In October, 2002, Islamic radicals set off two powerful bombs on the Indonesian island of Bali. Detonated in the heart of the tourist district, they obliterated several bars and nightclubs, killing over 200 people. It was the worst terrorist attack in the country's history. Shocked and taken aback by the carnage, the international media proclaimed the end of innocence for the tropical retreat.
Today, less than five years after the attack on Bali, the situation in Southeast Asia has changed dramatically. Across the region, jihadist groups are struggling to survive, Islamist parties seem to be weakening and the region's newest leaders openly wage war on terror. Indeed, Southeast Asia is proving to be a model for the "long war" against Islamist terror.
Co-operation has proceeded on several fronts. Regional governments have formalized their commitment to counterterrorism -- and to working with the U.S. on the problem -- by creating a joint counterterrorism centre located in Malaysia.
No less important, Southeast Asian nations have begun to mount an open challenge to Islamist schools and political parties. In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has proved to be a strong voice for secularism, thus weakening the appeal of Muslim radicals. In order to emphasize the seriousness of the threat, his government has televised the videos of local suicide bombers and has recruited top Muslim clerics to issue public messages against the Islamists. Jakarta has even employed former terrorists to preach that violence has no place in Islam.
Direct military assistance also has been crucial. Here the U.S. wisely has chosen to play a be-hind-the-scenes role, dispatching advisers, communications technology, and weaponry. In the Philippine military's operation against Abu Sayyaf this past winter, U.S. advisors also helped the Philippine navy keep Abu Sayyaf blockaded on the island of Jolo. When it came time to announce the victory, however, the U.S. maintained a low profile, allowing Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take the credit. In the eyes of the Philippine public, then, the campaign against Abu Sayyaf has remained a local operation.
In Indonesia, Washington helped to create a new 300-man elite counterterrorism force called Detachment 88, spending over US$20-million on its training and equipment. It proved a good investment. Detachment 88 played a major role in dismantling JI's leadership and helped lead the investigations of the Bali and Marriott bombings.
Beyond helping to track and kill terrorists, Washington has promoted economic development in the region and has tried to assist in settling local conflicts that very often have taken on an Islamic cast. In the southern Philippines, the U.S. has built new classrooms, medical clinics, roads, wells and other social-welfare projects, spending over US$250-million in aid since 2001.
There are important lessons to draw from all this: What the United States and its allies have done in the region might well be replicated elsewhere.
For one thing, in Southeast Asia the U.S. moved quickly to help local forces stand on their own; from the start, the struggle against Islamism was a genuinely collaborative effort. Southeast Asian politicians thus have been able to avoid charges of becoming American stooges.
As for direct assistance in fighting the terrorists, the lesson of Southeast Asia is to rely less on military establishments -- which, as in Iraq, have proved to be unreliable and corrupt -- than on specially trained forces such as Detachment 88, cordoned off from ordinary soldiers.
Equally important, Southeast Asia's elite units and police forces have won their victories through dogged investigative work, not by resorting to brutal interrogation techniques. With few reported incidents of abuse or torture, counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia continue to have a high standing in public opinion. By contrast, the more coercive tactics of, for example, the Mubarak government in Egypt have tarnished the war on terror and made it easier for Islamists to stir up rage against the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies.
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