Heard an interview on NPR tonight discussing the problems with Diebold. I looked up these articles.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5424229/
http://www.debates.org/pages/news_040813.html
I believe it was that elections director in Mohave County that left the room "ashen-faced" and asking if Diebold knew of the ways votes could be changed so easily. He was told, yes, they're aware.
And that programmer that embezzled money from that law firm? He did it via a backdoor he'd put in. And, guess what Diebold did with him at one point? Had him on its Board of Directors!
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5424229/
SAN FRANCISCO - Critics of electronic voting are suing Diebold Inc. under a whistleblower law, alleging that the company's shoddy balloting equipment exposed California elections to hackers and software bugs.
California's attorney general unsealed the lawsuit Friday. It was filed in November but sealed under a provision that keeps such actions secret until the government decides whether to join the plaintiffs.
Lawmakers from Maryland to California are expressing doubts about the integrity of paperless voting terminals made by several large manufacturers, which up to 50 million Americans will use in November.
The California lawsuit was filed in state court by computer programmer Jim March and activist Bev Harris, who are seeking full reimbursement for Diebold equipment purchased in California.
Issues cited by the case include Diebold's use of uncertified hardware and software, and modems that may have allowed election results to be published online before polls closed.
They are asking California to join the lawsuit against Diebold. The state has not yet made a decision.
State election officials have spent at least $8 million on paperless touchscreen machines. Alameda County, for one, has spent at least $11 million.
Under the whistleblower statute, March and Harris could collect up to 30 percent of any reimbursement.
"This is about money now -- a case of the capitalist system at work," said March, of Sacramento. "The laws on voting products and processes are unfortunately unclear. But the law on defrauding the government is really, really clear. Going after the money trail is cleaner than going after proper procedures."
Diebold spokesman David Bear said Saturday the company has not been served with the lawsuit and would not comment until it reviewed the case.
Election officials have until Sept. 7 to decide whether to join the lawsuit, said Tom Dresslar, spokesman for state Attorney General Bill Lockyer.
Alameda County also has not yet decided whether to participate, said Elaine Ginnold of the county's registrar of voters office. She said Diebold has been "extremely responsive" in addressing problems with its system used in the March primary, which forced at least 6,000 of 316,000 voters to use backup paper ballots.
"I think we avoided a major crisis -- it would have been much, much worse had we not had those paper ballot backups," Ginnold said.
Earlier this year, California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley banned one Diebold voting system unless counties met a host of conditions, including precautions to prevent tampering and giving paper ballots to voters who prefer them.
In the March primary, 573 of 1,038 polling places in San Diego County failed to open on time because of computer malfunctions. A software bug in North Carolina's 2002 general election deleted 436 electronic ballots from six paperless machines in two counties.
Some people are critical of the use of the whistleblower statute with its reward system for plaintiffs.
"I would like to see people support a real solution rather than just try to cash in," said Alan Dechert, founder of Open Voting Consortium Inc., whose voting system relies on nonproprietary software. "There are a lot of people who could be a tremendous asset, but they're grandstanding and reveling in the expose."
http://www.debates.org/pages/news_040813.html
The elections director of Mohave County, Ariz., was so proud of his new electronic voting system that Bev Harris barely had the heart to point out its vulnerabilities. But she did, and before long she was ticking off the ways that she said an outsider could hijack his central tabulator - the computer that stores all of the county's votes - and steal an election.
By the time she had shown him a "backdoor" way to gain access to his software without a password, the elections director was visibly concerned. Before she left, he asked her to send him a list of things he could do to safeguard this year's election.
Ms. Harris's visit to Mohave County was part of a monthlong trip in which she and her deputy, Andy Stephenson, traveled to 10 states, investigating flaws in electronic voting and giving on-the-fly computer security tutorials.
The trip started out in Ohio, where they knocked on the doors of employees of Diebold, one of the largest and most criticized voting machine companies. It ended in late July in Las Vegas at Defcon, a hackers' convention, where the consensus was that cracking a voting machine might not be so hard.
Ms. Harris, the director of Black Box Voting (the Web address is www.blackboxvoting.org), has made herself public enemy No. 1 for voting machine manufacturers, and some elections officials, with her hard-edged attacks on electronic voting and her investigative style. (She acknowledges that at one point in Ohio, she and Mr. Stephenson hid in the bushes with a microphone, eavesdropping on Diebold workers.)
But there is no denying that Ms. Harris, a onetime literary publicist from the Seattle area, is responsible for digging up some of the most disturbing information yet to surface about the accuracy and integrity of electronic voting.
"I wouldn't want to play her role," says Aviel Rubin, a Johns Hopkins computer science professor and a leading critic of electronic voting. "But we're all better off that she's out there."
When they're in road-trip mode, Ms. Harris and Mr. Stephenson are a high-tech public-interest group on wheels. With a laptop computer connected to the Internet by cellphone, they toggle between MapQuest, hunting down directions, and Google, searching for the latest electronic voting information. The phone rings frequently with leads to be investigated. As they drove through San Bernardino, Calif., Ms. Harris took a call from a small-town official in Indiana, who claimed a voting machine salesman picked up a top elections official in his county in a limousine and took her on a shopping spree.
In the San Bernardino County elections office, Ms. Harris asked the registrar of voters to explain why, in the presidential primary in March, the vote totals went down in the days after the election. He explained that the county's electronic voting system had faulty software that accidentally held on to some test votes, and added them to the real votes that were cast. He insists that the story showed that the system worked well, since the extra votes were eventually found. Ms. Harris is skeptical.
Even many of Ms. Harris's detractors concede that her past investigations have shaken up the electronic voting field.
While surfing the Internet last year, she came across secret source code - programming instructions - for Diebold voting machines, and made it publicly available. Mr. Rubin relied on the code she found in a report last July in which he identified what he called "stunning, stunning flaws" in Diebold software.
Ms. Harris also found software updates, or patches, that Diebold added to Georgia's electronic voting machines before the 2002 election, even though the software had not been properly certified. More recently, she caused waves in King County, Wash., her home county, when she revealed that one of the main designers of its elections management computer system was a convicted felon, who had embezzled $465,361 from a Seattle law firm.
Ms. Harris worries a lot about this year's election. One of the key vulnerabilities, she says, is the central tabulator, which could control a million or more votes in some counties. There will be thousands of election workers - including temporaries who may not even have had their backgrounds checked - with access to these computers, who she believes could change vote totals rapidly. "It isn't hacking an election," she says. "It's editing an election." She and many computer scientists worry that modems on the machines will make them vulnerable.
Ms. Harris hopes to expand her small Black Box Voting organization into a consumer-protection agency for electronic voting and election procedures.
There is clearly a need. When electronic voting was rolled out, with even less security than is in place now, groups like the League of Women Voters and the American Civil Liberties Union did little to warn about the dangers, and large public interest organizations and foundations are still doing too little.
The burden has been carried by a small group of public-minded citizens. Dr. Rebecca Mercuri of Harvard (www.notablesoftware.com), Prof. David Dill of Stanford University (www.verifiedvoting.org) and Professor Rubin have done heroic work in academia to investigate and explain electronic voting. Organizations like the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, which found a significant flaw in the audit function in Florida voting machines, and the Computer Ate My Vote movement are also making a real difference.
For now, Ms. Harris is continuing to work her leads. She has to follow up on an e-mail message she picked up on the road in Arizona, from an elections judge in Santa Clara, Calif., saying there was a problem there. "Usually when it's an elections judge, it's something good," she says.
Most disturbing of all, she has heard reports that one of the big machine manufacturers may be including a modem connection between a county's tabulating computer and the manufacturer's own headquarters, which could allow it to change vote totals from afar.
"It's pretty much never-ending," Ms. Harris says with a sigh.
I believe it was that elections director in Mohave County that left the room "ashen-faced" and asking if Diebold knew of the ways votes could be changed so easily. He was told, yes, they're aware.
And that programmer that embezzled money from that law firm? He did it via a backdoor he'd put in. And, guess what Diebold did with him at one point? Had him on its Board of Directors!
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