In the intelligence world, there is a lot of noise and a little signal. The trick is separating the signal from the noise because we don't have the resources to act on all the noise and we do not want to be alarmist all day, every day. It's easy after the fact to criticize the government for not recognizing what later turns out to be a true signal. Yet do we know how often various admins receive warnings of similar magnitude and urgency but do not act upon them because they do not deem them credible, and it turns out they really were just noise?
The real question is here, were these warnings, and the evidence which backed them up, sufficiently convincing that we should deem the Bush admin. negligent based on what they knew at the time, as opposed to what we know now? I think we're going to need to see the full spate of now classified documents before we can make that judgment. Some day the history books will write a verdict on this, once all the information is public and sufficient time has passed such that we can have critical distance and less partisanship and emotion to cloud our collective judgment. I prefer to wait until then.
On a side note, I don't think the Times should have published this story on 9/11. It's their right to do so, but I would have opted to publish it on a different day. In my view, 9/11 is for honoring the dead.