How to make this encryption more secure?

Red Squirrel

No Lifer
May 24, 2003
70,155
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I setup SSL for this site:

https://secure.iceteks.net

According to wireshark it seems encrypted, but I noticed in IE and firefox 3 I get a bunch of warnings that its not secure. What can I do to suppress those warnings or secure it further, without having to pay thousands of dollars per month to verisign or twate etc?
 

Bob151

Senior member
Apr 13, 2000
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Well, here is what I think, and you may already think the same. Without that "Trusted CA" that is the message that your IE and FF clients are going to see based on the nature that the browsers are designed these days. You may have to educate users how to "trust" your site.

If its an ecommerce site, sociologically, you almost have to use a cert from a CA that is in each browsers list of default CAs. That way consumers are not alarmed visiting the site, IMO.

Maybe there is some way to push a reg change via a "How to trust this site" URL on the site's homepage.
 

SagaLore

Elite Member
Dec 18, 2001
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First thing I noticed, was that you're using SSL v1.0. You really should be using SSL v3.0.

You'll always generate a warning because you are not recognized by any Trusted Authority listed in your browser. You'll have to buy one from Verisign, Thawte, etc. to get around this.
 

Red Squirrel

No Lifer
May 24, 2003
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Hmm so the protocol itself is designed in a way that it only works if your paying thousands of dollars to a specific set of companies? Sounds like a big monopoly game to me.

I'll look into how to change it to use SSL 3.0 though. Also is TLS maybe even a better choice? This particular page is not critical per say (once the webhost lauches, it will be the control panel login and such) but don't want users to have to go through huge warnings either if there's a way to supress them.
 

SagaLore

Elite Member
Dec 18, 2001
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Originally posted by: RedSquirrel
Hmm so the protocol itself is designed in a way that it only works if your paying thousands of dollars to a specific set of companies? Sounds like a big monopoly game to me.

Well, not really... its by design. It has to do with how Certificate Authorities work, and making sure the chain of certificates lead to a trusted source. And its only a few hundred dollars at most. :) Just be glad we don't have to pay for DNS. :shocked:
 

Red Squirrel

No Lifer
May 24, 2003
70,155
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Hmm good point about DNS. But once they standardize the certificate based DNS I wonder if that will change...

I don't mind paying for a domain name or hosting services, but when I have to pay hundreds for a <1KB file there's problems :p
 

Crusty

Lifer
Sep 30, 2001
12,684
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You're forgetting the fact that unless you can verify WHO signed your certificate you can not trust the person you are communication with. It's very easy for anyone to create a certificate that matches the one you have created(with different keys obviously). Now if someone can redirect your traffic to a server of their choice they can present this fake certificate which matches the credentials of the one you are currently using which will present to the users an SSL site that is NOT yours. Happy phishing :)

Whereas if your cert was signed by a trusted CA then it's impossible for them to generate a cert that has the exact same credentials as your, therefore when someone is able to redirect your traffic they will be presented with an error saying that the cert is not valid because it's not signed by a trusted CA.
 

QuixoticOne

Golden Member
Nov 4, 2005
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Trouble is:

a) the CAs themselves are not trustworthy; through incompetence or intentional betrayal of their clients they have often been found to give out certificates that claim to be trustworthy and representative of a given organization when in fact they're totally bogus.

b) There is something to be said for treating AUTHENTICATION distinctly from PRIVACY/SECURITY. You could hash / sign the message packets to ensure that they've been secure against enroute modifications between the endpoints of the connection as well as to ensure that the contents of the messages are private against interception between the communication endpoints. This has some value even if the authenticity of the endpoints of the communication aren't totally confirmed. I could be browsing something like a job search or personals forum or medical issues forum or something and the fact that it is encrypted would be helpful in assuring my privacy against my ISP or Employer or whoever isn't snooping on my interactions.

Sure you could always do a man in the middle impersonation attack to forge the identity of a site if that site isn't authenticated and validated by some globally trusted source(s), but that takes some explicit and somewhat complex actions to do. Without encryption you have zero privacy against even the most rudimentary packet sniffing or packet alterations / session hijacking et. al. anywhere along the path the data takes. I may be willing in many cases to have less than perfect authentication of a site but still want some probably enhanced chance of privacy in my communications with that site.

c) It is pretty much a scam in that you're paying to register a domain, so there's no good reason why you shouldn't "automatically" be able to have web sites or other services in that domain be automatically thought of as trustworthy relative to that domain being the origin of the data. To basically say that you have to pay for another registration just to take full (https) advantage of a domain that you're already the registered owner of is nonsensical. If the DNS services point to your hosts and the DNS records record a given entity as being the domain's owner then it is reasonable to assume that https://www.domain.com is indeed an "official" host for the domain it has. If we don't trust DNS or domain registrars then why do we use those systems or insecure protocols / organizations at all? What is the point of "whois" data on a domain if we assume that it is all meaningless? Why not have DNSSEC or whatever if we can't trust the host you're actually contacting / looking up is the authentic host? None of this actually saves you if the web server / database is hacked into anyway since the individual pages themselves aren't "signed" by the CA, only the overall site's certificate. Plenty of "trustworthy" sites like Myspace / facebook / yahoo / whatever have been hacked so they're actually serving malicious web content even though the link is certified to be "authentic and encrypted" with HTTPS / SSL and a CA signature for the web site itself.

IMHO ALL web pages of ANY sort should be delivered over HTTPs just for the privacy / security improvements that offers. I do not think there's anything inherently wrong with doing that via self-signed certificates, though, since paying exorbitant and recurring rates to a CA just for a fully automatic certificate signing (that itself isn't really any better guarantee of security than having it absent) is a scam and certainly isn't affordable for most anyone except commercial entities. The CA signing fee per year exceeds the averave per capita income of several nations on earth; asking hundreds of dollars fees just to "secure" your web site is another demonstration of the misguided and elitist nature of the internet which should instead be the very perfect vehicle of equal / (nearly) free speech.