- Sep 10, 2001
- 12,348
- 1
- 81
I thought the subject of the Iraq war deserved its own thread, since people insist on bringing it up in every other discussion. Since the post is absolutely and preposterously long, with many citations, I added bold text for those who want the executive summary.
Two primary charges were used to justify the invasion of Iraq:
1. Iraq had or actively sought weapons of mass destruction.
2. Iraq had ties to terrorism.
Of course, the greatest worry was the combination of these two factors, that Iraq might give WMD to terrorists.
Here is a brief history of the situation regarding Iraq since 1991 (after the first Gulf War):
Finally, Blix says
So, the executive summary:
Iraq complied with Resolution 1441 to a limited extent, even in the face of military action. There are still thousands of missiles and thousands of tons of chemical and biological weapons unaccounted for by Iraq. Note that they needed only to provide evidence of the whereabouts of these munitions, even if they had not been destroyed, but they did not. Further, intelligence from several countries indicated that mobile labs and underground facilities were used to create chemical and biological weapons. The inspectors were never given access to underground facilities, despite compulsion under threat of force to do so.
As for the insinuation that Bush had it out for Iraq, and that the Iraq war was planned before he even took office, the 9/11 Commission Final Report speaks to that. It also mentions repeatedly that it has long been known that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, has supported terror.
I know this is prohibitively long, so many probably won?t read it, but I think the ones that actually care about the truth will. I learned quite a bit doing this research, but nothing that changes my opinions on the subjects. I still believe that if Iraq had disposed of all their WMD, there is no reason for them to beat around the bush and not come out and tell us where they were or what they had done with them. Further, I submit that it is unreasonable, even naïve, to suggest that 100 weapons inspectors could hope to accurately peruse an area the size of California when intelligence sources indicate mobile and underground facilities are being used to avoid them. For those who say weapons inspectors should be given more time, how can you conceive that they would find anything that Iraq did not want them to find in such a large area?
Two primary charges were used to justify the invasion of Iraq:
1. Iraq had or actively sought weapons of mass destruction.
2. Iraq had ties to terrorism.
Of course, the greatest worry was the combination of these two factors, that Iraq might give WMD to terrorists.
Here is a brief history of the situation regarding Iraq since 1991 (after the first Gulf War):
So, to this point, UN inspectors had been in Iraq for 2 months. Iraq did not give accurate information regarding the whereabouts of some known WMD, even after repeated requests. This information was required by UN Resolution 1441 to prevent military action. The following is from the same report.In 1991, resolution 687 (1991), adopted unanimously as a part of the cease-fire after the Gulf War, had five major elements. The three first related to disarmament. They called for :
1. declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction and long range missiles;
2. verification of the declarations through UNSCOM and the IAEA;
3. supervision by these organizations of the destruction or the elimination of proscribed programmes and items.
After the completion of the disarmament :
4. the Council would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the sanctions (economic restrictions); and
5. the inspecting organizations would move to long-term ongoing monitoring and verification.
Resolution 687 (1991), like the subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required cooperation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given grudgingly. Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance ? not even today ? of the disarmament, which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and to live in peace.
As we know, the twin operation ?declare and verify?, which was prescribed in resolution 687 (1991), too often turned into a game of ?hide and seek?. Rather than just verifying declarations and supporting evidence, the two inspecting organizations found themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons programmes and to search for evidence through inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers and intelligence organizations. As a result, the disarmament phase was not completed in the short time expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the gradual development of that programme mitigated the effects of the sanctions.
The implementation of resolution 687 (1991) nevertheless brought about considerable disarmament results. It has been recognized that more weapons of mass destruction were destroyed under this resolution than were destroyed during the Gulf War: large quantities of chemical weapons were destroyed under UNSCOM supervision before 1994. While Iraq claims ? with little evidence ? that it destroyed all biological weapons unilaterally in 1991, it is certain that UNSCOM destroyed large biological weapons production facilities in 1996. The large nuclear infrastructure was destroyed and the fissionable material was removed from Iraq by the IAEA.
One of three important questions before us today is how much might remain undeclared and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter; the second question is what, if anything, was illegally produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that any weapons of mass destruction be produced or procured in the future.
In December 1999 ? after one year without inspections in Iraq ? resolution 1284 (1999) was adopted by the Council with 4 abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of 1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for ?cooperation in all respects? for a specified period of time, including progress in the resolution of ?key remaining disarmament tasks?, it opened the possibility, not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions.
For nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections by UNMOVIC. It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and Arab States and pressure by the United States and other Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last year that it would again accept inspections without conditions.
Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on 8 November last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq to cooperate. It required this cooperation to be immediate, unconditional and active. The resolution contained many provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity for peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection.
UNMOVIC shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal.
...
[After a sightseeing visit to a mosque], we receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not. Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events. They do not facilitate an already difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional and, at the same time, correct. Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner.
...
On 7 December 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some 12,000 pages in response to paragraph 3 of resolution 1441 (2002) and within the time stipulated by the Security Council. In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the declaration contains a good deal of new material and information covering the period from 1998 and onward. This is welcome.
One might have expected that in preparing the Declaration, Iraq would have tried to respond to, clarify and submit supporting evidence regarding the many open disarmament issues, which the Iraqi side should be familiar with from the UNSCOM document S/1999/94 of January1999 and the so-called Amorim Report of March 1999 (S/1999/356). These are questions which UNMOVIC, governments and independent commentators have often cited.
While UNMOVIC has been preparing its own list of current ?unresolved disarmament issues? and ?key remaining disarmament tasks? in response to requirements in resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two reports as unresolved, professionally justified. These reports do not contend that weapons of mass destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that possibility. They point to lack of evidence and inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed and confidence is to arise.
They deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil machinations of UNSCOM. Regrettably, the 12,000 page declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence that would eliminate the questions or reduce their number. Even Iraq?s letter sent in response to our recent discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security Council on 24 January does not lead us to the resolution of these issues.
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/Bx27.htm - a report by Hans Blix given to the UN 27 January 2003
So thousands of missiles, tons of chemical and biological weapons are unaccounted for by Iraq. Further, they reconstructed facilities to produce these substances after the weapons inspectors destroyed them previously. Bear in mind that they are under threat of military action by the UN if they do not actively supply the weapons inspectors with this information.I shall only give some examples of issues and questions that need to be answered and I turn first to the sector of chemical weapons.
Chemical weapons
The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever developed.
Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said, that the agent was never weaponised. Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
UNMOVIC, however, has information that conflicts with this account. There are indications that Iraq had worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed, even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory production, was higher than declared.
There are also indications that the agent was weaponised. In addition, there are questions to be answered concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq.
I would now like to turn to the so-called ?Air Force document? that I have discussed with the Council before. This document was originally found by an UNSCOM inspector in a safe in Iraqi Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War. I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided this document to UNMOVIC.
The document indicates that 13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period. Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these quantities are now unaccounted for.
The discovery of a number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was much publicized. This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the rockets must have been moved there in the past few years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such munitions.
The investigation of these rockets is still proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from 1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there during the Gulf War. This could be the case. They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather points to the issue of several thousands of chemical rockets that are unaccounted for.
The finding of the rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. During my recent discussions in Baghdad, Iraq declared that it would make new efforts in this regard and had set up a committee of investigation. Since then it has reported that it has found a further 4 chemical rockets at a storage depot in Al Taji.
I might further mention that inspectors have found at another site a laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor.
Whilst I am addressing chemical issues, I should mention a matter, which I reported on 19 December 2002, concerning equipment at a civilian chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq has declared that it had repaired chemical processing equipment previously destroyed under UNSCOM supervision, and had installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. On completion, we will decide whether this and other equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be destroyed.
Biological weapons
I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an important one.
Iraq has declared that it produced about 8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991. Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and no convincing evidence for its destruction.
There are strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it declared, and that at least some of this was retained after the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it should be found and be destroyed under UNMOVIC supervision or else convincing evidence should be produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year, Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg, of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as imported in Iraq?s submission to the Amorim panel in February 1999. As part of its 7 December 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this particular import of media was not included. The absence of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of the resubmitted document were renumbered.
In the letter of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq?s Foreign Minister stated that ?all imported quantities of growth media were declared?. This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media involved would suffice to produce, for example, about 5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax.
Missiles
I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant questions as to whether Iraq retained SCUD-type missiles after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a number of SCUD missiles as targets in the development of an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. Yet no technical information has been produced about that programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.
There has been a range of developments in the missile field during the past four years presented by Iraq as non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear understanding of them through inspections and on-site discussions.
Two projects in particular stand out. They are the development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even though it is stated that they are still undergoing development.
The Al Samoud?s diameter was increased from an earlier version to the present 760 mm. This modification was made despite a 1994 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to less than 600 mm. Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to Iraq prohibited the use of engines from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic missiles.
During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the final range for both systems would be less than the permitted maximum range of 150 km.
These missiles might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed systems. The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but some further technical considerations need to be made, before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both missiles.
In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted a number of casting chambers, which had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision. They had been used in the production of solid-fuel missiles. Whatever missile system these chambers are intended for, they could produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 km.
Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2.
Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.
Now, there are 3,000 pages of documents relating to nuclear weapons that Iraq failed to generate on request.When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present more evidence, we have all too often met the response that there are no more documents. All existing relevant documents have been presented, we are told. All documents relating to the biological weapons programme were destroyed together with the weapons.
However, Iraq has all the archives of the Government and its various departments, institutions and mechanisms. It should have budgetary documents, requests for funds and reports on how they have been used. It should also have letters of credit and bills of lading, reports on production and losses of material.
In response to a recent UNMOVIC request for a number of specific documents, the only new documents Iraq provided was a ledger of 193 pages which Iraq stated included all imports from 1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation Division, the importing authority for the biological weapons programme. Potentially, it might help to clear some open issues.
The recent inspection find in the private home of a scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents, much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium support a concern that has long existed that documents might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which claims that research staff sometimes may bring home papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot help but think that the case might not be isolated and that such placements of documents is deliberate to make discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by placing them in private homes.
Any further sign of the concealment of documents would be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent talks to encourage persons to accept access also to private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access to any site would be a very serious matter.
There are 100 inspectors searching an area the size of California. Six weeks later, the same statements about lack of documentation and the requirement for accurate interviewing is restated.In the past two months, UNMOVIC has built-up its capabilities in Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60 countries. This includes approximately 100 UNMOVIC inspectors, 60 air operations staff, as well as security personnel, communications, translation and interpretation staff, medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations and report to no one else. Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow as our training programme continues ? even at this moment we have a training course in session in Vienna. At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about 350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors.
The bold paragraph is particularly interesting to me, as it indicates Iraq ?disposed? of many chemical and biological weapons by burying them intact, meaning they would be readily accessible if anyone desired to use them.Iraq, with a highly developed administrative system, should be able to provide more documentary evidence about its proscribed weapons programmes. Only a few new such documents have come to light so far and been handed over since we began inspections. It was a disappointment that Iraq's Declaration of 7 December did not bring new documentary evidence. I hope that efforts in this respect, including the appointment of a governmental commission, will give significant results. When proscribed items are deemed unaccounted for it is above all credible accounts that is needed - or the proscribed items, if they exist.
Where authentic documents do not become available, interviews with persons, who may have relevant knowledge and experience, may be another way of obtaining evidence. UNMOVIC has names of such persons in its records and they are among the people whom we seek to interview. In the last month, Iraq has provided us with the names of many persons, who may be relevant sources of information, in particular, persons who took part in various phases of the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons, and proscribed missiles in 1991. The provision of names prompts two reflections
The first is that with such detailed information existing regarding those who took part in the unilateral destruction, surely there must also remain records regarding the quantities and other data concerning the various items destroyed.
The second reflection is that with relevant witnesses available it becomes even more important to be able to conduct interviews in modes and locations, which allow us to be confident that the testimony is given without outside influence. While the Iraqi side seems to have encouraged interviewees not to request the presence of Iraqi officials (so-called minders) or the taping of the interviews, conditions ensuring the absence of undue influences are difficult to attain inside Iraq. Interviews outside the country might provide such assurance. It is our intention to request such interviews shortly. Nevertheless, despite remaining shortcomings, interviews are useful. Since we started requesting interviews, 38 individuals were asked for private interviews, of which 10 accepted under our terms, 7 of these during the last week.
As I noted on 14 February, intelligence authorities have claimed that weapons of mass destruction are moved around Iraq by trucks and, in particular, that there are mobile production units for biological weapons. The Iraqi side states that such activities do not exist. Several inspections have taken place at declared and undeclared sites in relation to mobile production facilities. Food testing mobile laboratories and mobile workshops have been seen, as well as large containers with seed processing equipment. No evidence of proscribed activities have so far been found. Iraq is expected to assist in the development of credible ways to conduct random checks of ground transportation.
Inspectors are also engaged in examining Iraq's programme for Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs). A number of sites have been inspected with data being collected to assess the range and other capabilities of the various models found. Inspections are continuing in this area.
There have been reports, denied from the Iraqi side, that proscribed activities are conducted underground. Iraq should provide information on any underground structure suitable for the production or storage of WMD. During inspections of declared or undeclared facilities, inspection teams have examined building structures for any possible underground facilities. In addition, ground penetrating radar equipment was used in several specific locations. No underground facilities for chemical or biological production or storage were found so far.
I should add that, both for the monitoring of ground transportation and for the inspection of underground facilities, we would need to increase our staff in Iraq. I am not talking about a doubling of the staff. I would rather have twice the amount of high quality information about sites to inspect than twice the number of expert inspectors to send.
There is a significant Iraqi effort underway to clarify a major source of uncertainty as to the quantities of biological and chemical weapons, which were unilaterally destroyed in 1991. A part of this effort concerns a disposal site, which was deemed too dangerous for full investigation in the past. It is now being re-excavated. To date, Iraq has unearthed eight complete bombs comprising two liquid-filled intact R-400 bombs and six other complete bombs. Bomb fragments were also found. Samples have been taken. The investigation of the destruction site could, in the best case, allow the determination of the number of bombs destroyed at that site. It should be followed by a serious and credible effort to determine the separate issue of how many R-400 type bombs were produced. In this, as in other matters, inspection work is moving on and may yield results.
Iraq proposed an investigation using advanced technology to quantify the amount of unilaterally destroyed anthrax dumped at a site. However, even if the use of advanced technology could quantify the amount of anthrax, said to be dumped at the site, the results would still be open to interpretation. Defining the quantity of anthrax destroyed must, of course, be followed by efforts to establish what quantity was actually produced.
With respect to VX, Iraq has recently suggested a similar method to quantify a VX precursor stated to have been unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.
Iraq has also recently informed us that, following the adoption of the presidential decree prohibiting private individuals and mixed companies from engaging in work related to WMD, further legislation on the subject is to be enacted. This appears to be in response to a letter from UNMOVIC requesting clarification of the issue.
What are we to make of these activities? One can hardly avoid the impression that, after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there has been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January.
Source: Hans Blix UN Security Council briefing, 7 May 2003
This indicates that indeed Iraq is cooperating to a certain degree, but more than they had been previously. Note that this report is three and a half months after Resolution 1441.This is welcome, but the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out. This is not yet clear.
Against this background, the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC, as required under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002). The answers can be seen from the factual descriptions I have provided. However, if more direct answers are desired, I would say the following:
The Iraqi side has tried on occasion to attach conditions, as it did regarding helicopters and U-2 planes. Iraq has not, however, so far persisted in these or other conditions for the exercise of any of our inspection rights. If it did, we would report it.
It is obvious that, while the numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi side with a view to resolving some long-standing open disarmament issues, can be seen as "active", or even "proactive", these initiatives 3-4 months into the new resolution cannot be said to constitute "immediate" cooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance. They are nevertheless welcome and UNMOVIC is responding to them in the hope of solving presently unresolved disarmament issues.
This part surprised me. Hans Blix believed that his staff could verify the disarmament of Iraq in a matter of months. While he is the relevant expert, I would call to attention the years of inspections during the 1990?s, in which UNMOVIC was not able to complete this objective, given seven years. Further, I believe it unreasonable to assume that a team of 100 inspectors, even supported by surveillance aircraft, can accurately monitor 168, 617 square miles of Iraq. In particular, Blix himself acknowledges that Iraq may have made an unknown amount of chemical and biological weapons in the four years that the inspectors were absent, which does not factor into his timetable.How much time would it take to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks? While cooperation can and is to be immediate, disarmament and at any rate the verification of it cannot be instant. Even with a proactive Iraqi attitude, induced by continued outside pressure, it would still take some time to verify sites and items, analyse documents, interview relevant persons, and draw conclusions. It would not take years, nor weeks, but months. Neither governments nor inspectors would want disarmament inspection to go on forever. However, it must be remembered that in accordance with the governing resolutions, a sustained inspection and monitoring system is to remain in place after verified disarmament to give confidence and to strike an alarm, if signs were seen of the revival of any proscribed weapons programmes.
Finally, Blix says
I naturally feel sadness that three and a half months of work carried out in Iraq have not brought the assurances needed about the absence of weapons of mass destruction or other proscribed items in Iraq, that no more time is available for our inspections and that armed action now seems imminent.
So, the executive summary:
Iraq complied with Resolution 1441 to a limited extent, even in the face of military action. There are still thousands of missiles and thousands of tons of chemical and biological weapons unaccounted for by Iraq. Note that they needed only to provide evidence of the whereabouts of these munitions, even if they had not been destroyed, but they did not. Further, intelligence from several countries indicated that mobile labs and underground facilities were used to create chemical and biological weapons. The inspectors were never given access to underground facilities, despite compulsion under threat of force to do so.
As for the insinuation that Bush had it out for Iraq, and that the Iraq war was planned before he even took office, the 9/11 Commission Final Report speaks to that. It also mentions repeatedly that it has long been known that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, has supported terror.
So it is clear that Bush did not entertain the thought of striking Iraq immediately after 9/11, and asked whether or not Iraq was involved as a matter of course during the general inquiry as to who was behind the attacks. When asked by Tony Blair and his advisors, he kept the focus on Afghanistan.10.3 ?PHASE TWO?AND THE QUESTION OF IRAQ
President Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether Saddam
Hussein?s regime might have had a hand in it. Iraq had been an enemy of the
United States for 11 years, and was the only place in the world where the
United States was engaged in ongoing combat operations. As a former pilot,
the President was struck by the apparent sophistication of the operation and
some of the piloting, especially Hanjour?s high-speed dive into the Pentagon.
He told us he recalled Iraqi support for Palestinian suicide terrorists as well.
Speculating about other possible states that could be involved, the President
told us he also thought about Iran.59
Clarke has written that on the evening of September 12,President Bush told
him and some of his staff to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11. ?See if Saddam
did this,? Clarke recalls the President telling them.?See if he?s linked in any
way.?60 While he believed the details of Clarke?s account to be incorrect, President
Bush acknowledged that he might well have spoken to Clarke at some
point, asking him about Iraq.61
Responding to a presidential tasking, Clarke?s office sent a memo to Rice
on September 18, titled ?Survey of Intelligence Information on Any Iraq
Involvement in the September 11 Attacks.? Rice?s chief staffer on Afghanistan,
Zalmay Khalilzad, concurred in its conclusion that only some anecdotal evidence
linked Iraq to al Qaeda.The memo found no ?compelling case? that Iraq
had either planned or perpetrated the attacks. It passed along a few foreign
intelligence reports, including the Czech report alleging an April 2001 Prague
meeting between Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer (discussed in chapter 7)
and a Polish report that personnel at the headquarters of Iraqi intelligence in
Baghdad were told before September 11 to go on the streets to gauge crowd
reaction to an unspecified event. Arguing that the case for links between Iraq
and al Qaeda was weak, the memo pointed out that Bin Ladin resented the
secularism of Saddam Hussein?s regime. Finally, the memo said, there was no
confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with Bin Ladin on unconventional
weapons.62
On the afternoon of 9/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary
Rumsfeld instructed General Myers to obtain quickly as much information as
possible.The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested
in striking empty training sites.He thought the U.S. response should consider
a wide range of options and possibilities. The secretary said his instinct
was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time?not only Bin Ladin. Secretary
Rumsfeld later explained that at the time, he had been considering either one
of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party.63
According to Rice, the issue of what, if anything, to do about Iraq was really
engaged at Camp David.Briefing papers on Iraq, along with many others,were
in briefing materials for the participants. Rice told us the administration was
concerned that Iraq would take advantage of the 9/11 attacks. She recalled that
in the first Camp David session chaired by the President, Rumsfeld asked what
the administration should do about Iraq.Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz made the
case for striking Iraq during ?this round? of the war on terrorism.64
A Defense Department paper for the Camp David briefing book on the
strategic concept for the war on terrorism specified three priority targets for
initial action: al Qaeda, the Taliban, and Iraq. It argued that of the three,al Qaeda
and Iraq posed a strategic threat to the United States. Iraq?s long-standing
involvement in terrorism was cited, along with its interest in weapons of mass
destruction.65
Secretary Powell recalled that Wolfowitz?not Rumsfeld?argued that Iraq
was ultimately the source of the terrorist problem and should therefore be
attacked.66 Powell said that Wolfowitz was not able to justify his belief that Iraq
was behind 9/11. ?Paul was always of the view that Iraq was a problem that
had to be dealt with,? Powell told us.?And he saw this as one way of using this
event as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.? Powell said that President Bush
did not give Wolfowitz?s argument ?much weight.?67 Though continuing to
worry about Iraq in the following week, Powell said, President Bush saw
Afghanistan as the priority.68
President Bush told Bob Woodward that the decision not to invade Iraq was
made at the morning session on September 15. Iraq was not even on the table
during the September 15 afternoon session, which dealt solely with
Afghanistan.69 Rice said that when President Bush called her on Sunday, September
16, he said the focus would be on Afghanistan, although he still wanted
plans for Iraq should the country take some action or the administration eventually
determine that it had been involved in the 9/11 attacks.70
At the September 17 NSC meeting, there was some further discussion of
?phase two? of the war on terrorism.71 President Bush ordered the Defense
Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if Baghdad acted against U.S. interests,
with plans to include possibly occupying Iraqi oil fields.72
Within the Pentagon, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz continued to press the
case for dealing with Iraq.Writing to Rumsfeld on September 17 in a memo
headlined ?Preventing More Events,?he argued that if there was even a 10 percent
chance that Saddam Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack, maximum pri-
ority should be placed on eliminating that threat.Wolfowitz contended that
the odds were ?far more? than 1 in 10, citing Saddam?s praise for the attack, his
long record of involvement in terrorism, and theories that Ramzi Yousef was
an Iraqi agent and Iraq was behind the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.
73 The next day,Wolfowitz renewed the argument, writing to Rumsfeld
about the interest of Yousef ?s co-conspirator in the 1995 Manila air plot in
crashing an explosives-laden plane into CIA headquarters, and about information
from a foreign government regarding Iraqis? involvement in the attempted
hijacking of a Gulf Air flight. Given this background, he wondered why so little
thought had been devoted to the danger of suicide pilots, seeing a ?failure
of imagination? and a mind-set that dismissed possibilities.74
On September 19, Rumsfeld offered several thoughts for his commanders
as they worked on their contingency plans.Though he emphasized the worldwide
nature of the conflict, the references to specific enemies or regions named
only the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Afghanistan.75 Shelton told us the administration
reviewed all the Pentagon?s war plans and challenged certain assumptions
underlying them, as any prudent organization or leader should do.76
General Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command,
recalled receiving Rumsfeld?s guidance that each regional commander should
assess what these plans meant for his area of responsibility. He knew he would
soon be striking the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. But, he told us, he
now wondered how that action was connected to what might need to be done
in Somalia,Yemen, or Iraq.77
On September 20, President Bush met with British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, and the two leaders discussed the global conflict ahead.When Blair asked
about Iraq, the President replied that Iraq was not the immediate problem.
Some members of his administration, he commented, had expressed a different
view, but he was the one responsible for making the decisions.78
Franks told us that he was pushing independently to do more robust planning
on military responses in Iraq during the summer before 9/11?a request
President Bush denied, arguing that the time was not right. (CENTCOM also
began dusting off plans for a full invasion of Iraq during this period, Franks
said.) The CENTCOM commander told us he renewed his appeal for further
military planning to respond to Iraqi moves shortly after 9/11, both because
he personally felt that Iraq and al Qaeda might be engaged in some form of
collusion and because he worried that Saddam might take advantage of the
attacks to move against his internal enemies in the northern or southern parts
of Iraq, where the United States was flying regular missions to enforce Iraqi
no-fly zones. Franks said that President Bush again turned down the request.79
. . .
Having issued directives to guide his administration?s preparations for
war, on Thursday, September 20, President Bush addressed the nation before a
joint session of Congress.?Tonight,? he said,?we are a country awakened to
danger.?80 The President blamed al Qaeda for 9/11 and the 1998 embassy
bombings and, for the first time, declared that al Qaeda was ?responsible for
bombing the USS Cole.?81 He reiterated the ultimatum that had already been
conveyed privately.?The Taliban must act, and act immediately,? he said.?They
will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.?82 The President
added that America?s quarrel was not with Islam: ?The enemy of America is
not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is
a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them.?
Other regimes faced hard choices, he pointed out: ?Every nation, in every
region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the
terrorists.?83
President Bush argued that the new war went beyond Bin Ladin.?Our war
on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there,? he said.?It will not
end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated.?The President had a message for the Pentagon: ?The hour is coming
when America will act, and you will make us proud.? He also had a message
for those outside the United States. ?This is civilization?s fight,? he said.
?We ask every nation to join us.?84
President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings
with Central Command?s General Franks and other advisers on September 21
and October 2. Originally titled ?Infinite Justice,? the operation?s code word
was changed?to avoid the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of
infinite justice with God alone?to the operational name still used for operations
in Afghanistan:?Enduring Freedom.?85
I know this is prohibitively long, so many probably won?t read it, but I think the ones that actually care about the truth will. I learned quite a bit doing this research, but nothing that changes my opinions on the subjects. I still believe that if Iraq had disposed of all their WMD, there is no reason for them to beat around the bush and not come out and tell us where they were or what they had done with them. Further, I submit that it is unreasonable, even naïve, to suggest that 100 weapons inspectors could hope to accurately peruse an area the size of California when intelligence sources indicate mobile and underground facilities are being used to avoid them. For those who say weapons inspectors should be given more time, how can you conceive that they would find anything that Iraq did not want them to find in such a large area?
Facebook
Twitter