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Bitlocker, Truecrypt, not secure anymore ?

I got to say these folks are brilliant.
I never would have thought of this.



http://citp.princeton.edu/memory/
Contrary to popular assumption, DRAMs used in most modern computers retain their contents for seconds to minutes after power is lost, even at operating temperatures and even if removed from a motherboard. Although DRAMs become less reliable when they are not refreshed, they are not immediately erased, and their contents persist sufficiently for malicious (or forensic) acquisition of usable full-system memory images. We show that this phenomenon limits the ability of an operating system to protect cryptographic key material from an attacker with physical access. We use cold reboots to mount attacks on popular disk encryption systems ? BitLocker, FileVault, dm-crypt, and TrueCrypt ? using no special devices or materials. We experimentally characterize the extent and predictability of memory remanence and report that remanence times can be increased dramatically with simple techniques. We offer new algorithms for finding cryptographic keys in memory images and for correcting errors caused by bit decay. Though we discuss several strategies for partially mitigating these risks, we know of no simple remedy that would eliminate them.
 
If your machine is vulnerable to that type of attack then the bad guy already has "your pants around your ankles" so to speak and/or physical access to the machine.
 
If your machine is vulnerable to that type of attack then the bad guy already has "your pants around your ankles" so to speak and/or physical access to the machine.

Not at all. Previously when the assumption was that memory was cleared a few seconds after poweroff you were safe as long as you encrypted your documents, now it's possible for someone to force a poweroff of your machine and steal the key used to encrypt your documents.
 
now it's possible for someone to force a poweroff of your machine and steal the key used to encrypt your documents.

That's what I mean by someone having your pants around your ankles already.
 
Well I figured you were saying "It's alwayns been that way." instead of just repeating what the article says.
 
LOL...no. And, I'll make no pretenses at being a security expert nor am I smart enough to do anything like this myself. My point is, think about how compromised your machine is by the time they can actually execute this attack. Makes you want to beef up your firewall and intrusion detection/prevention don't it?
 
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