Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Realistically, in Vietnam, we would have waged a stronger war against Hanoi, hitting real targets instead of hiding from them so that the Chinese didn't enter the war (realistically they already had).
In Iraq we should have not disbanded the army (like the generals said), gone in with 3x the troops (like the generals said), gone after the Fadayeen (as the generals said) instead of going to Baghdad right away (Stalingrad anybody?), shut down the border with Iran (we have a problem with borders), and aggressively gone after militants while enticing the Iraqi army with actual paychecks and not IOUs.
I need to go to bed...
In Vietnam, the key was not necessarily Hanoi as much as Haiphong. The majority of their arms and munitions were entering there, and shutting down that conduit would have significantly hurt the NVA. Remember that we were in the Cold War, however; if we had started unrestricted bombing, the danger was that it would turn hot if we killed some Russians. The Russians could have influenced the North Koreans to cause us even more trouble, for instance. There was a delicate balancing act going on, which is easy to second guess with hindsight, but was probably a little more complicated several years after the Cuban Missile Crisis and with North Korea seizing an intelligence ship and its crew as well as downing a US surveillance aircraft.
In Iraq, not all the generals were in agreement, and some criticize the generals that you laud for being too timid and not voicing their opinions until after they left the service. One reason for a diminished level of troops, especially in the north, was the refusal of Turkey to allow the 4ID to travel overland from the Med -- completely out of our hands. Yes, some mistakes were made -- no plan survives first contact with the enemy. D-Day appears brilliant today, but had Rommel concentrated and committed his armored units early, the invasion could possibly have been defeated. Intelligence is far from perfect and always will be.
The decision to make for Baghdad still makes sense in hindsight, since the same considerations caused the "surge" into the capital right now. Baghdad is the cultural, political, and social nerve center of the country. It is the critical node for the population, the historical seat of the government, and the literal and figurative center of the country -- you control Baghdad, you control Iraq (yes, it's more complicated, but this is an internet forum -- shut up).
Stalingrad is not the appropriate historical comparison from WWII -- it's Moscow. Had the Germans reached and held Moscow, the Ostfront would likely have been MUCH different, as the Russians would have been largely unable to shift forces behind their lines without access to the numerous roads that met in Moscow (and, conversely, the Germans would have been able to better concentrate their forces to continue the offensive).
Also keep in mind that Iraq was looking fairly good at the beginning of 2006. When Al Qaida (FOREIGN ENTITY, remember!) bombed the Samarra mosque, everything went to hell, and all that progress was lost. Without foreign involvement in the conflict: sectarian violence would not be NEARLY as bad; advanced weapons and tactics wouldn't be as proliferated; insurgent groups would be more fractured and less coordinated; and the central government would likely be much more effective (among other things).
As for your comment about the Iraqi Army, there are issues, but they are a dedicated group for the most part. It has been slow building, but there are very effective Iraqi units out there standing shoulder to shoulder with US forces. The biggest hurdle is that when certain units or individuals are being effective, they are effectively targeted by insiders infiltrated by insurgents. YET, volunteers still flock to Iraqi security services to enlist. I admire those that do, much more so than the anti-war zealots in this country who don't believe anything is worth fighting for.