- Aug 23, 2004
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Just finished reading the book America?s Secret War by George Friedman (the guy runs the corporate intelligence outfit Stratfor) and I have to say that it has altered the way I see the war in Iraq somewhat, but not necessarily for the better.
His general point is that we invaded Iraq not for the incredibly hollow and fictitious reasons we were fed but because we were losing the support of Saudi Arabia. He states that the Saudi citizenry was/is a huge supporter of Al Qaeda. Personnel and resources come out of Saudi more than any other country and we required Saudi Intelligence to aid us in our hunt for Al Qaeda. This was due to their (the House of Saud) internal struggle to maintain their rule over a population that is widely supportive of Al Qaeda?s endeavors.
His main point is that we invaded Iraq to pressure Saudi Arabia into supporting our efforts to eradicate Al Qaeda as they had the best intelligence in the region, something we lacked almost entirely. One of the reasons for this is because the Saudi population was in effect propping up Al Qaeda with resources of all varieties, including people, money, and weapons. Fearing a national coup the Saudi government, genuinely allied with us due a symbiotic relationship we share, they withheld critical intelligence from us to assuage their citizenry. Not having any of that business, we decide the best way to strong arm the Saudi's into fearing us more than Al Qaeda and thereby supporting us with their superior intelligence capabilities was to invade the "most strategic country in the region"; Iraq.
This also served as a method by which we could convince those in the region that we weren't as militarily weak as Iran, Syria, Saudi, etc. perceived us to be (primarily because they think we always do things half assed and are paralyzed by our fear of military casualties).
Friedman doesn't appear to be under illusions as to the success (or almost total lack thereof) in Iraq, but does suggest that our invasion was supported by our (limited) "coalition of the willing" under no misconception as to the true nature of the operation (i.e. everyone knew Iraq was feeble and generally posed no threat to anybody *but* Iran of all places
). The reason France and Germany resisted was not because they objected to any kind human-rights issue but because they were concerned about the U.S. rendering them and the EU obsolete in terms of geo-politics.
I could go on, but I'll wrap up my post with my take on his view of the administrations strategy; they were playing a *way* more sophisticated game then I gave them credit for but pretty much failed to see the "trees for the forest." They were playing so many moves ahead that the Iraq move wasn't given near the scrutiny such a reckless plan deserved.
If anyone else has read it (been out since late'04) I'd love to hear your take on it, otherwise if you haven't I highly recommend you do *regardless of your political affiliation*. (For instance he's a conservative, I'm not.)
His general point is that we invaded Iraq not for the incredibly hollow and fictitious reasons we were fed but because we were losing the support of Saudi Arabia. He states that the Saudi citizenry was/is a huge supporter of Al Qaeda. Personnel and resources come out of Saudi more than any other country and we required Saudi Intelligence to aid us in our hunt for Al Qaeda. This was due to their (the House of Saud) internal struggle to maintain their rule over a population that is widely supportive of Al Qaeda?s endeavors.
His main point is that we invaded Iraq to pressure Saudi Arabia into supporting our efforts to eradicate Al Qaeda as they had the best intelligence in the region, something we lacked almost entirely. One of the reasons for this is because the Saudi population was in effect propping up Al Qaeda with resources of all varieties, including people, money, and weapons. Fearing a national coup the Saudi government, genuinely allied with us due a symbiotic relationship we share, they withheld critical intelligence from us to assuage their citizenry. Not having any of that business, we decide the best way to strong arm the Saudi's into fearing us more than Al Qaeda and thereby supporting us with their superior intelligence capabilities was to invade the "most strategic country in the region"; Iraq.
This also served as a method by which we could convince those in the region that we weren't as militarily weak as Iran, Syria, Saudi, etc. perceived us to be (primarily because they think we always do things half assed and are paralyzed by our fear of military casualties).
Friedman doesn't appear to be under illusions as to the success (or almost total lack thereof) in Iraq, but does suggest that our invasion was supported by our (limited) "coalition of the willing" under no misconception as to the true nature of the operation (i.e. everyone knew Iraq was feeble and generally posed no threat to anybody *but* Iran of all places
I could go on, but I'll wrap up my post with my take on his view of the administrations strategy; they were playing a *way* more sophisticated game then I gave them credit for but pretty much failed to see the "trees for the forest." They were playing so many moves ahead that the Iraq move wasn't given near the scrutiny such a reckless plan deserved.
If anyone else has read it (been out since late'04) I'd love to hear your take on it, otherwise if you haven't I highly recommend you do *regardless of your political affiliation*. (For instance he's a conservative, I'm not.)
