Iraqis lack basics of battlefield supply

[umbrella39]

"Logistics remains the Achilles' heel of the Iraqi ground forces," said a commission chaired by retired Marine Corps Gen. James Jones.

The commission's report, released Thursday, said U.S. and coalition forces often have to make sure the Iraqis have enough fuel even though the Iraqis took over responsibility for fuel distribution months ago.

The Iraqis don't take care of their equipment ? preventive maintenance is an "alien concept," the report said. A depot in Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad, is stocked with vehicles, ammunition, boots and uniforms, yet the commission heard frequently of Iraqi troops being unable to get the gear.

"Every command post and headquarters the commission visited had vehicles and equipment that were inoperable ? and more often than not, the commission found that Iraqis were waiting for the coalition to take care of the problem for them," the report said.


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These kinds of little problems make me wonder if the Iraqis will ever be able to get their own sh!t together. It really seems we can't teach these men to fish. So I guess we'll just have to keep giving it to them.

 

[ProfJohn]

This is very typical of Arab forces. Google ?Why Arab?s lose wars? and read a report written by a former officer who spent a lot of time working with Arab military units on training.

Apparently a lot of it is cultural in nature. Officers taking away training manuals so that they have more power etc etc. It is a very interesting read.

 

[1prophet]

Originally posted by: ProfJohn
This is very typical of Arab forces. Google ?Why Arab?s lose wars? and read a report written by a former officer who spent a lot of time working with Arab military units on training.

Apparently a lot of it is cultural in nature. Officers taking away training manuals so that they have more power etc etc. It is a very interesting read.

And to change this would mean to some their culture was inferior and they can't have that, but there is something more interesting here.

Imagine a culture that seeks to balance individuality with collectivism at least for military purposes.

One important way in which many PLA exercises now attempt to enhance the level of realism is by incorporating opposing forces. For instance, according to a January 2007 Jiefangjun Bao report, the PLAN recently conducted an opposing forces exercise involving some of China?s most modern destroyers [7]. The use of ?blue forces? in exercises is a particularly noteworthy development, because it makes training more realistic and challenging, encourages officers to take the initiative in response to changing situations and gives troops exposure to possible adversary tactics. (In the U.S. military, the ?red force? represents a potential adversary, whereas in China, the PLA is the ?red force? and the opposing force is the ?blue force.?) Other reports indicate that training is sometimes designed to force participating units to deviate from their plans. This is done to prepare officers and soldiers to cope with actual combat situations in which they may lose the ability to communicate with higher headquarters or find that the enemy has reacted to their actions in unexpected ways. According to a June 2006 Jiefangjun Bao article, ?The objective of this type of training is to break free of the formulaic training exercise patterns of the past?and temper the ability of the commander and his staff to assess the enemy situation, plan independently, and change their plans as needed? [8].

 

[Lemon law]

But that argument to hold, one would have to assume that Iraq insurgents lack the same logistics they cannot genetically understand because they are Arab. The point is, I think its a case where the Iraqi members of the army have not gotten to the point where they are invested in the concept of winning and that logistics is just a detail you have to master. Meanwhile, logistics is a US responsibility because we are running the show may be the dominant psychology operating. The lessons of any protracted war is that an army
takes time to learn the needed lessons. And in the case of Arab armies, Israel decimates them before they have a chance to learn.

As for the Iraqi insurgents, they manage to scrounge up what they need because they are dealing with personal survival and the supply lines are far shorter. And they soon learn the needed lessons.

 

[Pabster]

Originally posted by: Lemon law
As for the Iraqi insurgents, they manage to scrounge up what they need because they are dealing with personal survival and the supply lines are far shorter. And they soon learn the needed lessons.

Iran helps out a great deal in this regard.

 

[Lemon law]

Originally posted by: Pabster

Originally posted by: Lemon law
As for the Iraqi insurgents, they manage to scrounge up what they need because they are dealing with personal survival and the supply lines are far shorter. And they soon learn the needed lessons.

Iran helps out a great deal in this regard.

Iran may partly explain the Shia insurgency but not the Sunni part. And who knows what the Kurds are up to?

 

[Jhhnn]

Maybe, just maybe, training in logistics is something that the new Iraqi Army isn't being taught very well by their American mentors.

Obviously, there's no intent to create in them a full-fledged fighting force capable of independent action, certainly not in the near term. Leaving them logistically challenged makes sense if they're intended to be dependent on American forces...

Even if that's not true, modern machinery is something that requires a fair amount of training to properly maintain, and an established knowledge base in career noncoms to carry forward in a continuous fashion, something the Iraqis lack entirely...

Anybody who's spent any time in or around the military knows it's the 10 and 20 year sergeants and master sergeants who actually make the system work. The Iraqis don't have any of those guys...

 

[Pabster]

Originally posted by: Jhhnn
Maybe, just maybe, training in logistics is something that the new Iraqi Army isn't being taught very well by their American mentors.

Yep. Blame America First, per usual. I don't see any evidence to suggest that our troops are being negligent in training Iraqi forces.

 

[Lemon law]

Originally posted by: Pabster

Originally posted by: Jhhnn
Maybe, just maybe, training in logistics is something that the new Iraqi Army isn't being taught very well by their American mentors.

Yep. Blame America First, per usual. I don't see any evidence to suggest that our troops are being negligent in training Iraqi forces.

If you don't see the evidence then you are blind Pabster. Everyone in authority admits we did a terrible training job with the Iraqi police, started very late with the Iraqi military, and when he tried to use any of those units the surge plan GWB outlined was totally based on, they were woefully unprepared and totally untrained. In short you may be entitled to your own opinion but not your own phony facts.

In addition, Jnnhh makes a good point about it being the 10 and 20 year army vets at the NCO level who make a military work. To some extent the old Iraqi army had those types, but they got the boot in debathification and we have never allowed them back in.

And now the official US army position is that Iraqi units are still 18 months away from being capable if we start we training now. Or in others words, exactly where it was when we first started the occupation.

 

[Auric]

I'll throw some ideas out there... In their short history as a modern nation state the military developed quickly with sudden oil wealth so a disposable mentality of 'replace with new rather than fix old (or even maintain)' could easily have prevailed. The urgency of a prolonged war (and massive numbers of casualties) combined with ample supply from various willing nations could have fostered same. In addition, the general population may be less technologically savvy as they do not have the equivalent history of industrialization. For that reason, even the Ottoman Empire was considered backwards despite long traditions in sciences and innovation. But that said, a significant part of the population have simpler histories as villagers and nomads and are not even used to the mechanical trappings of city life. Of course this could all be a load of bollocks but there is most likely a cultural element for whatever reasons.

 

[Bob Ghengis Khan]

I'm on a batallion level advisory team somewhere in Iraq, and from personal experience the article is very accurate.

I can't get real detailed on some points I would really like to make because of OPSEC, but this one in particular I think I can: "A depot in Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad, is stocked with vehicles, ammunition, boots and uniforms, yet the commission heard frequently of Iraqi troops being unable to get the gear."

We've organized trips over a month in advance with all of the batallions in our brigade to pick up items in Taji, to show the Iraqis how to do it, personally led them there and helped cover the route in gun trucks, only to arrive with our list of approved requisitions to receive, no shit, a single reflector for a HMMVW for our whole battalion, for a very large convoy on a multiple-hour trip (again, thats as detailed as I can be I think)


The main problem is what I've witnessed about Iraqi culture post-Saddam. Nearly everyone I've seen is a complete thief, and sees nothing wrong with it. I say that even with deep respect for some Iraqis that I patrol the streets with, train on ranges and tactics, and with a few actually formed real friendships.

Every time they go on leave, we have to search every one of them for stolen items, and every time we pile up masses of food stolen from their chow halls (who needs an entire backpack filled with cream?), weapons, ammunition, and items that have zero use except to sell to insurgents (trauma packs and garbage bags filled with copper wire)

They may spend their time looking for insurgents here, but when they go home they're looking to score extra cash any way they can. This is at the junior level.

At the higher officer levels is when it affects unit logistics - when parts are ordered, every successive level steals some from the top for their own use to sell. Theatre wide, followed by Division gets a piece, Brigade wants their share and by the time it gets to battalion and the colonel gets his share before distributing its nowhere near whats needed.

"Every command post and headquarters the commission visited had vehicles and equipment that were inoperable ? and more often than not, the commission found that Iraqis were waiting for the coalition to take care of the problem for them," the report said."

"Even if that's not true, modern machinery is something that requires a fair amount of training to properly maintain, and an established knowledge base in career noncoms to carry forward in a continuous fashion, something the Iraqis lack entirely...

Anybody who's spent any time in or around the military knows it's the 10 and 20 year sergeants and master sergeants who actually make the system work. The Iraqis don't have any of those guys... "



Our jundi mechanics are surprisingly skilled, but again its true that whenever somethings fucks up they come to us to rescue them. Since as Marines we feel a need to get the mission done, we routinely aquire parts that technically we should probably leave up to them (and some of the parts runs have been successful)- but if we would tell them to handle their own shit altogether and just sit on the sidelines helping them with their paperwork or other purely advisory work, they would fall apart quickly.

And there are some longtime noncoms. Take for instance the Chief Warrant Officer in the S-4 shop, he's been 40 years in the IA. He's extremely skilled at his job, unfortunately the IA is extremely loaded down with brass that ultimately have the say. By this I mean a normal Marine batallion is led by a Lt Col. The Jundis have a full bird for a BC and a Lt. Col (or in some cases, a major)for each section in command (S1, S2, etc) He just doesnt have the say. There are good Iraqi officers, but they are few.

"Maybe, just maybe, training in logistics is something that the new Iraqi Army isn't being taught very well by their American mentors."

This is simply isn't true. The Iraqis are taught, its the combination of the corruption and the Iraqi belief that the Americans will take care of it. In their eyes it seems there are 2 views: either we arent going away and will continue to prop up their faults with our inexhaustible (to them) resources, or if we are planning to leave then they'd better make off with as much shit as they can before the music stops.

 

[1prophet]

Originally posted by: Bob Ghengis Khan
I'm on a batallion level advisory team somewhere in Iraq, and from personal experience the article is very accurate.

I can't get real detailed on some points I would really like to make because of OPSEC, but this one in particular I think I can: "A depot in Taji, 20 miles north of Baghdad, is stocked with vehicles, ammunition, boots and uniforms, yet the commission heard frequently of Iraqi troops being unable to get the gear."

We've organized trips over a month in advance with all of the batallions in our brigade to pick up items in Taji, to show the Iraqis how to do it, personally led them there and helped cover the route in gun trucks, only to arrive with our list of approved requisitions to receive, no shit, a single reflector for a HMMVW for our whole battalion, for a very large convoy on a multiple-hour trip (again, thats as detailed as I can be I think)


The main problem is what I've witnessed about Iraqi culture post-Saddam. Nearly everyone I've seen is a complete thief, and sees nothing wrong with it. I say that even with deep respect for some Iraqis that I patrol the streets with, train on ranges and tactics, and with a few actually formed real friendships.

Every time they go on leave, we have to search every one of them for stolen items, and every time we pile up masses of food stolen from their chow halls (who needs an entire backpack filled with cream?), weapons, ammunition, and items that have zero use except to sell to insurgents (trauma packs and garbage bags filled with copper wire)

They may spend their time looking for insurgents here, but when they go home they're looking to score extra cash any way they can. This is at the junior level.

At the higher officer levels is when it affects unit logistics - when parts are ordered, every successive level steals some from the top for their own use to sell. Theatre wide, followed by Division gets a piece, Brigade wants their share and by the time it gets to battalion and the colonel gets his share before distributing its nowhere near whats needed.

"Every command post and headquarters the commission visited had vehicles and equipment that were inoperable ? and more often than not, the commission found that Iraqis were waiting for the coalition to take care of the problem for them," the report said."

"Even if that's not true, modern machinery is something that requires a fair amount of training to properly maintain, and an established knowledge base in career noncoms to carry forward in a continuous fashion, something the Iraqis lack entirely...

Anybody who's spent any time in or around the military knows it's the 10 and 20 year sergeants and master sergeants who actually make the system work. The Iraqis don't have any of those guys... "



Our jundi mechanics are surprisingly skilled, but again its true that whenever somethings fucks up they come to us to rescue them. Since as Marines we feel a need to get the mission done, we routinely aquire parts that technically we should probably leave up to them (and some of the parts runs have been successful)- but if we would tell them to handle their own shit altogether and just sit on the sidelines helping them with their paperwork or other purely advisory work, they would fall apart quickly.

And there are some longtime noncoms. Take for instance the Chief Warrant Officer in the S-4 shop, he's been 40 years in the IA. He's extremely skilled at his job, unfortunately the IA is extremely loaded down with brass that ultimately have the say. By this I mean a normal Marine batallion is led by a Lt Col. The Jundis have a full bird and a Lt. Col (or in some cases, a major)for each section in command (S1, S2, etc) He just doesnt have the say. There are good Iraqi officers, but they are few.

"Maybe, just maybe, training in logistics is something that the new Iraqi Army isn't being taught very well by their American mentors."

This is simply isn't true. The Iraqis are taught, its the combination of the corruption and the Iraqi belief that the Americans will take care of it. In their eyes it seems there are 2 views: either we arent going away and will continue to prop up their faults with our inexhaustible (to them) resources, or if we are planning to leave then they'd better make off with as much shit as they can before the music stops.

In your opinion is this problem fixable or are we wasting our time and money?

 

[umbrella39]

The main problem is what I've witnessed about Iraqi culture post-Saddam. Nearly everyone I've seen is a complete thief, and sees nothing wrong with it.

Living and working with thousands of Iraqis in Dearborn, I can confirm this from 40 years of experience. It is engrained in their culture. I don't know how much longer the American tax payers should continue to foot the bill for their thieving ways. Thank you for your eye opening commentary on this real situation we are facing in Iraq. Maybe chopping of hands for stealing is a good deterrent after all.

 

[Bob Ghengis Khan]

"In your opinion is this problem fixable or are we wasting our time and money?"

The million dollar question, huh? At the level I'm with I see some hope. That Taji example I gave wasn't their fault at all, it came from way higher. And there have been very good successive runs to there.

These guys (Bn. level here) actually know the procedures on how to acquire supplies, and have a basic idea of how to conduct fire and movement, search houses, etc in a MOUT environment.

Fixing the higher levels? I know you really want an answer, but I cant tell you. What I can tell you (but probably shouldnt) is that our Brigade level advisory team are a bunch of complete tools who dont seem to have accomplished a thing. But thats a specific case and hopefully the next team will have their shit together.

Fixing the reliance on America? For starters, to seriously show these people that America won't be around forever and that they really have a limited time to unfuck themselves. They won't believe this as long as we keep bailing them out. I think its just common nature among us to not want to see people we're supposed to be helping failing and just stand by while they fail, but we have done it on multiple occassions and they learn a bit from each time.

And the corruption? We cant as advisors usually just fire a commander on the spot, but over time the officers can exert some good pressure. I dont know what the cases are at the divisional level up, I'm sorry. The truly corrupt that are just trying to bleed us try before we leave, they need to be weeded out, I'm sorry but I dont have the answers how

I dont think its possible to change the thieving mindset as long as their economy remains the way it is. I've seen some real examples of Iraqi patriotism (nationalism?) amongst the civilians, police and military that shows hope. Will that convert into enough pride to influence their morals? Doubtful, for the majority.

Feel I must say though that there are some really great Iraqis, who I would like having as neighbors when I rebecome a civilian.

Is it worth the money? In my eyes this is the best course, as time-consuming and absolutely frustrating as it can be to reform them. I've seen progress in my time here, but they arent ready. They seriously cannot sustain themselves if we were to say, leave tomorrow. Or a year. And it would be horrible for us if they fell in that manner. That's my opinion.