Originally posted by: LegendKiller
Originally posted by: dphantom
What I will grant is the change in separating investment banks from other types of banks also played a role. A repub congress encourgaed by a dem president pushed trhough these changes to regulations. Deregulation had nothing to do with todays problem. It was the above and the expansion of the CRA plus active backing of loans to unqualified borrowers AND those who borrowed with no down just to flip a house a few weeks later that brought us to where we are.
Banks and places like CW no doubt had a role as they were making loans expecting house valuses to rise quickly. But they could make those loans knowing they had a market to sell the mortgages to. And that was backed by F and F and others. If F and F would back it - a GSE that would not be allowed to fail, then you bet everyone had a great incentive to borrow as much as possible to make as much as they could because they thought they were safe.
This is just so flat out stupidly wrong I don't know where to begin.
1. F&F only recently bought up the mortgages, even then, they bought up a pretty small portion of the mortgages, about 5% of them.
Don't disagree at all
2. Banks were never *forced* to underwrite poor credits, nor to game the system with the plethora of exotic mortgages in their arsenal. If anything, CRA and GSE mortgages have both proven to be very credit worthy. CRA mortgages have a static pool default rate similar to many prime pools.
Never said banks were forced though in some cases certainly "encouraged to meet lending to certain areas".
3. Deregulation was absolutely the reason behind this problem. Banks who lent, the ones with subprime and near-prime mortgage businesses (LEH, BSC..etc), were also the ones securitizing the mortgages through the investment banks. Since commercial banks could also be mortgages banks AND investment banks, through the elimination of Glass-Steagall, the conflict of interest increased (Deregulation in 1999 forced by the Republicans). You had some banks (GS for example) push out CDO paper, on one side of the bank, only to be shorting it using derivatives on another side. The conflict of interest is very clear, exactly what the regulation known as Glass-Steagall was supposed to prevent.
Agree and I pointed that out quite clearly.
Through the process they had to hold the equity pieces of the securitizations, their way around that was to concentrate those into pools, CDOs. As the leverage got higher and higher, using CDO, CDO^2, and CDO^3...etc, the remaining pieces became more risky.
As a result of 2004 deregulation, banks were able to take on more and more of these assets through the issuance of debt, both short-term and long-term. The main driver behind the debt were SIVs (structured investment vehicles), which allowed the banks to push off the debt into off-balance sheet structures (another failed regulatory issue). SIVs issued short-term liabilities (asset backed commercial paper), with maturities of ~270 days, to fund assets of a weighted-average-life of 5+ years.
Obviously this is a big problem, especially if those assets start to take a dump. The ABCP market is finnicky, one problem sends investors running, nobody wants to take a loss. SIVs had no backup financing, which most banks offer for normal ABCP programs (letters of credit and liquidity). To make matters worse is that lines between traditional ABCP conduits and SIVs were blurred, hybrid conduits, or normal conduits with CDO debt, were allowed to blend, causing more confusion. Investors were scared about what could be next, this froze the CP markets.
After SIVs blew up, banks brought them on balance sheet, along with their other assets, which showed their leverage ratios to be 40:1, or worse. Normal leverage might be 10:1, or 5:1 for a well-run company.
Securitization structures had their own leverage (subordination). The rating agencies (not regulated), were able to poorly rate the transactions and allowed even more leverage than should have been possible. This is why the CDOs are now blowing up, because when the banks should have been able to get .70 out of a shitty mortgage for every $1 of face value, in a conservative structure, they got .85. That extra .15 should have been their equity in the transaction, reducing risk for the senior tranches of the bond.
Then, when they tried to put that .15 into a CDO, the rating agencies weren't diligent enough, nor regulated enough, to reduce the leverage and protect investors. Thus, the bonds (equity tranches and mezz tranches) were repacked at greater leverage than they should have been.
Naturally, as a wealth manager, you cannot dig through every investment possible, since all are complex, so you depend on the rating. Since the rating agencies were debautched, not regulated, and greedy, the ratings sucked. The RAs should have pushed back against the bankers, but they didn't. Regulations didn't force them to, so we all lose.
Add to that the lack of regulation for hedge funds, who can be levered 50:1, as well as the complex and almost completely unregulated derivatives market (CDS), you get a mix of deregulation and underregulation, that caused this whole problem.
One of the biggest fuckups was FAS140, which allowed lenders to securitize completely off balance sheet, while recognizing huge amounts of revenue up-front. Huge mistake.
You see, this problem is a massive circle-jerk of de/un-regulation. CRA was nothing more than a good-intentioned tool, same with the GSEs. It was really the banks and fund managers who were not watched over, that fucked it all up.