(Though what about that 128-bit encryption key stuff? How does that work into all this? 128 bits = 16 bytes, ya? So if I have a 50-character password on some data that's using 128-bit encryption, would it be quicker to try to directly brute-force the encryption key instead of the password?
Edit: After reading Mark R's post above, I think I might be way off.)
A 50 character random alphanumeric password will easily contain over 128 bits of entropy (assuming that the password truly is random). What this means is that the password isn't a weak point - you're better off brute force searching the 128-bit key, rather than trying to guess passwords according to any sort of pattern.
Whether it is easier to simply brute-force search for an encyption key, or guess passwords depends on whether the passwords are likely to follow a predetermined pattern, and how time-consuming it is to convert a password into a key. Some algorithms for converting typed passwords into binary keys are simply conventional hash algorithms (e.g. MD5). These algorithms are simple and fast. E.g. if you have a list of passwords to test, you can go through the list calculating hundreds of millions of MD5 values per second (using a decent GPU), and check the decryption keys at a similar rate.
So, if you can MD5 and check decryption on 100 million passwords/s, or check 200 million keys/s - if you reckon you can exclude 50% of possible keys due to weak passwords, it's better off to try guessing passwords.
This is a problem, and the use of MD5/SHA-1 or even SHA-512 hashes for converting passwords to keys is (although ubiquitous) considered insecure, as it makes it very easy to take advantage of weak user passwords.
'Secure' password-to-key conversion algorithms are specifically designed to be very slow, and require large amounts of resources (to make parallel processing difficult). E.g. some algorithms simply take the MD5, then take the MD5 of that, then repeat that 10000 times. This makes the conversion very slow, and makes a search for weak passwords too slow to be practical.
In this case, if you can only check 10 thousand passwords/s, compared to 200 million encryption keys, then you have to be looking for very, very weak passwords (compared to the underlying encryption) to make this a useful endeavour.