TLC comes back with---I was referring to the following comment, taken in context with other similar comments you've made regarding this situation:
But on the plus side Maliki now picks up many Sunni and Kurdish supporters who now short term want him to remain football team coach. But thats somewhat a losing strategy in an Iraq that is 40% Sunni and Kurd and more like 55% Shia.
But in a previous post I had said--The semi immediate question is who will be the coach of the Iraqi government team? Maliki was and was somewhat put into the job by various Shia factions including the faction of Al Sadr.
So a clear in in context picture is that I never said all the Shia were united under Al Sadr nor does my former statement say so.
But you do somewhat pose an interesting question TLC. And that question is how united are ALL the Iraqi insurgencies. We can talk about the three main groups, the Sunnis, the Shias, and the Kurds and ask how united or divided are they as single blocks. But somewhat what started all this, at least in my mind, is that two Shia factions were squabbling among themselves over who got the lions share of the oil that could be looted in Basra. And in once sense, Maliki won, and both Shia factions lost equally because each had to leave the field. Leaving the question hanging on if Maliki can long term keep what he won hanging, what we saw was both the Kurds and Sunnis somewhat jumping for joy because Maliki was smiting those not of their factions.
And if we assume the importance of this operation is the fact the Iraqi government is finally getting around to breaking the power of the insurgencies, its thus a possible sign that the Iraqi civilian government can assert control. And lets even assume that Maliki can now beat all the various divided Shia insurgencies, the next step is, you guessed it,
is to take on the Sunni and the Kurdish insurgencies. And after all the insurgencies are beaten to a pulp, the Iraqi democracy can flower, the US can sail home mission accomplished, and everyone will live happily ever after is the best case scenario.
The weed in that garden of Eden may be the coming realization by all the insurgencies that Maliki is the rascal who has now become a threat to the collective them. It was the current insurgents that had no power under Saddam, the anarchy resulting from the occupation allowed many to seize power, and they may be reluctant to give that power up.
So I have to somewhat conclude that the Sunni and Kurds that are cheering Maliki now, may wake up, smell the coffee, and start to see the long term threat this poses to their power. In which case, the natural inclination by all may be to force the fall of Maliki.
I bring that as another possibility and not a certainty. TLC, as you say, it may not be all that cut and dried.