National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is recommending 30 percent of Electronic Voting Machines...

[techs]

http://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3646231

Feds to Toughen E-Voting Standards?
By Michael Hickins


A federal agency is set to recommend significant changes to specifications for electronic-voting machines next week, internetnews.com has learned.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is recommending that the 2007 version of the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) decertify direct record electronic (DRE) machines.

DREs are currently used by more than 30 percent of jurisdictions across the U.S. and are the exclusive voting technology in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland and South Carolina.

According to an NIST paper to be discussed at a meeting of election regulators at NIST headquarters in Gaithersburg, Md., on Dec. 4 and 5, DRE vote totals cannot be audited because the machines are not software independent.

In other words, there is no means of verifying vote tallies other than by relying on the software that tabulated the results to begin with.

The machines currently in use are "more vulnerable to undetected programming errors or malicious code," according to the paper.

The NIST paper also noted that, "potentially, a single programmer could 'rig' a major election."

It recommends "requiring SI [software independent] voting systems in VVSG 2007."

The NIST is also going to recommend changes to the design of machines equipped with paper rolls that provide audit trails.

Currently, the paper rolls produce records that are illegible or otherwise unusable, and NIST is recommending that "paper rolls should not be used in new voting systems."

The lack of software independence has reared its ugly head in Sarasota's Congressional race, where 18,000 fewer votes were cast than in other races on the same ballot.

A recount was futile in that election because Sarasota uses a DRE-type machine.

This has provoked concerns that someone tampered with that election.

County officials told internetnews.com that the machines themselves are now being examined by a team of computer security experts and that they will finish their work by Friday.



I just hope the Bushies don't squash this. This is just a bare minimum of what needs to be done.

 

[Lemon law]

For those folks who bought such machines---decertifying them would cost millions of dollars. And amounts to a giant payday for companies like Diebold who manufactered such machines despite abundant WARNINGS and who now will happily try to sell new voting machines.

I hope the voters will throw the rascals who bought such machines out---and not reward the companies
who manufactered them with ANY repeat business.

 

[Rainsford]

Personally I think what NIST needs to do is hold a competition to determine a voting machine standard that can then be built based on open specifications by a commercial company. This idea is well tested in computer security, and was the basis for deciding on the Advanced Encryption Standard, better known as AES. This links the benefits of open design AND expert analysis with enough commercial appeal in building the machines that someone will be sure to take the contract to do so. Heck, we could have MULTIPLE companies building them all from the same open design, this helps eliminate the ability of any one group to hold too much sway over the process...and since the companies are just BUILDING the machines to specifications determined in an open forum, their ability to tamper or (far more likely) design a crummy product are limited. AES was a very successful process because it involved experts designing in the open rather than a company doing it behind closed doors...and this is a situation where we could learn a lot from the AES process.

 

[conjur]

Paper ballots counted by hand in the precinct with observers!

 

[Whoozyerdaddy]

Originally posted by: Rainsford
Personally I think what NIST needs to do is hold a competition to determine a voting machine standard that can then be built based on open specifications by a commercial company. This idea is well tested in computer security, and was the basis for deciding on the Advanced Encryption Standard, better known as AES. This links the benefits of open design AND expert analysis with enough commercial appeal in building the machines that someone will be sure to take the contract to do so. Heck, we could have MULTIPLE companies building them all from the same open design, this helps eliminate the ability of any one group to hold too much sway over the process...and since the companies are just BUILDING the machines to specifications determined in an open forum, their ability to tamper or (far more likely) design a crummy product are limited. AES was a very successful process because it involved experts designing in the open rather than a company doing it behind closed doors...and this is a situation where we could learn a lot from the AES process.

And at the end of the day you still have a paperless, electronic voting machine? No thanks. The voting process doesn't need a better mouse trap. A pen and paper are still the best answer.

 

[piasabird]

Actually they could be recertified if their software was updated so a querry could be run by an independent source or some third party sofrware was developed to make their data readable. Simply having a means of downloading the database and then being able to querry and get toatals might be nice.

There is no way some machine that depends on the ability to read a paper ballot is more dependable. If you think this, you are not thinking logically. You think some kind of scantron system is more dependable or less dependable than direct entry? If so explain why? I think the problem is that some software company just writes the software too fast and then does not fully test it in a field setting. Things tend to work better in the labratory than they do in real life.

It would be better to print the report out after each person votes if you want to keep a copy. Personally, I do not trust any scanning device. How do you know if your vote is really counted??

I think when a person votes, they should be issued a generated ID and then you could go back and print it out or display it on a screen for the person as proof that it is correct. It would not record the person's, name, it would only record the generated ID at the time they voted. What good are paper ballots, since they can easily be forged???