MomentsofSanity
Lifer
- Jan 25, 2011
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Several state RFRAs have the same definition of person (e.g. South Carolina), and the Hobby Lobby decision allowed the federal RFRA to be used by closely held corporations. Partnerships, LLCs, etc. would also be covered by the federal RFRA after that ruling.
As I mentioned above, several of the federal circuits have ruled that the federal RFRA can be used in suits in which the government isn't involved. The Supreme Court has not yet resolved this circuit split.
I don't see how that allows any greater level of discrimination than any of the other RFRAs. It appears to just allow a suit to be filed preemptively before damages have occurred. For example, if the government were to pass a law banning all hats, yarmulke-wearing Jews could sue before the law goes into effect even though they haven't yet been burdened.
In any case, my point was that the Indiana, federal, and other state RFRAs are all different, but not substantially so. Most of the aspects of the Indiana one that some people believe are new and frightening are actually already in effect in other RFRAs. That doesn't make it a good law, but at least its effects are somewhat predictable.
You have a very broad definition of several states. It's one. South Carolina. That is the only other so called RFRA that explicitly extends to businesses. Hobby Lobby extended to closely held businesses. Indiana extended to any and all businesses and organizations.
As to the matter of civil defenses, you're right the circuits are mixed. The indiana law unilaterally removed all of those disputes in one direction, then took it even further. There's an interesting read in the dissent of Hankins v. Lyght by then-Judge Sotomayor. It's worth reviewing should the matter find itself before the USSC on whether the federal RFRA Extends to civil matters.
RFRA by its terms does not apply to suits between private parties.
Two provisions of the statute implicitly limit its application to disputes in which the government is a party. Section 2000bb-1(c) states that [a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government (emphasis added). In the majoritys view, we should read this provision as broadening, rather than narrowing, the rights of a party asserting the RFRA. Maj. Op. at 103. This interpretation would be questionable even if Section 2000bb-1(c) were the only provision of the statute affecting the question of whether RFRA applies to private suits. When read in conjunction with the rest of the statute, however, it becomes clear that this section reflects Congresss understanding that RFRA claims and defenses would be raised only against the government. For instance, section 2000bb-1(b) of RFRA provides that where a law imposes a substantial burden on religion, the government must demonstrate[] . . . that application of the burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest (emphasis added). The statute defines demonstrate as meet[ing] the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(3). Where, as here, the government is not a party, it cannot go[] forward with any evidence.[8] In my 115*115view, this provision strongly suggests that Congress did not intend RFRA to apply in suits between private parties.[9]
All of the examples cited in the Senate and House Reports on RFRA involve actual or hypothetical lawsuits in which the government is a party. See S. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993); H.R. Rep. 103-88 (1993). The lack Of even a single example of a RFRA claim or defense in a suit between private parties in these Reports tends to confirm what is evident from the plain language of the statute: It was not intended to apply to suits between private parties.
It should also again be pointed out that Indiana added the part about civil defences immediately after the New Mexico case of the photographer when the trial judge ruled the RFRA was not a valid legal defense because the government was not a party. Arizona tried that too under Jan Brewer in 2012 and it created such an uproar she vetoed it.
While you dismiss the concerns about the broadening of the definition of burdens, there is enough significant difference between the Indiana law as originally presented and all other RFRAs that many legal experts agreed with those concerns.
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