If you had read the actual case law you would not have tried to make the arguments you did, because they are central parts of the majority opinion. You are either lying about reading the case or you are unable to read for comprehension.
C'mon, be you illiterate or dishonest?
And yes, you busted me. I'm working to tear down the US one institution at a time and I've decided to start with fighting against the eternal imprisonment of people without charges, something the US Constitution emphatically supports.
Strawman. I knew you couldn't do it.
Furthermore, Eisentrager is not the governing precedent in this case as ruled by the USSC in Boumediene. Eisentrager deals with those captured and held outside of US sovereignty, and the court determined that the US exerts de facto sovereignty over Guantanamo.
Ex parte Quirin was also taken into account in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision where it is specifically mentioned that such a decision has been superseded by the US ratification of the Geneva Conventions along with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Regardless of all that, Boumediene v Bush is the most recent USSC precedent on the issue, and they say you're wrong. Once again I'm sorry to rain on your parade.
Not a strawman, there is a significant representation of non-US interests here by both US citizens and non-Americans.
And at least you admit that you seek the destruction of the United States, you can be treated as a lawful combatant now. ;-)
My argument is not that there is no more recent case law, but that the primary questions were resolved earlier and have now been challenged as much for political purposes (such as your own avowed intent to subvert the nation's well-being and others in their attempt at political power) as for further definition of the application of habeas corpus.
The Syllabus of BOUMEDIENE et al. v. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al. (
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-1195.ZS.html) shows that the case was, in part being based on the plaintiffs denying membership in the al Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks and the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda.
Unaffiliated, single actors now have an easier case, but the USSC ruling may not apply in other cases where there is a determination of membership in terrorist organizations and an admission of enmity.
"(iv) Based on Eisentrager, supra, at 777, and the Courts reasoning in its other extraterritoriality opinions, at least three factors are relevant in determining the Suspension Clauses reach: (1) the detainees citizenship and status and the adequacy of the process through which that status was determined; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoners entitlement to the writ. Application of this framework reveals, first, that petitioners status is in dispute: They are not American citizens, but deny they are enemy combatants; and although they have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings, there has been no Eisentragerstyle trial by military commission for violations of the laws of war. Second, while the sites of petitioners apprehension and detention weigh against finding they have Suspension Clause rights, there are critical differences between Eisentragers German prison, circa 1950, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in 2008, given the Governments absolute and indefinite control over the naval station. Third, although the Court is sensitive to the financial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these factors are not dispositive because the Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction."
Eisentrager particularly applies when you have a timely review and not an extended period of detention.
From the USSC opinion -
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1195.pdf
"The real risks, the real threats, of terrorist attacks are constant and not likely soon to abate. The ways to disrupt our life and laws are so many and unforeseen that the Court should not attempt even some general catalogue of crises that might occur. Certain principles are apparent, however. Practical considerations and exigent circumstances inform the definition and reach of the laws writs, including habeas corpus. The cases and our tradition reflect this precept.
In cases involving foreign citizens detained abroad by the Executive, it likely would be both an impractical and unprecedented extension of judicial power to assume that habeas corpus would be available at the moment the prisoner is taken into custody. If and when habeas corpus jurisdiction applies, as it does in these cases, then proper deference can be accorded to reasonable procedures for screening and initial detention under lawful and proper conditions of confinement and treatment for a reasonable period of time. Domestic exigencies, furthermore, might also impose such onerous burdens on the Government that here, too, the Judicial Branch would be required to devise sensible rules for staying habeas corpus proceedings until the Government can comply with its requirements in a responsible way. Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall., at 127 (If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course). Here, as is true with detainees apprehended abroad, a relevant consideration in determining the courts role is whether there are suitable alternative processes in place to protect against the arbitrary exercise of governmental power."
"Our decision today holds only that the petitioners before us are entitled to seek the writ; that the DTA review procedures are an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus; and that the petitioners in these cases need not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of Appeals before proceeding with their habeas actions in the District Court. The only law we identify as unconstitutional is MCA §7,28 U. S. C. A. §2241(e) (Supp. 2007). Accordingly, both the DTA and the CSRT process remain intact. Our holding with regard to exhaustion should not be read to imply that a habeas court should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ runs. The Executive is entitled to a reasonable period of time to determine a detainees status before a court entertains that detainees habeas corpus petition. The CSRT process is the mechanism Congress and the President set up to deal with these issues. Except in cases of undue delay, federal courts should refrain from entertaining an enemy combatants habeas corpus petition at least until after the Department, acting via the CSRT, has had a chance to review his status."
From the Wiki article,
"Justice Scalia's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas. Justice Scalia argued that "the procedures prescribed by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act provide the essential protections that habeas corpus guarantees; there has thus been no suspension of the writ, and no basis exists for judicial intervention beyond what the Act allows." The commission of terrorist acts by former prisoners at Guantanamo Bay after their release "illustrates the incredible difficulty of assessing who is and who is not an enemy combatant in a foreign theater of operations where the environment does not lend itself to rigorous evidence collection." A consequence of the Court's majority decision will be that "how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch [the judiciary] that knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails." A conflict between the Military Commissions Act and the Suspension Clause "arises only if the Suspension Clause preserves the privilege of the writ for aliens held by the United States military as enemy combatants at the base in Guantanamo Bay, located within the sovereign territory of Cuba."
The finding, decided 5-4, seeks to implement speedy review and disposition but the trick question is in whether charged persons are lawful or unlawful combatants, and the difference is how each is treated and under which rules.
Choosing to use the civilian New York Southern District Court is a political act. New Yorkers are not pleased. And you shouldn't be either.