Even a stopped clock is right twice a day . . . FOXNews and accurate in the same sentence . . . miracles never cease.Originally posted by: MBony
They also said it wouldn't start until 2006. If that is true, then it won't be finished until 2016? Its hard not to see this as much more than a political move. I'm not debating its usefulness, but the timing makes it seems politically driven.
Originally posted by: BaliBabyDoc
Even a stopped clock is right twice a day . . . FOXNews and accurate in the same sentence . . . miracles never cease.Originally posted by: MBony
They also said it wouldn't start until 2006. If that is true, then it won't be finished until 2016? Its hard not to see this as much more than a political move. I'm not debating its usefulness, but the timing makes it seems politically driven.
Originally posted by: MBony
Originally posted by: BaliBabyDoc
Even a stopped clock is right twice a day . . . FOXNews and accurate in the same sentence . . . miracles never cease.Originally posted by: MBony
They also said it wouldn't start until 2006. If that is true, then it won't be finished until 2016? Its hard not to see this as much more than a political move. I'm not debating its usefulness, but the timing makes it seems politically driven.
Well can you prove me wrong? I'm not vouching for Foxnews, but talk is cheap. Put up or shut up...
Originally posted by: BaliBabyDoc
Originally posted by: MBony
Originally posted by: BaliBabyDoc
Even a stopped clock is right twice a day . . . FOXNews and accurate in the same sentence . . . miracles never cease.Originally posted by: MBony
They also said it wouldn't start until 2006. If that is true, then it won't be finished until 2016? Its hard not to see this as much more than a political move. I'm not debating its usefulness, but the timing makes it seems politically driven.
Well can you prove me wrong? I'm not vouching for Foxnews, but talk is cheap. Put up or shut up...
Dude turn up your sarcasm meter. The person that uttered that statement on FOXNews was actually providing useful, factual information . . . which is foreign territory for the Murdoch Misinformation Network.
During the drawdown in Germany, beginning 2nd quarter of FY92, we went from 326,000 to 100,000 in just over four years.Originally posted by: MBony
They also said it wouldn't start until 2006. If that is true, then it won't be finished until 2016? Its hard not to see this as much more than a political move. I'm not debating its usefulness, but the timing makes it seems politically driven.
With the exception of Kaiserslautern, Ramstein, Landstuhl, and Grafenwöhr/Vilseck, the remaining installations really aren't so elaborate. Most ASGs (Area Support Groups) focus around a brigade combat team.Originally posted by: Train
I think they are intentionally making it go slow, some of our overseas bases are so big and have been there so long that if we pulled out overnight the surrounding economies would get slammed, no need to burn bridges on your way out. A slow withdrawal just makes it easier for everyone to adjust.
Originally posted by: Todd33
The announcment is an election year carrot on a stick. It's purpose was to make military families vote for him, despite military his F-ups.
Let's be honest when Bush says "bring troops home" he doesn't really mean it. It means "redeploy troops to reward lackey's and punish others". Granted, it's easy to argue that troops in South Korea, Japan, and Germany are anachronistic at best.Originally posted by: UltraQuiet
Originally posted by: Todd33
The announcment is an election year carrot on a stick. It's purpose was to make military families vote for him, despite military his F-ups.
Really? It appears you know less about this than you do most other things you post about. Which is saying a lot. Traveling and being stationed overseas is very high on the list of why people join and stay in the .mil. A lot of people who are stationed overseas want to stay there and have to be forced back. As burnedout said he cherishes the 10 years he stayed in Germany, AndrewR and family appear to love Okinawa, I had a GREAT time every time I had to go overseas and the list goes on and on. This plan to reduce troops is right in line with this admins pre-election plan for the .mil. Trying to say this is an election year carrot only reveals an ignorance measured in orders of magnitude.
Promising to significantly reduce the troops in Iraq in 6 months is an election year carrot on a stick. Pure and utter bullsh!t.
You've got to love Bush misstatements . . . I think we can officially call them lies after 3 1/2 years.But the issue stung him in July when, in his speech accepting the GOP presidential nomination, he misstated one fact when talking about Army readiness.
Bush said: "If called on by the commander in chief today, two entire divisions of the Army would have to report ... 'Not ready for duty, sir."'
He also accuses Gore of proposing to shortchange the armed forces on funding and benefits. But the vice president's campaign released an economic plan Wednesday that would spend $100 billion of the projected budget surplus on the military over 10 years.
Bush would dedicate $45 billion of the surplus over the same period.
Interpretation: We don't know what's going on but we will figure it out later.The governor has said he is willing to have a top-to-bottom review upon election to see how we can restore our military to make it more efficient and more lethal and we will reserve judgment until that is done," said Fleischer.
Originally posted by: Todd33
The announcment is an election year carrot on a stick. It's purpose was to make military families vote for him, despite military his F-ups.
Let's be honest when Bush says "bring troops home" he doesn't really mean it. It means "redeploy troops to reward lackey's and punish others". Granted, it's easy to argue that troops in South Korea, Japan, and Germany are anachronistic at best.
But it's a ridiculous notion that THIS Bush plan for the military existed BEFORE the election.
Originally posted by: ReiAyanami
And then Hannibal marched on Rome, an empire in decline.
hey it cant last forever, so whose #1 next?
Dude can you read?! UQ (and I guess you as well) are contending BUSH had this plan BEFORE he was elected in 2000. As proof you cite 2001 and 2003 . . . uh OK.Originally posted by: AndrewR
Originally posted by: Todd33
The announcment is an election year carrot on a stick. It's purpose was to make military families vote for him, despite military his F-ups.
What a bunch of BS. Typical, but still BS. If you took an interest in anything but Bush bashing over the last few years, you would have seen the preparations for this reorg coming. General Pace, USMC, made numerous public statements about 2-3 years ago when he was in EUCOM.
Preparations for South Korea have been going on for YEARS, at the request of the South Koreans who want the US military out of Yongsan Garrison in Seoul. Negotiations have reached the point where the next step is announcing the plan and implementing it.
If President Bush had waited until after the election, assuming he's re-elected, there would have been howls of protest from the Dems over the delay in announcing the moves -- due to election year politics. :roll:
Let's be honest when Bush says "bring troops home" he doesn't really mean it. It means "redeploy troops to reward lackey's and punish others". Granted, it's easy to argue that troops in South Korea, Japan, and Germany are anachronistic at best.
Oh, so you're "honest" when you make childish semantic attacks? Bringing four brigades back from Europe is "bringing troops home" whether or not you want to see the obvious. The changes were a long time in coming and make sense from whatever perspective you choose, unless it's a Bush-bashing, Euro-loving one.
But it's a ridiculous notion that THIS Bush plan for the military existed BEFORE the election.
And you're an idiot if you believe that statement because it's patently false.
House Armed Services Committee meeting in June 2003 discussing military footprint.
The examination of the US military overseas was done in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001. LOOONG discussion here that I haven't read to any degree.
So, the 2001 QDR was part of 2004 election year politics?
Bringing forces from the continental United States to participate in exercises, exchange programs, and training activities is feasible, but the quality and quantity of these activities would be significantly lower than if in-theater forces are used. Forces in theater can exercise more frequently and longer because they do not have to spend time traveling across the Atlantic. They also are better positioned to build relationships with foreign counterparts because the same personnel can attend multiple events and develop substantive connections over time.
Similarly, forces in theater are better able to respond quickly to emerging conflicts than forces stationed in the United States. Operation Allied Force would have been significantly less effective if all or even a significant portion of the U.S. troops and equipment were required to be transported from the United States. Operations such as noncombatant evacuations, no-fly zone patrols, shows of force, and other SSCs would be much more difficult if the only forces available for such operations had to be brought from the United States. Many SSCs in the region and in surrounding areas might become more serious conflicts.
Granted, if the future of the US military is "cowboy diplomacy" . . . we don't need no stinkin' allies.American forces in Europe not only are concerned with current engagement activities and crises, but they also must focus on preparing to deal with tomorrow's challenges. Troops will be transforming themselves as part of the ongoing evolution of the U.S. military and will play an essential role in encouraging transformation within the militaries of NATO allies. A strong transatlantic relationship is essential to ensuring that NATO allies continue to improve their military capabilities. If the relationship begins to deteriorate, the Europeans may move toward maintaining only the basic military capabilities needed to address security problems in the immediate area.
Some might argue that a greatly reduced American presence in Europe would force the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security, but past experience indicates that the Europeans might instead choose not to address important security concerns--as happened in the early years of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. European nations with only minimal capabilities would be in no position to join the United States in coalitions of the willing to address larger security threats outside the European area. A significant American military presence in Europe is essential to demonstrating the enduring nature of the transatlantic relationship and to providing a continuing incentive for the Europeans to ensure that their military forces can operate effectively with the U.S. military in the future.
That doesn't sound like bring them home . . . kinda sounds like, "change the mix of forces . . . not necessarily the number."However, the types of forces that the United States maintains in Europe have not kept pace with the changed missions. To alleviate readiness and retention concerns and to give U.S. forces the tools that they need to perform their missions more effectively, the United States should reshape its forces in Europe to be more deployable, sustainable, and flexible, and less oriented overall toward heavy combat operations.
Responding to specific criticism of its performance in Kosovo and to the broader argument that it is too slow and risks becoming irrelevant to modern conflicts, the Army has begun a transformation process with the goal of developing a mix of light, medium, and heavy forces. The centerpiece of this transformation process is development by 2003 of three to five rapidly deployable interim brigades with new medium-weight, wheeled assault vehicles. By contrast, naval forces assigned to EUCOM are inherently highly deployable.
In light of existing mission requirements in Europe and the fact that much of the heavy combat force required for a major theater war in a region such as the Persian Gulf could come from the continental United States, shifting the balance of forces based in Europe from heavy combat units toward medium-weight units and combat support and combat service support units should be considered. Eliminating combat-heavy forces in Europe altogether would be extremely unwise, but exchanging some portion of the existing heavy brigades for the new medium-weight units would greatly enhance the Army ability to address current threats in Europe effectively.
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A partial shift away from heavy combat units also would enable the United States to field more support units in Europe; these units perform many of the missions needed for SSCs. Medical, construction, and communications units, as well as the entire range of special operations forces stationed in Europe, are experiencing particularly high operational tempo rates. Increasing the number of support units in this theater would better equip the force structure to meet future challenges.
In order to lead effectively in Europe, the United States will need to be able to demonstrate, through a force structure configured to deal with the real challenges Europe faces, that it is committed to preserving European security. The United States will need Congressional support for transforming its forces in Europe, but if European NATO members do not improve their military capabilities over the next several years, Congressional support for future American involvement in European security affairs will waver. Legislative burdensharing provisions will proliferate and become more stringent, and the drive to move troops out of Europe altogether could gain significant momentum.
Oops, Bushies didn't read this either.Promoting democratic governance often is cited as a significant element of the engagement activities of U.S. military forces overseas. But some inherent contradictions exist in this mission for CENTCOM, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, which does not have a tradition of democracy. Indeed, most U.S. allies in the region cannot be considered parliamentary democracies, although the degree of popular participation in government varies from state to state. Having democracy become firmly rooted in states throughout the Middle East may be a long-term U.S. and global interest, but the short-term result might be a regional instability that allows demagogues and populist dictators to overthrow the more moderate existing regimes. This possibility makes the near-term goals of U.S. presence in the region much narrower than its goals in Europe and East Asia.
Downright prophetic, huh?Likewise, because rotational naval forces operating in international waters or temporarily deployed air or land forces conduct much of the presence mission, no direct incentive exists to call for a reduction in U.S. regional presence. Fundamentalist anti-presence sentiment is focused against land-basing of what are viewed as "crusader" forces, implying that the presence of Western troops in the 21st century somehow is analogous to occupation of the Holy Land by Christian knights during the Middle Ages. Traditional enmities, even those that defy Western logic, remain.
If major changes to U.S. posture are needed, time will be required to build the necessary political consensus and then to implement the changes. The movements in the Asia-Pacific region may appear to be occurring at the pace of continental drift, but as the tectonic plates of the security environment grind past each other, they could suddenly slip--fundamentally altering the landscape before the United States has prepared adequately for change.
The most prominent of several possible developments that could threaten U.S. regional interests remains conflict on the Korean Peninsula. The possibility that North Korea could launch an attack on South Korea--perhaps as an attempt by Pyongyang to maintain its hold on power by creating a national emergency--remains real, if apparently remote. A more likely scenario would be the collapse of the North Korean state, which probably would result in the intervention of South Korean and American forces to restore order. If China also intervened (perhaps because of refugee flows into Manchuria), the danger of conflict between China and the United States or South Korea would arise. The United States already is well positioned to deal with any contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, however, and none of these scenarios seem to require a change in U.S. force posture.
Sounds like what Kerry said, "solve the Korea problem and THEN reduce troops."The United States is well postured to respond to the most likely immediate challenges on the Korean Peninsula: inter-Korean conflict or a North Korean collapse. However, it must also prepare for the eventuality of a resolution of the Korean problem, which might result in strong popular pressure for the removal of all U.S. forces. As a complete American withdrawal from Korea would not be in the interest of either the United States or the Republic of Korea, the United States should seek ways to ensure that it could maintain forces on the peninsula even after the Korean problem was resolved. This could well entail a significant reduction in troop numbers along with their reassignment to less intrusive locations, as well as a skillful public relations campaign to persuade the Korean people of the value of a continued U.S. military presence.
Resolution of the Korean problem undoubtedly would increase the pressure for a reduction in or removal of U.S. forces from Japan, but such sentiments are already growing. To counter this trend, the United States must seek ways to revitalize the U.S.-Japan alliance. Most fundamentally, this requires treating Japan as an equal partner in the relationship. Although allowing Japan to move beyond a subordinate role in the relationship might risk having it question the continued need for U.S. military presence, perpetuating the current unequal relationship ensures that the issue will one day explode. As in the case of a post-resolution Korea, the United States must be prepared to contemplate reductions in its presence in Japan.
Reductions alone, however, will not ensure the sustainability of military presence in Japan and could simply encourage attempts to eliminate all American bases in Japan. Reductions should occur only in the context of a restructuring of the U.S.-Japan security relationship aimed at ensuring the long-term viability of the alliance.
The United States maintains a very real and abiding interest in European security affairs. Forces in Europe perform numerous important missions to ensure that the United States can achieve its foreign policy objectives in that region. The needs of the European theater deserve to be given careful and thorough consideration in light of the essential role played daily by Americans stationed there.
Only by carefully and objectively assessing the needs of one theater against another during QDR 2001 can sound decisions be reached about whether these types of changes would be beneficial to achieving U.S. objectives without jeopardizing achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives as a whole.
Dude can you read?! UQ (and I guess you as well) are contending BUSH had this plan BEFORE he was elected in 2000. As proof you cite 2001 and 2003 . . . uh OK.
My general point is that IF Bush is talking about a total of 70k troops being based out of the US instead of Europe . . . I say, "go for it." If what he really means is that some portion of 70k will come back to the US but many will go to Poland or Bulgaria . . . I say, "what an arse."
Oh try reading your links before thinking they support your arguments
Using a force posture that was designed to meet outdated needs has created what some consider a mismatch between requirements and forces. Tempo challenges and difficulties associated with SSC operations such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo are, at least in part, manifestations of the strains thus generated.
U.S. military personnel in Europe today are busier than ever before, and although they have done an admirable job advancing U.S. objectives in Europe, the United States would be better served by a force posture designed specifically to address the existing and likely future security environment in that region.
However, the types of forces that the United States maintains in Europe have not kept pace with the changed missions. To alleviate readiness and retention concerns and to give U.S. forces the tools that they need to perform their missions more effectively, the United States should reshape its forces in Europe to be more deployable, sustainable, and flexible, and less oriented overall toward heavy combat operations.
Another problem is that much of the U.S. force structure in Europe is oriented toward theater warfighting rather than the types of missions the military in Europe is now called upon to perform. In light of existing mission requirements in Europe and the fact that much of the heavy combat force required for a major theater war in a region such as the Persian Gulf could come from the continental United States, shifting the balance of forces based in Europe from heavy combat units toward medium-weight units and combat support and combat service support units should be considered.
Similarly, forces in theater are better able to respond quickly to emerging conflicts than forces stationed in the United States. Operation Allied Force would have been significantly less effective if all or even a significant portion of the U.S. troops and equipment were required to be transported from the United States. Operations such as noncombatant evacuations, no-fly zone patrols, shows of force, and other SSCs would be much more difficult if the only forces available for such operations had to be brought from the United States. Many SSCs in the region and in surrounding areas might become more serious conflicts.
Whether the DCI and ESDI efforts are successful also may affect U.S.-European relations significantly. If the Europeans succeed in improving their military capabilities, the nature of U.S.-European roles in NATO may evolve considerably.
Originally posted by: arsbanned
hehe, whewww there's a lot o' info.
Anywho, how long did it take to close Subic and that Airforce base (can't recall the name right now) in the Phillipines? Seems like a much shorter time, and those were big bases with lots of people. What'd it take, a year? 2?
This plan to reduce troops is right in line with this admins pre-election plan for the .mil. Trying to say this is an election year carrot only reveals an ignorance measured in orders of magnitude.
They were closed by Mt. Pinatubo's ash.
Originally posted by: arsbanned
They were closed by Mt. Pinatubo's ash.
1. The ash from Mt. P erupting didn't come anywhere near Subic.
2. Since when do natural disasters chase the U.S. out of ANY place?
Those bases were closed becuase the threat they were there to counter went bu bye. Don't be disingenuous. If Bush was serious about closing a base and not earning political points, the bases in Europe could be shuttered in days. Get real.
This plan to reduce troops is right in line with this admins pre-election plan for the .mil. Trying to say this is an election year carrot only reveals an ignorance measured in orders of magnitude.
In fact, most of Bush's pre-election plan is smoke and mirrors . . . except for withdrawal from the ABM treaty. I guess you could count NMD but since it doesn't work and no one is going to attack . . . it's just sham . . . an expensive sham.
This particular announcement (coming at the VFW convention) was election year politics designed to get people talking about something other than his failed domestic policy and the 120k+ US troops indefinitely parked in Iraq. Feel free to maintain the illusion of propriety . . . I'm sure it makes it easier to sleep at night.
Bush has a plan to bring 70k troops and 100k family members/support home from Europe and Asia in the next decade. Have you heard his plan to bring 120k troops home from Iraq in the next decade? Team Kerry sux, too but at least they aren't responsible for the cluster duck in Iraq. Further, realistic, engaging diplomacy on the Korean peninsula might mean bringing most (if not all) US troops home over time under a sensible plan instead of a haphazard one.
The only glimmer of hope with another 4 years of Bushaster is that he's so overextended the military (and lied to get there) that it's unlikely he could cause nearly as much damage during a second term as the first. Granted, America misunderestimated him before . . . there may be no limit to the damage conceivable by the Moron and his minions.