woolfe9998
Lifer
- Apr 8, 2013
- 16,242
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Sorry, I didn't read a lot of this but enough to respond:
So, your whole position/argument is based on evidence found AFTER the fact about October 2001 that wasn't published until 2009 after 8 years of investigation? Everyone has 20/20 vision when they can take the time to sift thru everything, specially when it's evidence found AFTER the time has come and gone. I guess it's time we invent the hot tub time machine so we can go back in time and give them the known evidence learned after the fact, so they can correct there decisions, even though it's only circumstantial evidence and not hard concrete evidence.
This quote, all though it's from someone defending their decisions, sums it up quite nicely:
What if he wasn't there, and we did go in there heavy as you claim we should. Even the report says we had the forces, but there would have been heavy casualties because of the physical terrain (some thought it was worth the risk). When someone says it's worth a risk, they are banking on them being right without having any actual evidence that fully supports that conclusion. Hence, why it's a risk. Would your solution be, that we do that at all the other raids we conducted with the belief he was there, coming up empty handed? Which leads me back to "how do you supposed that would turn out?" If it is true, that we had a missed chance at taking him out at Tora Bora, that your report says a failure due to wrong decisions (even though that is all based off circumstantial evidence) why did it take 10 years to be able to track him down again if our intelligence was supposed to be so good?
On another note, I do find it hard to believe that anyone is going to stop and write a will while they are being bombed and attacked, as natural instinct is survival. But that is just my opinion.
I agree there is uncertainty about what would happen in a counter-factual situation where we took a different approach. But a stronger initial footprint and more aggressive use of our military had a better chance of not only taking out OBL, but further diminishing AQ forces and, of course, the Taliban itself. As I just said in another thread, about 1/3 of the Taliban escaped our grasp. Weakened, that remnant was able to use the US presence as a recruiting tool. A more aggressive initial approach would have diminished them further, and our getting out shortly thereafter would have made it very difficult for them to come back.
