I think you're making excuses, LK, the same excuses that have been used all along.
1. The enormous growth of sub prime arms leading up to the crash was an obvious indicator of a false market valuation for housing & RMBS. Many of these loans went to people who didn't have a prayer of converting to a standard 30 year note, because they couldn't qualify for anything other than the introductory rate cornholio. When the original terms expired, they were going to be screwed if prices didn't continue leaping- the guys sitting at the table showing them where to sign & the banks backing up the loan company knew it full well, along with everybody in between. We both know it.
2. The actual ability to pay was completely ignored. Anybody with a pulse could get a loan in 2005 & 2006, often at extremely low rates on a short term ARM, better rates than fully qualified buyers got on 30 year notes. Mortgages were marketed like furniture loans, and on similar terms. Yeh, no interest for a full year, but if you haven't paid it off by then, you're taking the high hard one. People can afford that on a few $K, they'll recover, but not on horribly overpriced real estate, the biggest & most long lasting financial obligation they'll ever take on.
3. The big banks achieved capture wrt the ratings agencies early in the game, playing them against each other & having the methodologies handed to them on a platter. They could "tailor" securities to achieve any rating they wanted, even ones loaded with bunk.
4. This whole "Nobody Knew, Honest!" routine makes me want to puke. For everybody selling protection in the synthetic derivatives market, there was somebody buying it, somebody like Magnetar-
http://www.propublica.org/article/t...d-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble-going/single
You're basically claiming that the sharpest financial minds in the world were a bunch of complacent chumps who hit their heads when they fell off the turnip truck, & I'm not buying it.
1. The enormous growth of sub prime arms leading up to the crash was an obvious indicator of a false market valuation for housing & RMBS. Many of these loans went to people who didn't have a prayer of converting to a standard 30 year note, because they couldn't qualify for anything other than the introductory rate cornholio. When the original terms expired, they were going to be screwed if prices didn't continue leaping- the guys sitting at the table showing them where to sign & the banks backing up the loan company knew it full well, along with everybody in between. We both know it.
2. The actual ability to pay was completely ignored. Anybody with a pulse could get a loan in 2005 & 2006, often at extremely low rates on a short term ARM, better rates than fully qualified buyers got on 30 year notes. Mortgages were marketed like furniture loans, and on similar terms. Yeh, no interest for a full year, but if you haven't paid it off by then, you're taking the high hard one. People can afford that on a few $K, they'll recover, but not on horribly overpriced real estate, the biggest & most long lasting financial obligation they'll ever take on.
3. The big banks achieved capture wrt the ratings agencies early in the game, playing them against each other & having the methodologies handed to them on a platter. They could "tailor" securities to achieve any rating they wanted, even ones loaded with bunk.
4. This whole "Nobody Knew, Honest!" routine makes me want to puke. For everybody selling protection in the synthetic derivatives market, there was somebody buying it, somebody like Magnetar-
http://www.propublica.org/article/t...d-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble-going/single
You're basically claiming that the sharpest financial minds in the world were a bunch of complacent chumps who hit their heads when they fell off the turnip truck, & I'm not buying it.
