Originally posted by: jonks
Originally posted by: Zenmervolt
Originally posted by: jonks
Originally posted by: Zenmervolt
In any case, WA is a "stand your ground" state. You have no duty to retreat and are legally allowed to confront a criminal who is attempting to steal your property. If the criminal flees, you cannot pursue them, but if they in turn threaten you, you are justified in defending yourself.
ZV
Again, OP asked about shooting someone breaking into your car. I'm not arguing if the crook then tries to attack you that you can't fight back. Just that if you yell "hey stop" and he keeps trying to break into the car, you can't open fire.
Here's a good link from the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle:
Washington Law for Law Student Teachers
Supplement to Street Law: A Course in Practical Law, 5th Edition, 1994. Revised January 2002.
http://www.law.washington.edu/...aw/supplement/Ch23.pdf
c. In Washington, a person owning property may use force as is reasonably
necessary to protect it, although deadly force is not justified.
The answer to a question in a textbook is not a valid citation of applicable law. Especially one that is 6 years out of date.
And you still refuse to address my point in regard to section 2 of RCW 9A.16.050.
ZV
Your application of (2) above completely obviates the need for (1). You said:
In any case, readings of section 1 are irrelevant, as section 2 explicitly grants permission to use deadly force to resist an attempt to commit a felony in the presence of the slayer.
Don't you think if you read (2) so broadly that there would be no reason for (1)? As the case below makes clear, this is about defense of persons, not property.
The Supreme Court of Washington's take on the justifiable homicide statute, both sections, including the articulation of the difference between them and an exlpanation of exactly why (2) does not encompass (1).
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...5_sc/729191MAJ&invol=4
Title of Case: State of Washington V Nathan Dallas Brightman
File Date: 10/06/2005
RCW 9A.16.050, Washington's justifiable homicide statute, reads:
Homicide is also justifiable when committed either:
(1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, . . . when there is
reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to
commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer . . . and
there is imminent danger of that design being accomplished; or
(2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony
upon the slayer . . . .
Actual Defense of an Attempted Felony: Brightman's arguments in this court
focus on RCW 9A.16.050(2) (justifiable homicide based on actual defense
against felony) and RCW 9A.16.020 (defining the lawful use of force).
Brightman claims that although his killing of Villa cannot be justified
under RCW 9A.16.050(1) because he did not fear Villa, it can be justified
under RCW 9A.16.050(2).
Brightman correctly notes that RCW 9A.16.050(1)
contemplates justifiable homicide where the defendant reasonably fears the
person slain is about to commit a felony upon the slayer or inflict death
or great personal injury, and there is imminent danger that the felony or
injury will be accomplished. See 9A.16.050(1).
In contrast, RCW 9A.16.050(2) considers a homicide justifiable where the defendant acted in
actual resistance against an attempt to commit a felony on the slayer. See
RCW 9A.16.050(2). Thus, RCW 9A.16.050(2) addresses situations in which a
felony or attempted felony is already in progress.9
Brightman argues that whenever the defendant can present evidence that a
robbery was being attempted or was already in progress when the defendant
acted in self-defense, then the defendant need not show that he or she
feared death or great bodily injury to justify deadly force. However,
Brightman concedes that even under RCW 9A.16.050(2), the court must
evaluate whether the force used by the slayer was reasonably necessary.
Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 19 ('{T}his Court should interpret RCW 9A.16.050(2)
to apply to a slayer who kills another person when the slayer is actually
resisting the other person's attempt to commit a felony against the slayer,
and the force the slayer intends to use is not more than necessary.'
(emphasis added)).
Justifiable homicide, and indeed all self-defense, is unmistakably rooted
in the principle of necessity. Deadly force is only necessary where its
use is objectively reasonable, considering the facts and circumstances as
they were understood by the defendant at the time. See RCW 9A.16.010;
Read, 147 Wn.2d at 242; Walker, 136 Wn.2d at 772. For example, in State v.
Nyland, this court held that adultery did not justify taking a human life:
'The class of crimes in prevention of which a man may, if necessary,
exercise his natural right to repel force by force to the taking of the
life of the aggressor, are felonies which are committed by violence and
surprise; such as murder, robbery, burglary, arson, . . . sodomy, and
rape.'
47 Wn.2d 240, 242, 287 P.2d 345 (1955) (quoting State v. Moore, 31 Conn.
479 (1863) (first emphasis added)).
In all of these felonies, human life
could be presumed to be in peril. Id. at 243.
But the Nyland court also
noted that 'a killing in self-defense is not justified unless the attack on
the defendant's person threatens life or great bodily harm.' Id. (emphasis
added).
[JONKS: You can't even use deadly force in defense of yourself! unless you reasonable perceive death or great bodily injury. If that's the case, how can you argue protecting your car authorizes deadly force?]
10 Thus, the Nyland court contemplated an individualized
determination of necessity, even where an attack on the defendant's person
occurred. See also State v. Griffith, 91 Wn.2d 572, 576-77, 589 P.2d 799
(1979) ('A self-defense instruction, or a justifiable homicide instruction,
is appropriate only where the slayer has used such force as is reasonably
necessary under the circumstances.' (emphasis added)).
In State v. Brenner, Division One of the Court of Appeals read Nyland
and Griffith to establish that even where a homicide is committed in
defense of a felony or attempted felony, 'the attack on the defendant's
person {must threaten} life or great bodily harm.' 53 Wn. App. 367, 377,
768 P.2d 509 (1989), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wentz, 149
Wn.2d 342, 68 P.3d 282 (2003). In State v. Castro, the defendant argued
that where a violent felony was being committed, deadly force is justified,
whether or not any other person would have acted similarly. 30 Wn. App.
586, 588-89, 636 P.2d 1099 (1981).
But Division One disagreed, concluding
that the very basis of the law of self-defense rests on the concept that
'in resisting an attempt to commit a felony the person so resisting is not
required to determine with absolute certainty what force is necessary for
that purpose, but it does exact of him that he shall not use any more force
than shall seem to him to be reasonably necessary for that purpose.'
Id. at 589-90 (quoting State v. Harper, 149 Mo. 514, 51 S.W. 89, 93
(1899)).
We agree that RCW 9A.16.050(2) incorporates the concept that each
act of deadly force must be reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Brightman argues that reading RCW 9A.16.050(2) in this way renders .050(2)
superfluous because it adds nothing to .050(1).11 But fundamentally,
Brightman himself concedes both that RCW 9A.16.050(2) should be informed by
RCW 9A.16.020, the general self-defense statute, and that each case
requires an evaluation of whether deadly force was necessary. Suppl. Br.
of Pet'r at 19. The statutory definition of necessity, of course, requires
an evaluation of reasonableness. RCW 9A.16.010(1).
The Nyland, Griffith, Brenner, and Castro cases support a conclusion that a
justifiable homicide instruction based on either .050(1) or .050(2) depends
upon a showing that the use of deadly force was necessary under the
circumstances. All of these courts implied that an individualized
determination of necessity is required, contradicting the notion that
deadly force is per se reasonable whenever a robbery or other violent
felony is attempted. Thus, a trial court may conclude, as a matter of law,
that the use of deadly force was unreasonable where the defendant was
attempting to recover a small amount of money from someone whom the
defendant did not fear. See State v. Madry, 12 Wn. App. 178, 181, 529 P.2d
463 (1974) ('A small sum of money is not worth the injury to human life or
even the threatening of such injury which results from the use of deadly
force.'). Because Brightman freely admitted that he did not fear Villa, we
hold that the trial court was entitled to refuse to give a justifiable
homicide instruction in this case.
************************************************
Nail in the coffin, another excerpt from the above case:
"Furthermore, even if we considered the incident a robbery, not all
robberies justify the use of deadly force. Division One has interpreted
the
justifiable homicide defense to apply 'only if the felony which was
sought to be prevented threaten{ed} life or great bodily harm.' State v.
Brenner, 53 Wn. App. 367, 376, 768 P.2d 509 (1989)."
/thread
Excellent conversation all-around though, I always appreciate it when someone can actually prove me wrong with logic instead of emotion. :beer: :thumbsup:
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