ForThePeople
Member
In this highly divided and partisan political environment I thought that I would address the issue of American foreign policy. It is our foreign policy which receives the most attention - and which draws the most ire from the global community - but rarely have people stopped and analyzed it.
With this in mind I'd like to present just such an analysis for your consumption.
American Foreign Policy as Arbitrary Decisions
Perhaps the biggest criticism of American foreign policy is that it is, to a meaningful extent, arbitrary. This is the claim which underlies the idea that we should not have attacked Sadam unless we were also willing to attack other dictators (because we arbitrarily chose Sadam from a field of possible dictators to attack).
I would submit that this system - relating to individual countries on a case by case basis, rather than a principled approach to foreign policy - is a necessity of contemporary geopolitics.
Let us explore the issue vis a vis Weapons of Mass Destruction and the dictators who have them. The American approach has been one of a 2x2 matrix consisting of both intent and action, which can either be good or bad. Thus a country can have:
a good intent, good action (such countries promise not to threaten us and do not seek to find a way to threaten us). Examples: Western Europe
a good intent, bad action (those countries which profess to not seek WMD while deceptively doing so). Examples: Israel, Pakistan
a bad intent, good action (those countries which profess to seek WMD while not actively doing so). These countries are those which threaten us without any means with which to threaten, a "bark worse than bite" kind of scenario. This is the situation which ultimately greeted us in Iraq.
a bad intent, bad action (those countries which have WMD and threaten us with their use). Examples: North Korea, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
Here, then, we find that the last two (bad intent) are quite different: one is inherently dangerous while the other only attempts to appear so by bluffing.
Also in the first two we can see that the good intent, bad action can in fact become elevated ("enlightened") to good, good if they declare their weapons programs. The reason why a country might choose this option is clearly spelled out by the Israeli choice to adopt this strategy: it maintains plausible deniability (thus avoiding inspection regimens) while at the same time has the same benefits as if it had chosen to threaten - the opponent believes that the other side has a "nuclear option" of last resort.
How, then, do we describe the American policy relating to WMD possession by countries? Why is it that we allow Israel to pass while rebuking North Korea? What does it mean that we escalate against Iraq while only threatening North Korea?
Part of the critique that American foreign policy is arbitrary results from these types of situations.
Competing Interests
When it comes to issues for which America is widely looked to as an examplar we find even more confusion. Consider, for example, the issue of human rights.
We take two very different approaches to human rights in the cases of China and Afghanistan. We firmly derided the Taliban for their widespread abuse of human rights while barely confronting the Chinese with their offenses. Why, then, can we so harshly rebuke one country while giving the other a slap on the wrist?
The key to this is that our foreign relation is not comprised of a single bellweather issue. In the case of China we have to balance our belief in human rights against the potential economic consequences of jeopardizing our relationship. In China, unlike in Afghanistan, significant commercial interests dictate that we not be heavy handed in criticisms of Chinese policies towards human rights.
Thus the issue of human rights - unlike the issue of WMD - is resolved on the basis of principle. America has decided that economic benefits take precedance over human rights.
We can then infer that those countries which the US has rebuked for human rights violations represent those countries who do not have significant economic ties to the US. This can also explain our failure to criticize other countries who display egregious human rights violations - we do not speak out because we fear the economic loss. This explains our relationship with Saudi Arabia, the country responsible for radical fundamentalist Islam and horrid treatment of women.
Principlism vs. Cherry Picking
In the first example - WMD - we made our foreign policy decisions on the basis of actions from the other country. In the next case we only examined principles which America considers important without regard to the country in question. Americans believe that women should be treated well everywhere, regardless of the country, but yet Saudi Arabia has not been rebuked.
This two situations - the country-specific and the country-independent - have to be calculated for each issue for each nation. This, inevitably, leads to a foreign policy that differs among the various countries.
This is, in fact, the same reasoning that parents and teachers use when deciding how to reward or punish children.
It is not that the American foreign policy is arbitrary, it is rather that the world is complicated and a unique balance of issues and relations must be struck for each country.
The Role of the Status Quo
Lastly our analysis of foreign policy must address the issue of the status quo, or the world as it is. It is not the case that a President or Legislator receives the world anew, to create as he would wish, but rather that they inherit a world already populated with issues and nationalisms and a myriad other conditions.
Those in charge must then make the decision whether it is better to disrupt the status quo and attempt to correct a problem, or rather to leave things as they are. The role of this can not be overstated - unlike what many people believe the ability of any nation to modify a problem is not as powerful as they would wish, and sometimes the status quo, however bad it "feels", represents a draw that is not worth disturbing.
Take, for example, the whole history of the Iraq problem. It was George HW Bush (Senior, 41) who waged the first Gulf War. This ended with Iraq being split into several distinct "no fly zones" patrolled by American forces. Clinton then inherited a problem and made the choice that the status quo was better than the problems which would result from enforcing UN mandates or removing Sadam from power. It can be argued that leaving Sadam in power - despite the horrible acts which he committed - was, in fact, better than the problems created by removing him. The status quo was better than the alternative.
This line of thinking is very powerful. It rules, for example, our decisions not to invade Mexico to clean up Mexican corruption; not to reform the electoral college, not to nationalize healthcare, etc.
The conclusion, then, is that the world is far from perfect and our policies must face this reality - sometimes the best that we can hope for is nothing.
Conclusion
This is my short, cursory analysis of American foreign policy. Discuss.
With this in mind I'd like to present just such an analysis for your consumption.
American Foreign Policy as Arbitrary Decisions
Perhaps the biggest criticism of American foreign policy is that it is, to a meaningful extent, arbitrary. This is the claim which underlies the idea that we should not have attacked Sadam unless we were also willing to attack other dictators (because we arbitrarily chose Sadam from a field of possible dictators to attack).
I would submit that this system - relating to individual countries on a case by case basis, rather than a principled approach to foreign policy - is a necessity of contemporary geopolitics.
Let us explore the issue vis a vis Weapons of Mass Destruction and the dictators who have them. The American approach has been one of a 2x2 matrix consisting of both intent and action, which can either be good or bad. Thus a country can have:
a good intent, good action (such countries promise not to threaten us and do not seek to find a way to threaten us). Examples: Western Europe
a good intent, bad action (those countries which profess to not seek WMD while deceptively doing so). Examples: Israel, Pakistan
a bad intent, good action (those countries which profess to seek WMD while not actively doing so). These countries are those which threaten us without any means with which to threaten, a "bark worse than bite" kind of scenario. This is the situation which ultimately greeted us in Iraq.
a bad intent, bad action (those countries which have WMD and threaten us with their use). Examples: North Korea, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War
Here, then, we find that the last two (bad intent) are quite different: one is inherently dangerous while the other only attempts to appear so by bluffing.
Also in the first two we can see that the good intent, bad action can in fact become elevated ("enlightened") to good, good if they declare their weapons programs. The reason why a country might choose this option is clearly spelled out by the Israeli choice to adopt this strategy: it maintains plausible deniability (thus avoiding inspection regimens) while at the same time has the same benefits as if it had chosen to threaten - the opponent believes that the other side has a "nuclear option" of last resort.
How, then, do we describe the American policy relating to WMD possession by countries? Why is it that we allow Israel to pass while rebuking North Korea? What does it mean that we escalate against Iraq while only threatening North Korea?
Part of the critique that American foreign policy is arbitrary results from these types of situations.
Competing Interests
When it comes to issues for which America is widely looked to as an examplar we find even more confusion. Consider, for example, the issue of human rights.
We take two very different approaches to human rights in the cases of China and Afghanistan. We firmly derided the Taliban for their widespread abuse of human rights while barely confronting the Chinese with their offenses. Why, then, can we so harshly rebuke one country while giving the other a slap on the wrist?
The key to this is that our foreign relation is not comprised of a single bellweather issue. In the case of China we have to balance our belief in human rights against the potential economic consequences of jeopardizing our relationship. In China, unlike in Afghanistan, significant commercial interests dictate that we not be heavy handed in criticisms of Chinese policies towards human rights.
Thus the issue of human rights - unlike the issue of WMD - is resolved on the basis of principle. America has decided that economic benefits take precedance over human rights.
We can then infer that those countries which the US has rebuked for human rights violations represent those countries who do not have significant economic ties to the US. This can also explain our failure to criticize other countries who display egregious human rights violations - we do not speak out because we fear the economic loss. This explains our relationship with Saudi Arabia, the country responsible for radical fundamentalist Islam and horrid treatment of women.
Principlism vs. Cherry Picking
In the first example - WMD - we made our foreign policy decisions on the basis of actions from the other country. In the next case we only examined principles which America considers important without regard to the country in question. Americans believe that women should be treated well everywhere, regardless of the country, but yet Saudi Arabia has not been rebuked.
This two situations - the country-specific and the country-independent - have to be calculated for each issue for each nation. This, inevitably, leads to a foreign policy that differs among the various countries.
This is, in fact, the same reasoning that parents and teachers use when deciding how to reward or punish children.
It is not that the American foreign policy is arbitrary, it is rather that the world is complicated and a unique balance of issues and relations must be struck for each country.
The Role of the Status Quo
Lastly our analysis of foreign policy must address the issue of the status quo, or the world as it is. It is not the case that a President or Legislator receives the world anew, to create as he would wish, but rather that they inherit a world already populated with issues and nationalisms and a myriad other conditions.
Those in charge must then make the decision whether it is better to disrupt the status quo and attempt to correct a problem, or rather to leave things as they are. The role of this can not be overstated - unlike what many people believe the ability of any nation to modify a problem is not as powerful as they would wish, and sometimes the status quo, however bad it "feels", represents a draw that is not worth disturbing.
Take, for example, the whole history of the Iraq problem. It was George HW Bush (Senior, 41) who waged the first Gulf War. This ended with Iraq being split into several distinct "no fly zones" patrolled by American forces. Clinton then inherited a problem and made the choice that the status quo was better than the problems which would result from enforcing UN mandates or removing Sadam from power. It can be argued that leaving Sadam in power - despite the horrible acts which he committed - was, in fact, better than the problems created by removing him. The status quo was better than the alternative.
This line of thinking is very powerful. It rules, for example, our decisions not to invade Mexico to clean up Mexican corruption; not to reform the electoral college, not to nationalize healthcare, etc.
The conclusion, then, is that the world is far from perfect and our policies must face this reality - sometimes the best that we can hope for is nothing.
Conclusion
This is my short, cursory analysis of American foreign policy. Discuss.
