How about some information from Paul O'Neill (this is a review of the first couple of chapters of Suskind's book):
Cheney persuaded O'Neill to take the position as Treasury Secretary. They'd known each other since the Nixon days (as an aside, Rumsfeld was long-time colleague of Cheney, too.) Cheney also was aware that O'Neill was close friends with Alan Greenspan and thought O'Neill would be a good ally in communicating the Administration's economic policy to Greenspan. O'Neill and Greenspan go back to the Ford administration and, in the mid-80s, Greenspan championed O'Neill becoming a director at Alcoa and, later, the CEO of Alcoa where O'Neill worked wonders. Over the next 15 years, O'Neill and Greenspan would meet every few months.
O'Neill and Greenspan were both of the mindset that the yearly fiscal surpluses would lead to a $5 trillion surplus after 10 years. This would lead to the ability to reduce the national deficit and allow a reform of Social Security (which would easily take half of that surplus.) Bush's proposed tax cuts would take much of the other half, leaving not much room for deficit reduction and also making fiscal responsibility a very important aspect of the budget process. Spending more could lead to larger deficits should the economy sour and lessen or take away the forecasted surplus.
Larry Lindsey was slated to head the National Economic Council. The NEC was created by Clinton to act as an honest broker between the Treasury Dept. and the President's Council of Economic Advisors. However, Lindsey was showing he was more partisan; in favor of Bush's aggressive tax cuts and no triggers or conditions placed on those cuts based upon there being a surplus and the size of it. Bush wanted tax cuts, placing Social Security reform on the backburner.
O'Neill and Greenspan, both moderate and pragmatic, were leery of a return to fiscal irresponsibility and spending any surplus and ignoring the deficit. O'Neill worried about Lindsey's partisan views and made a note:
Get an agreement for [Lindsey] to be the honest broker not the unilateral advisor to the [President] or get him out of the broker role.
In early February, Lindsey wrote a scathing memo criticizing the Office of Tax Analysis for not having a model of forecasts based upon Bush's planned tax cuts. It stated they should have had one prepared as far back as during the campaign in 2000 since Bush stood firmly by his tax cut promise. The OTA had only been working officially for the new President for two days and some members of the team were not even on board yet.
This was the breach O'Neill had feared: The "honest broker" was an advocate. Hard-eyed analysis would be painted as disloyalty to the Bush administration.
O'Neill responded:
Larry: This is bureaucratic chickensh*t.
You must have something better to do with your time
than send me memos such as this one.
On January 30, 2001, Bush's first Principal's meeting was held. The topic: Mideast Policy. O'Neill, as Treasury Secretary, was a member of the Principals.
The meeting started off discussing the Arab-Israeli conflict:
"I'm not going by past reputations when it comes to Sharon," Bush said. "I'm going to take him at face value. We'll work on a relationship based on how things go."
Bush had met Sharon only briefly, once before, in Dec. 1998. "Just saw him that one time. We flew over the Palestinian camps," Bush said sourly. "Looked real bad down there. I don't see much we can do over there at this point. I think it's time to pull out of that situation."
And that was it, according to O'Neill and several other people in the room. The Arab-Israeli conflict was a mess, and the United States would disengage.
Powell said such a move might be hasty. Powell stressed that a pull back by the U.S. would unleash Sharon and the Israeli army. "The consequences of that could be dire," Powell said, "especially for the Palestinians."
Bush shrugged. "Maybe that's the best way to get things back in balance."
Powell seemed startled.
"Sometimes a show of strength by one side can really clarify things," Bush said.
Then the topic turned to Iraq. Tenet showed photos of an alleged bio/chem weapons factory. When asked by O'Neill what evidence there was, Tenet mentioned some circumstantial evidence but admitted there was "no confirming intelligence."
O'Neill later inquired about the U.S.'s ability to blast Saddam's anti-aircraft batteries. Tenet said that intelligence was so poor that targeting military installations or weapons factories would "be going in there blind."
The meeting adjourned with Powell tasked to draw up a new sanctions regime, Rumsfeld to "examine our military options", Tenet to improve current intelligence, and O'Neill to financially squeeze Saddam.
10 days into the new administration and 30 years' effort (from Kissinger to Clinton's last-gasp effort before leaving office) to bring peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict was gone. In its place, Iraq, a grainy picture, perhaps misleading. And no mention of bin Laden, Al Qaeda, or terrorism in general.
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