Like the Twin Towers, the nuke plants were designed to withstand the biggest plane of it time. (727?)
Like Japan in WWII, did the hijackers make a tactical mistake by going after symbolic targets instead of strategic ones?
How would today be different with 4 less nuke plants in existance?
FYI....
- a nuclear power plant's containment structure, which encloses the nuclear reactor, is only a few dozen meters in diameter, very much smaller (and therefore difficult to aim at) than the WTC's towers, which represent a volume larger than a NPP's containment structure by a factor of 100 (at least).
- a nuclear power plant's containment structure consists in a more or less 1 meter thick wall of very thick and heavy reinforced concrete : much more resistant than the windows and not-so-thick metallic structures of the WTC.
- if the airplane hits other buildings on the site around it, other than the containment structure, the reactor will automatically stop due to the many independant and automatic security systems (even, in most cases, if the control room was destroyed).
- if the airplane hits the side of the circular concrete containement structure (at an angle significantly less than 90°), it will probably just bounce off the side and hardly damage the external structure at all, because the containment structure in most power plants is very heavy, thick and strong and has a more or less circular form (reinforced concrete).
- if the airplane hits the top of the containment structure, it will probably not directly damage the vital structures of the core of the reactor which are, in most installations, located much lower, in the bottom part, or at middle height in the reactor building, and the reactor will stop automatically (the automatic protection against earth-quakes will be activated by the impact).
- if the airplane hits the containment structure in it's middle-height or lower part, which isn't easy because there are many other (non-nuclear) buildings around a nuclear power plant, it will the need to get through not only the very thick external containment, but also several successive reinforced concrete walls (about 20 to 40 centimeters thick each), on most nuclear power plants, before reaching the heart of the reactor itself. The probability that pieces of a large airplane make their way through all these successive walls isn't so certain.
- terrorist attacks or plane accidents are in fact taken in consideration when designing nuclear power plants, but only to resist the crash of small airplanes. A large airplane at full speed as in the case of the WTC, may produce some damage to the containment structure and, perhaps, to the reactor itself.
- although it has only a small probability, the worse accident cannot be excluded. In this case, the greatest risk (there are many if's, but it may happen, even if the probablitiy is quite small) for water reactors (the most widespread type of nuclear reactor today) is the important amount of radioactive iodine contained inside the reactor which could perhaps be released in the reactor building, and to the environment if the containment structure was damaged.
- please note the many if's : if the plane doesn't miss the NPP (relatively small, compared to WTC), if it hits the concrete containment exactly on the middle, not on the sides, if it strikes the containment structure not too high and not too low, if it gets through the containment structure, if it damages both the (small in volume) core of the reactor or a vital part of the primary circuit), if it also damages several or all the multiple redundant safety systems, then a bad accident MAY perhaps happen.
- the general concepts used since many decades as the basis of nuclear safety for designing nuclear power plants : multiple and redundant safety systems, and a very thick and strong containment structure, in case everything else fails, are in fact the best strategy that one could develop to prevent and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack such as those against the WTC.
- even in case the worse happens (although this isn't the highest probability), the main danger for the civilian populations around the site would be the release of radioactive iodine, a fission product, in the atmosphere. If the reactor just started recently, then there is only little amounts only of iodine (a product of the nuclear fission) inside the reactor.
- a counter-poison exists to prevent the effects of radioactive iodine in the human body, and it is very efficient in case of a major release of iodine in the atmosphere : it consists in absorbing non-radioactive iodine pills. This protective measure saturates the thyroid gland and is efficient in only 10 to 15 minutes after taking the pill.
http://www.ecolo.org/documents/documents_in_english/terrorist_attack_on_nuclea.htm
I think it would have been easier for them just to run the plane into a large office building killing people directly. Rather than trying to damage a reactor and pray that enough radiation released from the reactor is enough to kill people, given the fact that none of the mitigation systems take in effect (as mentioned above). I think at worse you will kill a couple of control room operators. Or damage some buildings.
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