Obviously it's not meant to fight tug boats.
I'm curious. Do you have any concept of momentum and the amount of energy that is expended when a vessel this large and a tugboat make contact?
Look at the wash generated by this cruise ship and what it does to a marina.
http://www.foxla.com/news/national-news/204360742-story
I happen to be a boater, and I'm regularly faced with people who don't understand the forces involved in a collision. Sure, it's a slow motion collision. But you are talking about the momentum of hundreds of tons of force. If the tugboat pushes on ANY boat in the wrong place, damage will result. Your attempt to wave it off as military stupidity is stupidity.
I'm curious. Do you have any concept of momentum and the amount of energy that is expended when a vessel this large and a tugboat make contact?
Look at the wash generated by this cruise ship and what it does to a marina.
http://www.foxla.com/news/national-news/204360742-story
I happen to be a boater, and I'm regularly faced with people who don't understand the forces involved in a collision. Sure, it's a slow motion collision. But you are talking about the momentum of hundreds of tons of force. If the tugboat pushes on ANY boat in the wrong place, damage will result. Your attempt to wave it off as military stupidity is stupidity.
are they at least bullet proof?Except, as has already been stated, these ships are expected to be put out of action by a single hit because of the lethality of modern weaponry.
Except, as has already been stated, these ships are expected to be put out of action by a single hit because of the lethality of modern weaponry.
So this is what Ford is boasting about when they say military grade aluminium.
wall of txtI know I'm just feeding the fire because so many folks haven't read up on the program, but:
Combat Survivability During the 2001-2003 timeframe, when the Navy was first deciding what it expected LCS to be, retired Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski became Director of the OSD’s new Office of Force Transformation. A naval aviator by trade, Vice Admiral 20 Cebrowski had championed small, modular Streetfighter combatants while serving as President of the Naval War College. And, as mentioned previously, he believed Streetfighters “must be designed to lose [that is, to be lost in combat]. If no risk or loss is contemplated, they are a poor design concept because they forego… economies of scale that are a prominent advantage…”115 Consistent with his experience as a combat aviator, he therefore envisioned LCS crews would simply abandon their ship after taking a serious hit. While Admiral Clark agreed with Admiral Cebrowski that the Navy needed small combatants in its future fleet design, he personally disagreed with the idea of an expendable warship and knew such a concept would never sell in the surface warfare community. The CNO therefore sought the most survivable ship possible within the program’s aggressive cost targets.116 In practical terms, this necessarily meant LCS seaframes could be built to no more than Level I survivability standards, the lowest of three levels then assigned to U.S. Navy warships.117 As explained in OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) instruction 9070.1, “Survivability Policy for Surface Ships of the U.S. Navy,” the governing U.S. Navy instruction on survivability in 2002-2003: Level I represents the least severe environment anticipated and excludes the need for enhanced survivability for designated ship classes to sustain operations in the immediate area of an engaged Battle Group or in the general war-at-sea region.118 In other words, LCS would not be expected to continue fighting after taking a hit. This design approach was consistent with mine warfare and PCs, which were both built to Level I standards. However, it was not as robust as the Perry-class FFG, with its Level II standards, designed to allow the ship to “conduct sustained combat operations following weapons impact,” much less the Level III standards used for large multimission ships to give them “the ability to deal with the broad degrading effects of damage from antiship cruise missiles, torpedoes, and mines.”119
http://awin.aviationweek.com/Portals/AWeek/Ares/work white paper.PDF
Navy didn't want to admit someone dropped a tool box so they blamed the tugboat.
and the Navy pulls the plug on their littoral ships, 3 of which are less than 3 years old.The recently commissioned littoral combat ship suffered a crack hull after being hit by tugboat and will be repaired in port.
these are multi-million $$$ combat ships.
wtf springs leak after hit by tug boat?!
what is it meant to fight?
3rd world villagers in a row boat armed with sling shots and a rock?
and the Navy pulls the plug on their littoral ships, 3 of which are less than 3 years old.
US Navy chief defends plan to scrap troubled warships even though some are less than 3 years old | CNN Politics
The chief of the US Navy defended the service's plans to scrap nine relatively new warships in the coming fiscal year even as the service tries to keep up with China's growing fleet. Three of the littoral combat ships slated for decommissioning are less than three years old.www.cnn.com
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday told the House Armed Services Committee Wednesday that the anti-submarine ships could not perform their primary mission.
"I refuse to put an additional dollar against a system that would not be able to track a high-end submarine in today's environment," Gilday told the committee. He said the main reason for the early retirement was that the anti-submarine warfare system on the ships "did not work out technically." The decommissioning of the ships would save the Navy approximately $391 million, according to the service's proposed FY23 budget.
But that recoups only a fraction of the cost of the nine littoral combat ships, which totaled about $3.2 billion.
Rep. Adam Smith, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, said, "We can't use them, number one because they're not ready to do anything. Number two, when they are, they still break down."