In October, 2002, Islamic radicals set off two powerful bombs on the Indonesian island of Bali. Detonated in the heart of the tourist district, they obliterated several bars and nightclubs, killing over 200 people. It was the worst terrorist attack in the country's history. Shocked and taken aback by the carnage, the international media proclaimed the end of innocence for the tropical retreat.
To anyone who had been paying attention to political developments in Southeast Asia, however, the surprise was misplaced. Well before the Bali bombing, Islamists had turned the region into a front in their global jihad. In the Philippines, the radical group Abu Sayyaf, which allegedly received funding from the brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden, had built itself into a powerfully lethal force. In Indonesia, an even deadlier terror group, Jemaah Islamiah (JI), had also expanded, bombing churches and ultimately putting in motion the Bali plot.
But even after 9/11 and the Bali bombing, the governments of Southeast Asia did little. Indonesia's then-vice president, Hamzah Haz, actually celebrated the 9/11 attacks, announcing his hope that they would help "cleanse America of its sins." The country's president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, barely responded to the carnage in Bali. In the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia, governments similarly dithered.
But then, things changed. And in the last few years, the region has served up several important success stories.
This past January, on the southern Philippine island of Jolo, special-forces units of the national army hiked into the thickly forested interior. Relying on intelligence from advisors provided by U.S. special forces and on tips from locals, the soldiers surrounded leaders of Abu Sayyaf and proceeded to blast their mountain hideouts. By the end of the month, nearly all of Abu Sayyaf's commanders had been killed.
In neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia, security forces have made similar gains. In late 2005, members of an elite Indonesian police unit stormed a small house in the city of Malang. Inside were three key JI bombmakers, including a mastermind of the deadly attack in Bali. Last month, the group suffered yet another blow when Indonesian national police captured both the alleged head of JI's military wing, Abu Dujana, and the organization's alleged acting leader, a man known variously as Zarkasih, Nuaim, Sharoni, Zainuddin and Abu Irsyad,
These victories capped an aggressive counterterrorism campaign waged over the past two years by the governments of the region with the active support of the United States. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elected president of Indonesia in 2004, agreed early on that his country faced a serious threat and needed help. With assistance from Malaysia, Australia and the Philippines, his government tracked the Bali bombers and other JI members. Indonesian police captured over 200 suspected terrorists, and their counterparts in Malaysia have made key follow-up arrests.
Co-operation has proceeded on several fronts. Regional governments have formalized their commitment to counterterrorism -- and to working with the U.S. on the problem -- by creating a joint counterterrorism centre located in Malaysia.
No less important, Southeast Asian nations have begun to mount an open challenge to Islamist schools and political parties. In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has proved to be a strong voice for secularism, thus weakening the appeal of Muslim radicals. In order to emphasize the seriousness of the threat, his government has televised the videos of local suicide bombers and has recruited top Muslim clerics to issue public messages against the Islamists. Jakarta has even employed former terrorists to preach that violence has no place in Islam.
Several factors combined to produce this turnaround. For one, the Islamists overplayed their hand. The wanton destruction of the Bali bombing, which not only killed dozens of locals but also ruined the fabled island's tourist economy, turned many Indonesians against JI. Abu Sayyaf's brutality had a similar effect in the Philippines.
Direct military assistance also has been crucial. Here the U.S. wisely has chosen to play a be-hind-the-scenes role, dispatching advisers, communications technology, and weaponry. In the Philippine military's operation against Abu Sayyaf this past winter, U.S. advisors also helped the Philippine navy keep Abu Sayyaf blockaded on the island of Jolo. When it came time to announce the victory, however, the U.S. maintained a low profile, allowing Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to take the credit. In the eyes of the Philippine public, then, the campaign against Abu Sayyaf has remained a local operation.
In Indonesia, Washington helped to create a new 300-man elite counterterrorism force called Detachment 88, spending over US$20-million on its training and equipment. It proved a good investment. Detachment 88 played a major role in dismantling JI's leadership and helped lead the investigations of the Bali and Marriott bombings.
Beyond helping to track and kill terrorists, Washington has promoted economic development in the region and has tried to assist in settling local conflicts that very often have taken on an Islamic cast. In the southern Philippines, the U.S. has built new classrooms, medical clinics, roads, wells and other social-welfare projects, spending over US$250-million in aid since 2001.
There are important lessons to draw from all this: What the United States and its allies have done in the region might well be replicated elsewhere.
For one thing, in Southeast Asia the U.S. moved quickly to help local forces stand on their own; from the start, the struggle against Islamism was a genuinely collaborative effort. Southeast Asian politicians thus have been able to avoid charges of becoming American stooges.
As for direct assistance in fighting the terrorists, the lesson of Southeast Asia is to rely less on military establishments -- which, as in Iraq, have proved to be unreliable and corrupt -- than on specially trained forces such as Detachment 88, cordoned off from ordinary soldiers.
Equally important, Southeast Asia's elite units and police forces have won their victories through dogged investigative work, not by resorting to brutal interrogation techniques. With few reported incidents of abuse or torture, counterterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia continue to have a high standing in public opinion. By contrast, the more coercive tactics of, for example, the Mubarak government in Egypt have tarnished the war on terror and made it easier for Islamists to stir up rage against the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies.
For all its differences with the struggle in the Middle East, the less-studied "second front" against Islamism, in Southeast Asia, shows that even short-term gains may be enough to silence those who claim that the fight is essentially unwinnable. The dramatic reversal that has taken place in the region in a few short years offers some hope that the dire conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq might yet be turned around.
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