Your assignment, to go in there in mid-2004 and set up a new training operation, comes out of what? What's the impetus for that?
... There were a number of different programs that were under way to help stand up the Iraqi police, to help establish the Ministry of Interior that would oversee those police and a variety of other organizations, border forces and so forth. It was the same on the military side, to start standing up the national Iraqi army. ...
The idea was to combine the effort overall -- particularly for the Iraqi army and the police -- to get our arms around all of that and to make this a very comprehensive approach to help the Iraqis to, first of all, organize, literally to design what force structure would be required, given this new situation they were facing; then, to help them train it, help them equip it, advise it ... and to help them rebuild the infrastructure that was necessary to support all of that. That's a massive task, [and] what we needed was an organization that could oversee both the military and the police. You actually got a certain synergy out of that because some of the equipment was the same. Certainly the construction efforts were similar, and so forth.
Is it fair to say that you were brought in to fix a situation that was broken?
Well, we were certainly brought in to bring it all together. I mean, there were elements of it that had not done well. There were elements that were broken. There were also elements that had done well. So what we needed to do, again, was to do a comprehensive look. ...
We were brought in to take all of these efforts, the efforts that the divisions were overseeing, the efforts that CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] was overseeing, the efforts to stand up police and military and so forth, [and to] have one overarching headquarters that would be responsible to the new Multi-National Force-Iraq [MNFI] headquarters. ...
There was a lot going on, and we built on that. ... It was a matter of getting common standards across the board, a common approach. In many cases we added new rigor to some of the training, or different standards to it, or higher level of equipping. We brought a considerable amount of additional people to bear on this, because again, you're talking about an enormous effort. This is not a traditional security assistance effort. This is helping a sovereign nation of 27 to 30 million people re-establish not just battalions, brigades and divisions, but all the institutions that support that -- all of the training institutions, military academies, staff colleges, centers for leadership and ethics, centers for lessons learned, not to mention the parts system, the maintenance system, the infrastructure, the tools, the training. It's a massive endeavor.
Had we failed by not coming in with a comprehensive approach a year earlier?
Some of this [sectarian human rights abuses] may have been a result of acceleration of the formation of these [police] units É obviously, it made vetting more difficult.
Well, clearly at this point in time, there was a need for a comprehensive approach. I'll leave it to the historians to say what, perhaps, other organizations could have brought in at various times. ...
Between the police and the army, what did you recognize as your bigger challenge?
Well, the police have always been the bigger challenge in any such endeavor. I've studied the history and so forth of other counterinsurgency efforts, and police are always very challenging because they are local. They are individuals; they're not units. When you're battling barbaric insurgents and terrorists as were in Iraq in 2004, 2005 and still now, you really need forces that can be tough, that have unity. They are units; they're not just individuals. In a situation where individuals and their families who live in that community can be intimidated, it's very difficult to develop those forces and to get them stood up. That's why there was a need for a more robust army structure, to augment and try to provide the security space in which that training, recruiting, equipping and operating could go forward, and also the need for what have now become the National Police as well. ...
You're talking about the commandos that were formed --
The police commandos and the public order battalions and the police mechanized units, now all called National Police.
These are special forces, special police?
They are police units. That's the key. They're not just individual cops; they're not just individual departments. They are actual paramilitary units, like Carabinieri [Italian military police]/gendarmerie [armed French police]. We actually, interestingly, don't have something like that in the United States, although we have some special units, and we have SWAT teams and others. But these are actually police units that exist to support internal security in the area.
We had discussed it with Minister [Falah al-]Naqib. He was very, very enthusiastic about it. He wanted very much to accelerate the process of their development, and did accelerate their development. Remember, he was a Sunni Arab who felt very much the weight of responsibility to respond to what was, by and large, a Sunni Arab insurgency.