As campaign 2000 unfolded, it was widely assumed that Vice President Al Gore would run the third straight presidential race on the New Democrat themes that he and Bill Clinton rode to victory in 1992 and 1996. But the Gore campaign often looked and sounded like a throwback to the doomed Democratic campaigns of the 1980s, replete with vintage class warfare themes and narrowly tailored appeals to constituency groups. This backsliding from reform-minded centrism to interest group liberalism was a key factor in turning a race Gore should have won handily into a virtual tie.
To be sure, Gore voiced some key New Democrat themes: preserving fiscal discipline by paying down the national debt, support (though heavily qualified) for expanding trade, and a commitment to vigorous U.S. global leadership backed by a strong military. By last September, however, those themes had been overshadowed by Gore's business-bashing "populism" and a laundry list of poll-tested programs and promises aimed at specific slices of the electorate. Often these proposals had merit; seniors really do need a prescription drug benefit. But the campaign's inability to articulate any sense of public purpose larger than the expansion of government for the benefit of favored groups also reinforced George W. Bush's charge that Gore was really a big spending liberal -- "Mondale with a surplus," in the tart description of one observer.
Where Clinton had spoken to broad middle-class aspirations and values, Gore framed his appeals to particular group interests. The Gore campaign Web site invited visitors to select from a list of interest or identity group affiliations, so that they could be steered quickly to custom-tailored proposals for that group. Campaign scheduling also reinforced the interest-group oriented message. Gore's unmodulated performance on the stump fed the damaging public perception that he "would say anything" to get elected.
The point here is not that Gore should have shunned the party's most loyal constituencies. No Democrat can win without their support, and no one can argue they did not do their job in 2000. But in an era of political parity, Democrats cannot build electoral majorities by narrow appeals to traditional constituency groups. To build a new progressive majority, Democrats must appeal both to their base and to new constituencies -- wired workers, Gen Xers, suburban women and independents -- on the basis of crosscutting ideas and values.
When the Gore campaign finally hit upon an overarching theme, "fighting for the people, not the powerful," it had a contrived feel. It's the sort of line campaign consultants love because it gets a strong response in focus groups. It didn't appear to grow naturally out of Gore's political biography or a considered analysis of the structural inequities of American capitalism. Indeed, Gore's combative "populism" was jarringly out of sync with a population basically satisfied with the country's direction and heartily sick of partisan warfare. It was also confusing: When an incumbent with a strong record adopts the rhetoric of an insurgent, he gives the impression of running against himself. "The biggest problem," lamented one Gore campaign aide, "was that our message didn't fit our policy."
After all, the strongest argument for a Gore presidency was the one that most voters already agreed with: America had made great progress on the Clinton-Gore watch and continued to move in the right direction. Gore was instrumental in shaping the policies that helped restore fiscal discipline, spur the emergence of an explosively inventive New Economy, produce the longest and strongest economic expansion in memory, reduce violent crime and welfare dependency, and create a relatively stable international environment in which American interests and values have rarely been more secure. In the end, the strength of these fundamentals came achingly close to overcoming an ill-conceived and ill-executed presidential campaign. But not close enough -- and Democrats who wonder how victory slipped from their hands must now assess the costs of that failure.
In exchanging a winning New Democrat message for a faux populism and narrow appeals to interest groups, the Gore campaign lost the political ground his party had gained during the last decade along five critical philosophical dimensions: the role of government, economic opportunity, civic responsibility, mainstream values, and security.
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