The First Amendment does not say that no government official may take any
action respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. It says that ?Congress shall make no law? doing that. Chief Justice Moore
is not Congress. Nonetheless, he apparently recognizes that the religion clauses of
the First Amendment apply to all laws, not just those enacted by Congress. See
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511 (1947) (holding that the
Establishment Clause applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Even with that concession, his position is still plenty
bold. He argues that because of its ?no law? language, the First Amendment
proscrib es only law s, which should be defined as ?a rule of civil co nduct . . .
commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.? Brief of Appellant at
19 (quoting 1 W illiam Blackstone, Commentaries *44). Any governmental action
promoting religion in general or a particular religion is free from constitutional
scrutiny, he insists, so long as it does not command or prohibit conduct. The
monument does neither, but instead is what he calls ?a decorative reminder of the
moral foundation of American law.? Brief of Appellant at 19.
The breadth of the Chief Justice?s position is illustrated by his counsel?s
concession at oral argument that if we adopted his position, the C hief Justice would
be free to adorn th e walls of the Alabama Supreme Court?s courtroom with
sectarian religious murals and have decidedly religious quotations painted above
the bench. Every government building could be topped with a cross, or a menorah,
or a statue of Buddha, depending upon the views of the officials with authority
over the premises. A crèche could occupy the place of honor in the lobby or
rotunda of every municipal, county, state, and federal building. Proselytizing
religious messages could be played over the public address system in every
government building at the whim of the official in charge of the premises.
However appealing those prospects may be to some, the position Chief
Justice Moore takes is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612, 109 S. Ct. at 3110, which held unconstitutional the
placement of a crèche in the lobby of a courthouse, stands foursquare against the
notion that the Establishment Clause permits government to promote religion so
long as it does not command or prohibit conduct. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 3110 (?To be
sure, some Christians may wish to see the government proclaim its allegiance to
Christianity in a religious celebration of Christmas, but the Constitution does not
permit the gratification of that desire, which would contradict ?the logic of secular
liberty? it is the purpose of the Establishment Clause to protect.?) (citation
omitted). To the same effect is the decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587,
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992), where the Supreme Court explained that, ?[ a ] school
official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction should be
given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a constitutional
perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must occur.? A nd in
Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), prob. juris. noted and aff?d in
part, 466 U .S. 924, 104 S. Ct. 1704, cert. denied sub. nom. Bd. of Sch. Comm?rs of
Mobile County v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 926, 104 S. Ct. 1707, and aff?d in part, 472
U.S. 38, 105 S . Ct. 2479 (1985), this Court concluded that ?[ I ]f a statute
authorizing the teachers? activities would be unconstitutional, then the activities, in
the absence of a statute, are also unconstitutional.? Id. at 1533-35.