DAVE BRADLEY: That's not my perception of what happened.
But what, really, I think the problem was is we did a half-good job on what became the ISA bus. You had to fiddle around with DIP switches in order to plug anything new in there. And we decided the time had come to do something different.
And we wanted to solve a lot of problems with the MicroChannel. So we sort of all rolled them up into one thing and put it out there.
And a separate event happened at the same time that I think affected everyone's perception. That is, IBM changed the way they licensed patents at that time. Before that time, you essentially could get them for a song. About 1986, 1987, we changed the practice to still a very -- what I believe to be a very reasonable fee, but one that was more than we had charged before. So everybody said, okay, they're closing it up, the MicroChannel is going to cost you an arm and a leg to do it.
I don't think anybody paid more money to build a MicroChannel machine than they did to build an AT bus machine. But that's just what the perception was.
And so -- But remember, I'm an engineer. I wasn't making grand strategy. From an engineering viewpoint, we were just trying to solve a bunch of the problems that we had built into the ISA bus.
ANDY GROVE: Well, I can shed possibly a thin beam of light on that. Because the PS/2 machines were slated to be built around an internally developed CMOS 286 developed inside IBM, manufactured inside IBM, under license by Intel, and we were thanked for our services and bid an affectionate goodbye.
BILL GATES: Same here.
(Laughter.)
BILL GATES: That was the machine that had this special hypervisor in it that subsumed DOS. And that's where the SysRq key on the AT machine is, because they had bonded out the 286 to use the special debug instructions. So it was an attempt to regain the high ground.
ANDY GROVE: That's my perception.
BILL GATES: Yeah.
BRENT SCHLENDER: How dare they.
BILL GATES: It's fair game. It didn't work. But....
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Olden Days