Russia Gives Up Mass Army.

ZzZGuy

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Nov 15, 2006
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http://en.rian.ru/valdai_op/20090914/156124823.html


Q. What are the components and the significance of the military reform that is underway in Russia?

A. It?s very broad, with dozens of ways in which what is going on can be understood. But the gist of it, the reason why the chief of the General Staff has said that it is the biggest reform in the last 200 years, is that Russia is giving up the mass army preparing for a large-scale war. That old system was introduced by War Minister Dmitry Milyutin in 1874. The purpose was to have a rather small regular army for peace time and a huge pool of reservists, five or six times the size of the regular army. And that was followed for almost 150 years. That explains the existence of so many divisions, so many tanks which were a part of so-called ?empty divisions.? The majority of Russian divisions consisted of a couple of hundred officers of different ranks, a small company of soldiers, and lots of equipment stored at the base. And in the case of war, conscripts would be called up and the division would be considered to be combat ready.

Q. And what comes instead?

A. Instead comes a much smaller army if we consider the reserves as a part of it. The reserves are gone. The General Staff thinks that it is sufficient to have about 100,000 reservists and 1,000,000 strength of a regular army.

Q. So, basically, there is no more mobilization.


A. No mobilization, no large-scale war, no threats from NATO. Why was the threat of the NATO so popular with the military? Because it allowed them to keep up the old system, this mobilization system, and consider themselves useful, though the regular officers of those divisions have been doing nothing for the last 15 years -- no military training, no re-education. We had 20,000 tanks, now 2,000 tanks will be left. The rest will be turned into scrap.

Q. And what kind of effect is it going to have on Russian nuclear arsenal?

A. Well, the military ought to be not necessarily prepared for a large-scale war, but certainly ought not exclude it completely from its planning. And for the time being nukes are the replacement - and mostly tactical nukes, because strategic nukes are a political weapon. The tactical nukes are actually the replacement for those reserves, dozens and dozens of reserve divisions in case of something happening. It is not considered a real threat at the present time. But when they speak about Chinese spread or NATO spread, you cannot just dismiss it as something impossible. Still, in the planning and they ask: ?Are you ready to respond to a large-scale Chinese attack?? Of course, those small brigades of 3,000-4,000 men would not be serious force compared to the Chinese. So what about the nukes?


That?s the old tactic of NATO against the Soviet Union, when it had an overwhelming conventional power in Europe. NATO was relying on nukes. That?s not a new project, just takes over the old NATO approach to?


So it would seem Russia has finally realized that all those men they could hardly pay and equipment rusted beyond repair for a war that isn't coming any time soon is a waste of money. Now they are downsizing their army to what they can maintain properly and focusing more on quality then quantity. The replacement for the vast reserves they used to call upon in times of large scale war is tactical nukes, lots of them from what I can gather. But I see not indication that they are any more willing to use nukes of any kind in small conflicts then they where before.

They still won't have power projection like the USA has, they will be better able to fight small scale conflicts which seems to be what modern warfare is based around today.
 

BassBomb

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Nov 25, 2005
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What happened to the extremely old agreement to remove nuclear weapons?

Was that vaporware or was I dreaming
 

Zedtom

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Nov 23, 2001
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The Chinese Army still believes that a large infantry is key, but in the twenty-first century the power rests in superior air power, drones and stealth submarines. The use of spy satellites makes the movement of large masses of troops less effective, but mobility and surprise are still paramount.
 

PJABBER

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Feb 8, 2001
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The Russian Army is not being reduced at all, they are just laying off a lot of the senior officers - 60%, or around 200,000, are now facing early retirement. They plan on increasing the number of active duty sergeants and junior officers so that their structure is more in line with the better functioning Western armies. Military spending is slated to increase. They will remain the fifth largest military force in the world.

Their Army structure is in many ways based on their experience in WWII when they mobilized/drafted a huge and inexperienced army from the civilian population. The large number of officers they retained were there to manage the expected influx of draftees in a future land war.

This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.
 

K1052

Elite Member
Aug 21, 2003
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Maybe I'll pick up a T-34. That would be handy for the commute.
 
Dec 10, 2005
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Originally posted by: DesiPower
Originally posted by: K1052
Maybe I'll pick up a T-34. That would be handy for the commute.

good luck with gas and parking

Parking won't be a problem when you drive a tank. Just park over a row of cars in the compact section.
 

K1052

Elite Member
Aug 21, 2003
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Originally posted by: DesiPower
Originally posted by: K1052
Maybe I'll pick up a T-34. That would be handy for the commute.

good luck with gas and parking

It would be worth every penny just to see the looks on the cab drivers faces here when they try to cut off 40 tons of cold Soviet steel.
 

Red Dawn

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Jun 4, 2001
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Originally posted by: PJABBER

This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Maybe I missed something but from what I read the Russians kicked Borat and the rest of those Georgian Monkeys asses when they fought. Please if you will go into the details of how poorly the Russian Army performed.
 

0marTheZealot

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Apr 5, 2004
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Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).
 

nageov3t

Lifer
Feb 18, 2004
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Originally posted by: K1052
Maybe I'll pick up a T-34. That would be handy for the commute.

stay away from the later model T-1000, I hear it will only drive to Sarah Connor's house.
 

K1052

Elite Member
Aug 21, 2003
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Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

The Georgian ground forces sucked but their air defense system preformed quite well actually. Russia's failure to secure air superiority would have signifigantly harmed it had they encountered much real resistance on the ground.

In short if it tried a similar offensive against most of the NATO countries which sport a lot more advanced air defenses and competent armies they would have gotten schooled.
 

K1052

Elite Member
Aug 21, 2003
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Originally posted by: loki8481
Originally posted by: K1052
Maybe I'll pick up a T-34. That would be handy for the commute.

stay away from the later model T-1000, I hear it will only drive to Sarah Connor's house.

But it would be so handy for opening blister packs.
 

PJABBER

Diamond Member
Feb 8, 2001
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Originally posted by: Red Dawn
Originally posted by: PJABBER

This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Maybe I missed something but from what I read the Russians kicked Borat and the rest of those Georgian Monkeys asses when they fought. Please if you will go into the details of how poorly the Russian Army performed.

I don't have time to pull out a lot of background data but at least let me offer one fairly authoritative after action analysis for your reading pleasure. For convenience I will just use extracts from this single report, though others are available.

Remember, the Georgian War was a preplanned Russian military operation with prepositioned forces using some of their best units, not the typical low readiness divisions that are charged with responsibility for that region.

Russia?s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War

Russia?s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War
ROGER N. McDERMOTT
2009

Mr. Roger N. McDermott is an external researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College. He is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC. Mr. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. His articles appear in scholarly journals including the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and his weekly assessments of security developments in Central Asia, Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown Foundation), are read by policy planners. He is also the co-editor of the book, Russian Military Reform 1992-2002 (Frank Cass: London/Portland, 2003). Mr. McDermott is a graduate of the University of Oxford, specializing in defense and security issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).


First, what went well -

Within a few hours of the commencement of the operation the 76th (Pskov) Airborne Division?s 104th Regiment was already in action in the Tskhinvali suburbs with 1,550 soldiers and more than 100 vehicles, accompanied by no fewer than 200 men from the Pechora GRU brigade Glavnoye Razvedyvatel?noye Upravleniye (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff). Russian mobility was arguably far superior to that seen in previous conflicts. Within 24 hours the deployed forces almost doubled in size even though Russia could not begin an immediate airlift, owing to Georgian air defenses, and the army columns? slow movement toward Tskhinvali via the Rokki Tunnel forced commanders to commit troops piecemeal.

A key factor in the speed of the Russian military victory was the opening of a second front in Abkhazia using mechanized infantry. In South Ossetia, Russian forces captured Tskhinvali and then crossed into undisputed Georgian territory to effectively cut the main highway and railway routes west of Gori. At least 2,000 soldiers occupied Zugdidi, a Georgian town ten kilometers from the border, and an armored column continued another 30 kilometers to Senaki, capturing a military base and airfield, severing the main highway and railway at a second location, enabling de facto Russian military control of all heavy traffic movement across Georgia. Abkhaz separatists subdued Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, while Russia?s Air Force (Voyenno-Vozdushnyye Sily?VVS) destroyed military facilities in Tbilisi and Poti.

So far, so good for the Russians, right? A well executed strike by an overwhelming force on several fronts, including some air envelopment despite failure to take out AA which resulted in the loss of at least six planes, including a top of the line Tu-22M3 strategic bomber. (Official data provided by deputy chief of the General Staff Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn showed Russia lost three Su-25 ground attack aircraft and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber. But providing crew names, exact times, locations and types of aircraft, the Moscow Defense Brief argued that Russia in fact had lost six aircraft in combat during the five-day war. The two aircraft that were lost but not mentioned in official reports were Su-24M front-line bombers, the report said.) More on that a bit later.

Arguably the rapid collapse of the Georgian armed forces, however, was more a result of Georgian military weakness, poor management, and limited combat capabilities, than anything accurately reflecting the prowess of Russia?s armed forces.

It is this author?s contention that the Russian military and political leadership came to perceive the Georgian war as a setback to their aspirations of projecting the image of a ?resurgent Russia.? This negative assessment of Russia?s conventional armed forces in the conflict sent a seismic shock throughout the security establishment.

The Georgian war was arguably the last war of the twentieth century for Russia?s armed forces; in the sense that it was largely fought using organizations, tactics, and equipment designed in the last century.

The retrospective critique of Russia?s armed forces that publicly unfolded in the autumn of 2008 was centered on key aspects of the military?s combat capabilities. A recognizable pattern emerged which focused on aged vehicles, hardware, and weaponry; ineffective command and control organizations and systems; lack of interservice coordination; failures of intelligence support and the GLONASS (Global?naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System)... Shamanov?s analysis of the weak performance of the Russian military in Georgia encompassed three factors: poor interoperability between the Air Force and ground units, communication problems during combat, and low-resolution reconnaissance systems.

General Makarov, whose prominent role in the military reform campaign seemed intended to deflect criticism away from Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov, addressed a meeting of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences in Moscow on 16 December. He highlighted the immense operational and planning problems and low levels of combat readiness that were prevalent during the war in Georgia. In short, Makarov suggested that Russian forces were incapable of fighting a modern war and had to be radically reformed. ?To find a lieutenant colonel, colonel, or general able to lead troops with a sure hand, you had to chase down officers one by one throughout the armed forces, because those career commanders in charge of ?paper regiments and divisions? just could not resolve the tasks set.? Once officers were allocated personnel and equipment they soon demonstrated their ineffectiveness by ?losing their heads? or in some cases refusing to fulfill assignments.

Russia?s use of airpower in the campaign undoubtedly played a major role in securing the military?s operational goals. Yet, as the media and officials developed their criticism of Russia?s conventional forces, they extended their criticism to include the Air Force. The root cause of this negativity stemmed from the downing of a Tu-22M3 strategic bomber by Georgia?s air defenses. The bomber was shot down while flying a reconnaissance mission, an event that was singled out by the media as intolerable. It is remarkable that the VVS conducted no suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations; however, this may have been a reflection of the lack of night-fighting capability. On the eve of the campaign the VVS had no around-the-clock SEAD capabilities, which meant Russia did not possess the option of mounting an air campaign such as those executed by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan in 2001, or Iraq in 2003. Retired VVS commanders Army-General Petr Deynekin and Army-General Anatoliy Kornukov harshly criticized the failure to suppress Georgia?s air defenses. General Kornukov was especially damning, saying the Tu-22 ?was sent to its death,? and he raged at ?the miscalculations of intelligence and the incompetence of the Air Force leadership.? General Deynekin added that the ?poorly organized? search-and-rescue service contributed to the capture of Russian pilots. Other critics attacked the absence of a unified command system as a cause of aircraft losses.

Communication systems and electronic warfare assets employed by commanders and frontline forces were obsolete, in many cases ?unchanged since Soviet times.? The 58th Army commander, Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Khrulev, was reported to have communicated with his forces in the midst of combat via a satellite phone borrowed from a journalist, since communication between units was unavailable.20 Intelligence failures were quite evident, as demonstrated by the inability of units to communicate space-based and electronic intelligence, which consequently ?failed to inform the country?s leadership of the concentration of Georgian troops.? Additionally, such failures resulted in electronic warfare systems not being employed to suppress Georgia?s air defenses. Commanders were forced to struggle in their efforts to gain timely information related to events on the battlefield; difficulties compounded by the fact that maritime and topographic maps provided conflicting data. Satellite-targeting support to artillery was woefully absent, thereby preventing the use of precision-guided munitions and the accurate adjustment of artillery fire. Despite promises made in December 2007 by Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov to fully equip the Russian Army with GLONASS receivers by mid-2008, the Russian Army largely went into combat in August with World War II-era compasses and maps. Russian forces allegedly attempted to use the US Global Positioning System (GPS), but were thwarted in their attempts by the fact that the map of Georgia was blanked out for 48 hours. They were forced to resort to targeting conventional weapon systems through the use of vintage 1960s optical equipment.

In fact, the calamitous performance of Russia?s C3I during combat operations in Georgia sheds some light on the rapid decision by Russian authorities to seek increased funding to address these weaknesses.

(Major-General Aleksandr Vladimirov) did acknowledge that the call for radical change, such as the reorganization to a brigade-based structure, with emphasis on a mobile permanent-readiness force, was a direct result of weaknesses exposed during the conflict in Georgia:

Our victorious five-day war with Georgia showed up the poor performance of the General Staff, the poor performance by the command of the military district, and the poor performance of the army command.

On 14 October 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced a ?new stage? in military reform, promising the most radical change to the military since 1945. Serdyukov said this reform would affect the entire functional basis of Russia?s armed forces, transforming personnel numbers, central command and control agencies, and the officer training system. Although these plans were initiated prior to the war in the South Caucasus, he stated that the events in Georgia had ?strongly influenced? the character of the reforms. The program involves the following elements:

? Reducing the armed forces to one million by 2012.
? Downsizing the General Staff by 200,000 officers.
? Converting from a ?mobilization? to a ?permanent readiness? force structure by 2012.
? Introducing a three-tiered structure (military district, operational command, and brigade) to improve command and control efficiency.
? Streamlining the military education system, resulting in a reduction in the number of educational facilities.
? Reforming the airborne forces by distributing airborne brigades to all six military districts.
? Updating equipment and weapon systems in stages with the aim of achieving a modernized military by 2020.

Serdyukov explained that the overall aim of this reform is to create a professional, permanent combat-ready force. All formations of Russia?s Army will be fully manned and become permanent-readiness forces by 2012. Recognizing the controversial nature of the reforms, Minister Serdyukov expected a fierce reaction from the military. He made it abundantly clear that the top-heavy troop management system, more suited to large-scale conventional warfare, had to evolve. ?From the point of view of positions, our Army today is reminiscent of an egg which is swollen in the middle. There are more colonels and lieutenant colonels than there are junior officers. In three years we will build a pyramid, in which everything will be precisely structured and tested.?

The whole report runs just 16 pages and is worth reading if you are into this kind of stuff.

Another article of interest on the battle for South Ossetia can be found here -

Assault on Georgia! Exclusive Military Analysis on South Ossetia Conflict - Ralph Peters
 

Veramocor

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Mar 2, 2004
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Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

I'd say China with their population that is over 1 billion larger than Russia's population. The soldiers don't even need to be good eventually they'd overwhelm Russia.
 
Dec 10, 2005
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Originally posted by: Veramocor
Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

I'd say China with their population that is over 1 billion larger than Russia's population. The soldiers don't even need to be good eventually they'd overwhelm Russia.

Who would win? Two top-of-the-line Russian tanks or a million Chinese foot soldiers with rifles?
 

Schadenfroh

Elite Member
Mar 8, 2003
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Originally posted by: Veramocor
I'd say China with their population that is over 1 billion larger than Russia's population. The soldiers don't even need to be good eventually they'd overwhelm Russia.
Russia is a massive country and a huge Chinese army has many mouths to feed in their march towards Moscow. Supply lines would become stretched and the Russians would likely have air superiority in the first 10 minutes (at least over their own territory). I am not up to speed on their navies, could Russia pull off a massive blockade of China's major ports?
 

Fox5

Diamond Member
Jan 31, 2005
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A 1,000,000 man standing army is still a pretty massive force...
Sounds like they just cut the reserves and are focusing on a somewhat quality over quantity military. The nature of war is now limited territorial engagements instead of full-scale. You'd think they could sell some of those old tanks instead of scrapping them.

BTW, very funny that they lack modern navigation systems, doesn't seem like war with the US would have gone well for Russia in the later parts of the Cold War.
 

rudder

Lifer
Nov 9, 2000
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Originally posted by: Zedtom
The Chinese Army still believes that a large infantry is key, but in the twenty-first century the power rests in superior air power, drones and stealth submarines. The use of spy satellites makes the movement of large masses of troops less effective, but mobility and surprise are still paramount.

See what happens when the Russians try to occupy Georgia with too few troops (just an Example). The same thing that happened in Iraq. Sure we have the ability to invade and conquer any nation within 30 days through air superiority...but you still need all those boots on the ground.

The key is figuring out what levels of readiness can be maintained with a large number of reservists.
 
Jun 26, 2007
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If they are not going to invade anyone, good for them, spetsnaz and their airforce can fix pretty much anything, if not, they still have their armored divisions.

I think a good rule would be to have as many as you can fit in your armored vehicles, it would also fix another problem... i'm sure you know what i'm talking about.
 

miketheidiot

Lifer
Sep 3, 2004
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Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

the french could give them a good run.

actually, considering the current state of military affairs in russia, i think major western European countries could
 
Jun 26, 2007
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Originally posted by: miketheidiot
Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

the french could give them a good run.

actually, considering the current state of military affairs in russia, i think major western European countries could

Actually, GB could alone, but as part of NATO and not an ARROGANT ARSEHOLE part of NATO, we discuss such things with our member nations first, seeing how they might take heat from such a mission.

I think the EU will eventually replace NATO entirely because most troops i work with and my unit are not under US nor NATO command.

Though we do consult jobs at times when your General is at loss, he never follows any advice though.
 

JTsyo

Lifer
Nov 18, 2007
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Originally posted by: Brainonska511
Originally posted by: Veramocor
Originally posted by: 0marTheZealot
Originally posted by: PJABBER
This move was accelerated because of the poor performance of the Russian Army against the tiny Georgian military last year.

Huh? They were eating breakfast in South Ossetia and had dinner in Tbilisi that evening. I don't know what you are talking about. Russia crushed Georgia. Russia would crush any nation on earth except for the US. No army comes close to Russia on any level (except of course the US).

I'd say China with their population that is over 1 billion larger than Russia's population. The soldiers don't even need to be good eventually they'd overwhelm Russia.

Who would win? Two top-of-the-line Russian tanks or 10,000 Chinese cavalrymen

fix'd for ya.