The Proximity of Combatants to Civilians.
Classical guerrillas obtain much of their cover and
concealment via intermingling with innocent civilians;
classical conventional armies avoid civilians where
possible and tend to obtain cover and concealment
via terrain rather than civilian intermingling. Hence
the greater the proximity of combatants to civilians,
the greater the degree to which the actor?s methods
approximate the guerrilla extreme.
Hezbollah is often described as having used
civilians as shields in 2006, and, in fact, they made
extensive use of civilian homes as direct fire combat
positions and to conceal launchers for rocket fire into
Israel.90 Yet the villages Hezbollah used to anchor its
defensive system in southern Lebanon were largely
evacuated by the time Israeli ground forces crossed the
border on July 18. As a result, the key battlefields in the
land campaign south of the Litani River were mostly
devoid of civilians, and IDF participants consistently
report little or no meaningful intermingling of
Hezbollah fighters and noncombatants. Nor is there
any systematic reporting of Hezbollah using civilians
in the combat zone as shields. The fighting in southern
Lebanon was chiefly urban, in the built-up areas of
the small to medium-size villages and towns typical
of the region. But it was not significantly intermingled
with a civilian population that had fled by the time the
ground fighting began. Hezbollah made very effective
use of local cover and concealment (see below), but this
was obtained almost entirely from the terrain?both
natural and man-made.91
The Use of Uniforms to Distinguish Combatants
from Civilians.
Classical conventional militaries use uniforms or
other distinguishing marks to differentiate combatants
from noncombatants; classical guerrillas seek to blend
in with civilians rather than to distinguish themselves
from them, and hence often wear versions of typical ci-
vilian clothing. Hence the greater the incidence of uniformed
combatants, the greater the degree to which the
actor?s methods approximate the conventional extreme.
In 2006, the great majority of Hezbollah?s fighters
wore uniforms. In fact, their equipment and clothing
were remarkably similar to many state militaries??
desert or green fatigues, helmets, web vests, body
armor, dog tags, and rank insignia.92 On occasion, IDF
units hesitated to fire on Hezbollah parties in the open
because their kit, from a distance, looked so much like
IDF infantry?s: at Addaisseh, seven Hezbollah fighters
were mistaken for Israelis until an IDF soldier noticed
that one of them was wearing track shoes.93 Again,
there were exceptions: at Marun ar Ras, most fighters
were seen in uniform, but some armed combatants
were also observed in civilian clothes; 2 of 20 bodies of
dead Hezbollah fighters at At Tayyibah were found in
civilian clothing; two fighters in civilian clothes were
observed at Frun, and a few more at Al Qantarah; at At
Tiri, combatants were observed in uniform pants, but
not tops.94 But the great majority of Hezbollah fighters
in 2006 were uniformed and visually distinguishable
from civilians.