How to remove this as I am the admin.?

[The Day Dreamer]

These similar kinda approval for some specific programs when I am already the admin. I have no problem of it askign for new programs but for the ones I use daily, its kinda irritating.. What can I do to remove them?

P.S - Windows 7 user.

Thanks in advance

 

[ninaholic37]

edit: nevermind, misread the questionhttp://www.7tutorials.com/how-change-user-account-control-uac-levels

 

[VirtualLarry]

Norton used to have a UAC Whitelisting tool, which is what I think that you are asking for.

 

[G73S]

Create elevated Shortcut to run Program bypassing UAC Prompt in Windows 8 | 7

 

[Ketchup]

Control Panel \User Accounts\Changer User Account Settings\

Pull the slide all the way to the bottom and OK.

 

[thedosbox]

Insert "using an administrator account for daily use is poor security practice" comment here.

 

[The Day Dreamer]

Create elevated Shortcut to run Program bypassing UAC Prompt in Windows 8 | 7

Not working, already tried it

 

[G73S]

then disable UAC and get done with it

 

[imagoon]

then disable UAC and get done with it

Yes remove all forms of safety nets, that is the answer. Run as root always.

------------

What does the "show details" say? Also that scheduled tasks thing does work, we use it for administrative tasks on servers all the time. We also leave UAC on, on all production servers.

 

[imagoon]

Insert "using an administrator account for daily use is poor security practice" comment here.

+1, it is poor daily use

 

[Towermax]

Try "Elevated Shortcut" from WinAero:

http://winaero.com/comment.php?comment.news.152

It has worked fine for me in several cases.

 

[destrekor]

+1, it is poor daily use

To be fair, I don't think it really much matters for Windows users, unless you like to run every random installer, batch, and email attachment you can stumble across.
Which is to say, for the uneducated user, true, probably good form to use a non-admin daily account. For the informed user, they probably have at least decent enough practices.

I don't think exploits in established programs, like browsers, will be prevented by the lack of admin privileges. I might be wrong on that.

If you live in the deepnet, well... I think it would be especially prudent to run with low-level privileges. Outside of that, I find one likely won't be encountering enough security threats--if you are in informed user--to make a difference.

 

[imagoon]

To be fair, I don't think it really much matters for Windows users, unless you like to run every random installer, batch, and email attachment you can stumble across.
Which is to say, for the uneducated user, true, probably good form to use a non-admin daily account. For the informed user, they probably have at least decent enough practices.

I don't think exploits in established programs, like browsers, will be prevented by the lack of admin privileges. I might be wrong on that.

If you live in the deepnet, well... I think it would be especially prudent to run with low-level privileges. Outside of that, I find one likely won't be encountering enough security threats--if you are in informed user--to make a difference.

Maybe, but there are people that turn off UAC and roam on admin accounts. At that point you are back to XP level security unfortunately.

 

[destrekor]

Maybe, but there are people that turn off UAC and roam on admin accounts. At that point you are back to XP level security unfortunately.

Disabling outright, I agree is a bad idea. Toning is down isn't terrible. I've gotten used to UAC prompts in 7 and 8 (Vista was asinine with UAC - MS toned it down from there). I also read my UAC prompts, and look at them like a need to enter SU.

 

[Ketchup]

Maybe, but there are people that turn off UAC and roam on admin accounts. At that point you are back to XP level security unfortunately.

What do you think is going to happen?

And a virus has never turned off uac without someone's knowledge:

https://www.google.com/search?q=vir...la:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=sb

 

[imagoon]

What do you think is going to happen?

And a virus has never turned off uac without someone's knowledge:

https://www.google.com/search?q=vir...la:en-US:official&client=firefox-a&channel=sb

Thank-you for reenforcing my point. Since they were running as admin accounts, the virus pops up a UAC prompt to disable UAC. No surprise here. It is bit like running Firefox as root and being surprised when something gets in to the system.

 

[mikeymikec]

I don't think exploits in established programs, like browsers, will be prevented by the lack of admin privileges. I might be wrong on that..

UAC / running without admin privs does not prevent exploits per se. An exploit might be to alter the user's home page for example, which does not require admin privs. However, an exploit may require admin privs to have any effect on the environment simply because it was designed that way.

UAC isn't the answer to stopping privilege escalation, it's simply another security measure, like having your front door locked. A burglar might be able to pick the lock or simply break a window, but it doesn't change the fact that having security measures in place is better than not having security measures in place.

I see a lot of other peoples' computers through my work. In the later years of XP (pre Vista), I'd say that most malware I encountered exploited administrative privs. After Vista was released, the amount of malware I encountered that exploited admin privs dropped like a stone, it's like 10% of what it used to be.

Designing software to circumvent more security measures (ie. be cleverer) means that it is more likely that the software will fail to achieve its intended objective, simply because peoples' computers are set up differently, and software almost always has defects.

 

[imagoon]

To be fair, I don't think it really much matters for Windows users, unless you like to run every random installer, batch, and email attachment you can stumble across.
Which is to say, for the uneducated user, true, probably good form to use a non-admin daily account. For the informed user, they probably have at least decent enough practices.

I don't think exploits in established programs, like browsers, will be prevented by the lack of admin privileges. I might be wrong on that.

If you live in the deepnet, well... I think it would be especially prudent to run with low-level privileges. Outside of that, I find one likely won't be encountering enough security threats--if you are in informed user--to make a difference.

I would add that our local admin -> only user rights program here reduced virus alarms around 95%. We removed local admin rights for all users and now most of the fixes are simply: Delete profile, user logs in again. I mean something like cryptolocker would still run in the user's context and encrypt anything at their rights level but it would prevent a full machine take over.

 

[Ketchup]

Thank-you for reenforcing my point. Since they were running as admin accounts, the virus pops up a UAC prompt to disable UAC. No surprise here. It is bit like running Firefox as root and being surprised when something gets in to the system.

Not really. That would affect UAC on ANY user, with ANY User Account Control setting, not making any difference weather they were an administrator or not.

Point being, with the default setting, these pop up way too often. The average user is going to ignore these at some point.

 

[mikeymikec]

Point being, with the default setting, these pop up way too often. The average user is going to ignore these at some point.

Really? The only occasions (in a standard usage context) I can think of when I see UAC prompts are:

Firefox updates (monthly or less often)
Thunderbird updates (less than one a month)
(Presumably) Adobe Flash Player update (once a month)
When I'm installing something new (once you have a working system, how often is this exactly?)

So if I'm generous at this point, 5 UAC prompts per month. If it was 60 a month (approx two per day) on average, I might be inclined to agree with you.

 

[imagoon]

Not really. That would affect UAC on ANY user, with ANY User Account Control setting, not making any difference weather they were an administrator or not.

Point being, with the default setting, these pop up way too often. The average user is going to ignore these at some point.

Please cite an example where UAC controls were adjusted from a non admin account? On my normal user box trying to change UAC results in an admin login box. The registry entries are also restricted since the are in the system hive.

 

[Ketchup]

Please cite an example where UAC controls were adjusted from a non admin account? On my normal user box trying to change UAC results in an admin login box. The registry entries are also restricted since the are in the system hive.

If you mean what I think you mean, the first link is probably malware disabling it and the second one definitely is ( according to the writer anyway.)

Also, I remember more than one instance of uac not doing anything until after the biggest threats were renoved in times past.

Anyway, I think I have provided enough info for the user to make a well-infirmed decision on his own.

 

[imagoon]

If you mean what I think you mean, the first link is probably malware disabling it and the second one definitely is ( according to the writer anyway.)

Also, I remember more than one instance of uac not doing anything until after the biggest threats were renoved in times past.

Anyway, I think I have provided enough info for the user to make a well-infirmed decision on his own.

So your citing a google search and expecting me to do the work to prove your point. That isn't happening. Cite your source.

 

[SunnyD]

Start->Run->gpedit.msc

Left Pane: (Drill Down)
Computer Configuration
-> Windows Settings
-> Security Settings
-> Local Policies
-> Security Options

Right Pane:
Scroll down until you find the "User Account Control" policy block.

• Admin Approval Mode for the Built-in Administrator Account : Disabled
• UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using ... : Disabled
• Behavior of the elevation to prompt for administrators in the Admin
• Approval Mode : Elevate without prompting
• Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users : Prompt for credentials
• Detect application installations and prompt for elevations : Disabled
• Only elevate executables that are signed and validated : Disabled
• Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode : Enabled
• Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation : Disabled
• Virtualized file and registry write failures to per-user locations : Enabled

You may also have to do the same under local/current user configuration. Not that I suggest it, since this will disable the one layer that sits between you and silent installers.

 

[Ketchup]

NM.