The problem, however, was that Black September had served its purpose. The
PLO and its chairman had the recognition and acceptance they craved. Indeed,
any continuation of these terrorist activities, ironically, now threatened
to undermine all that had been achieved. In short, Black September was,
suddenly, not a deniable asset but a potential liability. Thus, according to
my host, Arafat ordered Abu Iyad "to turn Black September off." My host, who
was one of Abu Iyad's most trusted deputies, was charged with devising a
solution. For months both men thought of various ways to solve the Black
September problem, discussing and debating what they could possibly do,
short of killing all these young men, to stop them from committing further
acts of terror.
Finally they hit upon an idea. Why not simply marry them off? In other
words, why not find a way to give these men -- the most dedicated,
competent, and implacable fighters in the entire PLO -- a reason to live
rather than to die? Having failed to come up with any viable alternatives,
the two men put their plan in motion.
They traveled to Palestinian refugee camps, to PLO offices and associated
organizations, and to the capitals of all Middle Eastern countries with
large Palestinian communities. Systematically identifying the most
attractive young Palestinian women they could find, they put before these
women what they hoped would be an irresistible proposition: Your fatherland
needs you. Will you accept a critical mission of the utmost importance to
the Palestinian people? Will you come to Beirut, for a reason to be
disclosed upon your arrival, but one decreed by no higher authority than
Chairman Arafat himself? How could a true patriot refuse?
So approximately a hundred of these beautiful young women were brought to
Beirut. There, in a sort of PLO version of a college mixer, boy met girl,
boy fell in love with girl, boy would, it was hoped, marry girl. There was
an additional incentive, designed to facilitate not just amorous connections
but long-lasting relationships. The hundred or so Black Septemberists were
told that if they married these women, they would be paid $3,000; given an
apartment in Beirut with a gas stove, a refrigerator, and a television; and
employed by the PLO in some nonviolent capacity. Any of these couples that
had a baby within a year would be rewarded with an additional $5,000.
Both Abu Iyad and the future general worried that their scheme would never
work. But, as the general recounted, without exception the Black
Septemberists fell in love, got married, settled down, and in most cases
started a family. To make sure that none ever strayed, the two men devised a
test. Periodically, the former terrorists would be handed legitimate
passports and asked to go to the organization's offices in Geneva or Paris
or some other city on genuine nonviolent PLO business. But, the general
explained, not one of them would agree to travel abroad, for fear of being
arrested and losing all that they had -- that is, being deprived of their
wives and children. "And so," my host told me, "that is how we shut down
Black September and eliminated terrorism. It is the only successful case
that I know of."
In the years since, as terrorism has itself become more egregiously lethal
and destructive, seemingly more intractable and unrelenting, I have thought
often of that story, and I suspect that it is a less far-fetched plan for
combating terrorism than it at first seems. The authorities in Northern
Ireland, for example, pursued a somewhat similar strategy during the years
before the current cease-fire. Hard-core IRA and Loyalist terrorists serving
long prison sentences were often given brief furloughs during holiday
periods. The men to whom this privilege was accorded were carefully
selected. They were mostly in their thirties, and therefore at a time in
their lives when the perceived immortality of youth has been superseded by
the dawning realization of death's inevitability, if not for themselves,
then certainly for their parents.
Once at home with their families, these men, as the authorities had
correctly calculated, developed a keen appreciation of elderly parents whom
they might never see again once they were returned to prison, and also of
children growing up too fast and of still young and attractive wives wasting
their lives waiting. When the men returned to prison, they were asked if
they would be interested in an expedited release. The Northern Ireland
Office relied on a combination of factors to wean these men from terrorism:
family pressure to forsake violence and secure an early release and the
men's having seen with their own eyes how much the province had changed. To
qualify for this form of parole, the men were required to move out of
segregated prison wings (where they lived with only fellow IRA or Loyalist
prisoners) and into fully integrated cell blocks, where Protestants and
Catholics mixed freely -- and nonviolently. This was a critical first step
on the road to parole, followed by vocational training (not provided in
segregated wings), counseling, and more-frequent family visits and
furloughs. No one who had taken advantage of this opportunity for early
parole ever returned to violence or to prison. The program was so successful
that the option could be offered to only a limited number of prisoners, lest
the terrorist organizations, fearing the loss of too many senior veterans
and commanders, forbid their members to participate in the program. To a
great extent, accordingly, the climate of peace that emerged in Northern
Ireland in the mid-1990s may have owed as much to the creativity and
foresight of the Northern Ireland Prison Service as to the political
dexterity and visions of Gerry Adams and David Trimble or Martin McGuinness
and Senator George Mitchell.
The lesson here is not that the United States should host a series of mixers
in the Arab world in hopes of encouraging the young men of al Qaeda or other
terrorist organizations to forsake violence and embrace family life. Rather,
the lesson is that clever, creative thinking can sometimes achieve
unimaginable ends. Indeed, rather than concentrating on eliminating
organizations, as we mostly do in our approach to countering terrorism, we
should perhaps focus at least some of our attention on weaning individuals
from violence.