INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION
Under the United States Constitution and Article First, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution, a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner detain an individual for investigative purposes if the officer believes, based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual is engaged in criminal activity, even if there is no probable cause to make an arrest (State v. Lipscomb, 258 Conn. 68, 75, (2001); Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968)).
The police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. A court reviewing the legality of such a detention must look to the whole situation when determining whether detention is justified and consider if the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity (State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620 (2006)).
The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions (Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, (1993)).
The Terry court recognized one such exception when it held that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot the officer may briefly stop the suspicious person and make reasonable inquiries aimed at confirming or dispelling his suspicions.
But a police officer is not entitled to detain or search every person whom he sees on the street or of whom he makes inquiries. Before he does so, he must have constitutionally adequate, reasonable grounds for doing so. For example, in the case of the self-protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the individual was armed and dangerous (Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968)
Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard. It focuses not on the police officer's actual state-of-mind, but on whether a reasonable person, having the information available to and known by the police, would have had that level of suspicion (State v. Lipscomb, 258 Conn. 68, 75 (2001)).
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, such as articulable reasons and founded suspicion. But such terms fall short of providing clear guidance for the factual situations that arise. But the essence is that the totality of the circumstances must be taken into account. Based upon that whole picture, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped (State v. Nash, United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
When engaging in a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, courts ask whether a person of reasonable caution knowing the facts available to the officer at the moment of the detention would believe that the action taken was appropriate (United States v. Newton, 369 F3d 659, 673-674 (2d Cir. cert denied 543 U.S. 947 (2004)). In the Newton case the court held that the seizure was not a de facto arrest under the Fourth Amendment when it lasted only a few minutes, occurred at a residence rather than the police station, and resulted from a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous. To satisfy the reasonableness standard, officers conducting stops on less than probable cause must employ the least intrusive means reasonably available to carry out their legitimate investigative purposes. But the law recognizes the important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation (State v. Nash, 278 Conn. 620 (2006)).
Where an officer has a reasonable basis to think that the person stopped poses a present physical threat to the officer or others, the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to take necessary measures to neutralize the threat without converting a reasonable stop into a de facto arrest. This doctrine has supported a range of restraints incident to a stop, from the pat-down at issue in Terry, to the drawing of firearms, to the use of handcuffs (State v. Nash).
Similarly, requiring a suspect to accompany a police officer to another place does not necessarily transform what would otherwise be a permissible investigatory detention into an arrest (State v. Nash). In State v. Mitchell (204 Conn. 187, 199, cert denied 484 U.S. 927 (1987)), the court held that transporting the defendants to the hospital for viewing by the victim did not exceed the permissible scope of an investigative detention (204 Conn. 187, 199, cert denied 484 U.S. 927 (1987)). (Also see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, (1983) in which the Court stated that there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory detention.)
The Connecticut Supreme Court determined that handcuffing and removing the defendant to a secure location one-half block away from the gathering crowd does not, as a matter of law, exceed the permissible scope of an investigative stop and protective pat down. But the court agreed with the defendant's position that the police may not bring him to the police station as part of an investigative detention. The court concluded that it would not be within the narrow scope of a permissible investigative stop to handcuff and transport a detainee to a police station solely for the purpose of interrogation (State v. Nash; State v. Edwards, 214 Conn. 57, 70-71(1999)).
The Nash court also held that a full pat-down search of the defendant for weapons in the lobby of the police substation, to which the defendant had been transported following an investigatory stop, did not violate his rights under the Fourth Amendment.