Considering they practically pick their own boards, yes. It's funny how libertarians and conservatives believe in meritocracy... except when it comes to CEO's.
I believe in free enterprise and free markets. If a company wants to contract with a person for services, I believe the parties ought to be able to strike whatever price they find mutually acceptable. If certain companies are frittering money away by making imprudent personnel decisions then there creates the opportunity for well-managed companies to become more efficient and, in turn, more profitable. Overpaying any personnel (whether it be high-level executives or mere employees) is an inefficiency that, at a fundamental level, is no different from a company using an outdated manufacturing process.
Going to your original post, captured boards and CEO-domination are legitimate corporate governance problems as it attenuates the ability of the board to reduce agency costs and might even encourage risk-taking. An equally important problem in the realm of risk-taking, however, is the influence of shareholders (especially institutional holders) (see, e.g.,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1397685). Whereas the agency problems engendered by the diverging interests of shareholders and management, respectively, are, by now, orthodoxy, the problem I highlight is only now emerging as field of study.
CEO pay has NOTHING to do with market forces. They are set by an network of interlocking board of directors who look out for the CEO's first and everyone else (including shareholders) get crumbs. The relationship between a CEO and the Board is anything BUT an arms length relationship.
The existing exchange rules, along with Sarbox, ensures that the compensation and audit committees be comprised entirely of independent directors. Moreover, NYSE exchange rules require a majority of the full board be independent. I don't know how much more regulation you can have while still remaining practical (i.e., monitoring executives to make sure they aren't fraternizing with BoDs). Of course, there are other proposed forms of regulation but such proposals would significantly intrude on the contract relationship between CEOs and the corporation and the corporations law as always viewed this as a private relationship.
Finally, if American shareholders were more quiescent -- in effect, more European -- I might find more merit in your argument for more drastic intervention/regulation. America, however, has a quite activist shareholding tradition and proxy contests are not uncommon. To be sure, there are imperfections with the existing state of affairs vis-a-vis proxy access and the like. My reluctance to whole-heartedly embrace reform, however, stems not only from my belief that corporations are private entities but, more importantly, from a belief that regulation has its own set of costs and, moreover, often carries with it undesirable unintended consequences (i.e., Sarbox).