Not really. Facilities are defined in the agreement as follows:
My take on your suggestion for a 'do over' is that it completely undermines the entire UN process and sends the wrong message. What needs to happen is that Iran needs to follow through with the requests being made of it so verification can be made, trust can be built, and there will be no need for war or any attacks on its facilities.
So, uhh, obviously Parchin is not such a facility, at all, nor has the IAEA alleged it to be, correct? They have not claimed to have any information as to the existence of any nuclear material at that facility. Why, then, do they claim it's their job to go there, again?
The rest? The demands, not requests, being made on Iran are inconsistent. The US demands they stop enrichment entirely, while the IAEA demands they adopt additional protocols. Netanyahu's demands are even greater-
The demands of Iran must be clear: to take away the enriched material, halt the enrichment and dismantle the facility in Qom.
Obviously, Netanyahu intends that no offer the Iranians could accept ever be made. It's also obvious that the material he demands Iran to give up, produced under IAEA scrutiny, is not weapons grade, and never will be if IAEA supervision continues.
What I've offered does not conflict with what the IAEA says they want, at all- additional protocols, greater safeguards. And yet the US somehow manages to avoid making any proposal consistent with stated IAEA positions, and manages to give the impression that the official IAEA position is the same as our own & that of Israel, when it's not. The security council adopts the US position wrt Iranian enrichment, even as the official IAEA position remains unchanged. The whole of the UN never gets to say yea or nay, at all.
Under Amano's leadership and obvious US pressure, the IAEA plays along with the ruse, refusing to stay within its mandate, generating propaganda at every opportunity.
The apparent truth of the matter is that if Iran ceases enrichment temporarily, then the demand will escalate to permanent cessation, even though the NPT allows them to do so.
Your reference to "trust" is specious. We'll never trust the Iranians, nor they us. The real issues are supervision & confirmation that Iran is, indeed, producing only reactor grade materials, and that they're not diverting reactor byproducts to weapons production. If no weapons grade materials are produced, no weapons can exist, which was the stated intent of the NPT in the first place, to allow member states to enrich their own fuel with safeguards suitable to prevent the creation of weapons grade material.
I fail to see how what I've offered contradicts that, either.