Khe Sanh had been garrisoned by Americans since 1962. General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, felt maintaining a presence at Khe Sanh was critically important. It served as a patrol base for interdiction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as the western terminus for the defensive line along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and as a barrier to Communist efforts to carry the fighting into the populated coastal regions of South Vietnam. By early 1968, 6,000 Marines at Khe Sanh were surrounded by 20,000 North Vietnamese troops. The siege began on January 21, 1968. In a report dated February 18, the New York Times explained the importance of Khe Sanh, noting that this area in northwest South Vietnam provided a base for allied operations against the infiltration by the Communists of men and supplies into the south. After the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded the Marine position at Khe Sanh, allied forces were unable to inhibit this infiltration; it became too dangerous for the Marines to leave their base in sufficient numbers to greatly affect the movement of enemy forces. Although that situation may have reduced the strategic value of Khe Sanh in any conventional sense of the word, American military commanders believed the United States would suffer a heavy psychological blow if they retreated from Khe Sanh.
Unlike the Americans, the North Vietnamese were unable to hold fixed positions due to the efficacy of allied firepower. As a result, the Communists concentrated on harassing and disrupting allied forces. The American military command concluded that the only way to stop the disruption was to destroy enemy forces in sufficient numbers. The American commanders hoped that at Khe Sanh they would be able to kill enemy troops in a ratio of 10 to 1, 20 to 1, or even 30 to 1. The Americans clung to their belief in the value of a positive kill ratio in face of compelling evidence showing they were mostly unable to achieve it.
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