries and force ethnic Russians into their populations and ultimately civic/social structures to render them more compliant to Moscow. There are still a lot of very hard feelings about that, even to the point where many of those indigenous people considered the Nazis to be the lesser of the two evils.

Any state on Russia's border that doesn't cower before them diplomatically and economically is considered a threat. To quote a former US ambassador to Russia: "Russia can have at its borders only enemies or vassals".

 

[PJABBER]

It's apartheid like policy. Just because they aren't subject to torture, does not make it non-apartheid. I don't think the word apartheid referred to torture. Torture was a means of enforcing the policy. Also, these are not their "new homelands" as you claim, these people lived there for decades or were born there. And the only think the ruling ethnic majorities are urging them to do is to leave by making them second class residents.

senseamp, I really don't understand why you continue to use the word apartheid in your comments. I think any South Africans that were actually subjected to state sponsored apartheid would be particularly offended by your trivialization of the word.

Apartheid ? meaning separateness in Afrikaans (which is cognate to the English apart and -hood) ? was a system of legal racial segregation enforced by the National Party government in South Africa between 1948 and 1994.

Racial segregation in South Africa began in colonial times, but apartheid as an official policy was introduced following the general election of 1948. New legislation classified inhabitants into racial groups (black, white, coloured, and Indian), and residential areas were segregated by means of forced removals. From 1958, Blacks were deprived of their citizenship, legally becoming citizens of one of ten tribally based self-governing homelands or bantustans, four of which became nominally independent states. The government segregated education, medical care, and other public services, and provided black people with services inferior to those of whites.

There is no segregation of any sort in the Baltics, no separate homelands, no officially separate treatment of any minority, racial or otherwise. You do have individual prejudice, of course, but it is not nearly to the level that blacks experienced in South Africa, or even the U.S. or Europe.

As to your concern about citizenship for the Russian minorities, I believe this was more of an issue before the Baltics were accessed into the EU in 2004. At that point EU regulation applied and there is now a generally standardized mechanism for someone to become a citizen.

I would be very, very cautious in accepting Russian and surrogate claims about any "second class" citizenship issues the Russian speaking minorities in these countries may be claiming or even experiencing. The Baltic states have been very aware that claims of issues, real or false, may be used to justify a Russian invasion to "protect" Russian minorities. Such a casus belli is likely going to be used if the Russians should choose to again occupy these countries.

Wiki is your friend...

Citizenship

After regaining independence, Latvia and Estonia passed citizenship laws on the basis of the legal continuity of their statehood throughout Soviet occupation, automatically recognising citizenship according to the principle of jus sanguinis for the persons who held citizenship before 16 June 1940 and their descendants. Persons who arrived after the occupation of 1940 and their descendants may obtain citizenship through naturalisation. This policy affects not only ethnic Russians, but also the descendants of those ethnic Estonians and Latvians who emigrated from these countries before independence was proclaimed in 1918. Dual citizenship is also not allowed, except for those countries (such as the USA) traditionally holding large numbers of emigres.

Knowledge of the respective national language and history was set as a condition for obtaining citizenship. However, the purported difficulty of the initial language tests became a point of international contention, as the government of Russia, the Council of Europe, and several human rights organizations claiming that they made it impossible for many older Russians who grew up in the Baltic region to gain citizenship. As a result, the tests were altered, but a large percentage of Russians in Latvia and Estonia still have non-citizen or alien status. Those who have not applied for citizenship feel they are regarded with suspicion, under the perception that they are deliberately avoiding naturalisation. For many, an important reason not to apply for citizenship is the fact that, as non-citizens, they are free to work or visit relatives in Russia. As Latvian citizens, they will be required to apply for visas.

The language issue is still contentious, particularly in Latvia, where there were protests against plans to require at least 60% of lessons in state-funded Russian-language high schools to be taught in Latvian (in the first version of the Law on education this was 100 %).

In contrast, Lithuania granted citizenship to all its residents at the time of independence redeclaration day willing to have it, without requiring them to learn Lithuanian. Probably the main reason that Lithuania took a less restrictive approach than Latvia and Estonia is that whereas in Latvia ethnic Latvians comprised only a small majority of the total population, and in Estonia ethnic Estonians comprised about 70 percent, in Lithuania ethnic Lithuanians were about 80 percent of the population. Therefore, as a matter of voting in national elections or referendums, the opinions of ethnic Lithuanians would likely carry the day if there were a difference in opinion between Lithuanians and the larger minority groups (Russians and Poles), but this was less certain in the other two Baltic countries, especially in Latvia.

Some representatives of the ethnic Russian communities in Latvia and Estonia have claimed discrimination by the authorities, these calls frequently being supported by Russia. On the other hand, Latvia and Estonia deny discrimination charges and often accuse Russia of using the issue for political purposes. In recent years, as the Russian political leaders have begun to speak about the "former Soviet space" as their sphere of influence such claims are a source of annoyance, if not alarm, in the Baltic countries.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have since 2004 become members of NATO and the European Union provides a counterbalance to Russia's claims to speak for the interests of ethnic Russian residents of these countries. Furthermore, to satisfy a precondition for their admission to the EU, both Estonia and Latvia slightly adjusted their citizenship policies in response to EU monitoring and requests. Claims of discrimination in basic rights by Russians and other minorities in the region may have less effect now than they did during the years when the Baltic countries' membership applications were still pending with the EU.

My personal experience is that xenophobia is a much, much stronger element of the individual consciousness in Russia than in the Baltics. In fact, you only have to look at the documented experience of African blacks and the other minority racial groups that went to Patrice Lumumba University (now Peoples? Friendship University of Russia) in Moscow. The stated purpose of establishing this particular university was to give young people from Asia, Africa and Latin America, especially from poor families, an opportunity to be educated and to become highly qualified specialists.

The Western intelligence community found that the University was a front for a KGB training facility, where future leaders of the so-called ?National Liberation Movements? are being educated, but I wonder what thee future leaders really thought of Russia after Black and Asian students have increasingly been subject to violent racist and anti-foreigner attacks, including a number of murders.

For example, on the night of 24 November 2003, a mysterious fire in a university student dormitory left over 40 foreign students dead. Russian media later cited a police source as saying all the doors leading to the fire escapes had been blocked. The fire services blame an electrical fault, however students blamed arsonists; the previous night, they said, two skinheads had been chased from the area following an attempted arson attack. There has been no police investigation. The home countries of the dead and injured are: China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Angola, Ivory Coast, Tahiti, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Peru, Malaysia, Mongolia, India, Nigeria, Tanzania and Sri Lanka. In addition, Palestinians were also listed.

I think anyone who has spoken to those invited to go has some pretty interesting stories of how they were treated there by the Russian citizenry.

 

[theeedude]

Originally posted by: K1052
A lot of those Baltic states weren't too excited that the the Russians decided to appropriate their countries and force ethnic Russians into their populations and ultimately civic/social structures to render them more compliant to Moscow. There are still a lot of very hard feelings about that, even to the point where many of those indigenous people considered the Nazis to be the lesser of the two evils.

Any state on Russia's border that doesn't cower before them diplomatically and economically is considered a threat. To quote a former US ambassador to Russia: "Russia can have at its borders only enemies or vassals".

Russia does not want enemies on its door steps. Wars in Russia have historically turned out to be wars of attrition, and it's better to fight them on someone else's turf, from Russian point of view.
Not all that different from the Monroe doctrine.