- Jun 27, 2005
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NY Times
This is interesting on a couple of fronts...
First the conspiracy front, which relates to a new/revived story floating around about Russian GRU involvement in "scrubbing" Iraq clean of WMDs and moving Saddams stockpiles to Syria and Lebanon. Link 1 Link 2 (I know...)
Second is this: It was all a misunderstanding created by Saddam's actions to comply with weapons inspectors as much as he had to while still maintaining the possibility that he might still have WMDs in an effort to deter the US and keep the Iraqi Shiites under control.
His actions would explain why everyone seemed to think that he still had WMD stockpiles even when inspectors found nothing.
(Continued from the NYT link)
In either case... Whether Saddam screwed himself by trying to maintain ambiguity about the WMD status of Iraq OR there was Russian involvement in sanitizing Iraq of WMDs (A very old accusation brought back into the light by John Shaw)... As more and more information starts to come out, the accusations of outright lying on the part of Dubbya seems to be losing traction.
Ever vigilant about coups and fearful of revolt, Mr. Hussein was deeply distrustful of his own commanders and soldiers, the documents show.
He made crucial decisions himself, relied on his sons for military counsel and imposed security measures that had the effect of hobbling his forces. He did that in several ways:
¶The Iraqi dictator was so secretive and kept information so compartmentalized that his top military leaders were stunned when he told them three months before the war that he had no weapons of mass destruction, and they were demoralized because they had counted on hidden stocks of poison gas or germ weapons for the nation's defense.
This is interesting on a couple of fronts...
First the conspiracy front, which relates to a new/revived story floating around about Russian GRU involvement in "scrubbing" Iraq clean of WMDs and moving Saddams stockpiles to Syria and Lebanon. Link 1 Link 2 (I know...)
Second is this: It was all a misunderstanding created by Saddam's actions to comply with weapons inspectors as much as he had to while still maintaining the possibility that he might still have WMDs in an effort to deter the US and keep the Iraqi Shiites under control.
His actions would explain why everyone seemed to think that he still had WMD stockpiles even when inspectors found nothing.
(Continued from the NYT link)
In December 2002, he told his top commanders that Iraq did not possess unconventional arms, like nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, according to the Iraq Survey Group, a task force established by the C.I.A. to investigate what happened to Iraq's weapons programs. Mr. Hussein wanted his officers to know they could not rely on poison gas or germ weapons if war broke out. The disclosure that the cupboard was bare, Mr. Aziz said, sent morale plummeting.
To ensure that Iraq would pass scrutiny by United Nations arms inspectors, Mr. Hussein ordered that they be given the access that they wanted. And he ordered a crash effort to scrub the country so the inspectors would not discover any vestiges of old unconventional weapons, no small concern in a nation that had once amassed an arsenal of chemical weapons, biological agents and Scud missiles, the Iraq survey group report said.
Mr. Hussein's compliance was not complete, though. Iraq's declarations to the United Nations covering what stocks of illicit weapons it had possessed and how it had disposed of them were old and had gaps. And Mr. Hussein would not allow his weapons scientists to leave the country, where United Nations officials could interview them outside the government's control.
Seeking to deter Iran and even enemies at home, the Iraqi dictator's goal was to cooperate with the inspectors while preserving some ambiguity about its unconventional weapons ? a strategy General Hamdani, the Republican Guard commander, later dubbed in a television interview "deterrence by doubt."
That strategy led to mutual misperception. When Secretary of State Colin L. Powell addressed the Security Council in February 2003, he offered evidence from photographs and intercepted communications that the Iraqis were rushing to sanitize suspected weapons sites. Mr. Hussein's efforts to remove any residue from old unconventional weapons programs were viewed by the Americans as efforts to hide the weapons. The very steps the Iraqi government was taking to reduce the prospect of war were used against it, increasing the odds of a military confrontation.
In either case... Whether Saddam screwed himself by trying to maintain ambiguity about the WMD status of Iraq OR there was Russian involvement in sanitizing Iraq of WMDs (A very old accusation brought back into the light by John Shaw)... As more and more information starts to come out, the accusations of outright lying on the part of Dubbya seems to be losing traction.
