- Jan 20, 2001
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Fortune via CNNMoney
Good products, reasonable prices and foresight . . .As the story of the tarnished Crown hints, nothing was inevitable about Toyota's success. It has managed to survive discriminatory taxes, import restraints, and the occasional xenophobic hissy fit - U.S. workers taking sledgehammers to imported cars - to become something of a model citizen.
Naturally, the 'blame the unions' crowd will find that excuse all encompassing. A more telling reason . . . how many brands has GM terminated, divested, or sold in the past decade? Good products at a reasonable price soothes a lot of ills.There's no question that coming in fresh, Toyota had some advantages over Detroit: It was unburdened by retiree obligations, union contracts that had been bid up over decades, and brands like Oldsmobile that refused to make money (or die). And yes, it was lucky to have small cars ready to sell when the first oil shocks hit in the 1970s.
The GM and Ford version . . . 'take the last redesign . . . add more chrome.'One way Toyota reads the public mind is the think tank at Toyota Motor Sales in Torrance, Calif., where a research department staffed by 116 people monitors the industry and keeps tabs on demographic and economic developments. Its mission: to predict consumer trends and create a lineup of cars and trucks to capitalize on them.
Less 'right to work' and more 'knowing which states have pols for sale . . . that they don't already own.'To show that it was serious, Toyota decided to build a brand-new plant dedicated to this model in San Antonio. Far from normal transportation routes, the location is difficult logistically, but it did plop Toyota in the heart of truck country - and in a big, powerful state.
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The latter is emphatically no coincidence. Beginning in 1988, when it started production in its first assembly plant in Georgetown, Ky., Toyota has been careful to locate each new assembly plant in a different state, partly to maximize congressional clout. "It is better to be spread as broadly as we can be spread," says Josephine Cooper, who runs Toyota's Washington, D.C., office. Toyota has no political action committee, but it has built an effective lobbying operation.
Good management . . . good management . . . good managementIn this sense Toyota can look as American as baseball, hot dogs, apple pie - and yes, Chevrolet. But in terms of how it's managed, that is not quite the case. Every U.S. function - sales and marketing, R&D, manufacturing - reports to Japan. U.S. managers sometimes endure 20-hour roundtrip flights to attend a single meeting. Japanese "coordinators" in the U.S. shadow each operation and make their own reports to headquarters. Organizationally it looks like a nightmare, but somehow the two-language, two-culture hybrid works.
The primary problems with the Detroit Three were not unionized labor or government regulations. The problem was always at the top . . . poor management. For decades, if you needed a good work truck, the Detroit 3 could deliver . . . exclusively. Despite their claims to the contrary, it looks like Toyota wants to take the last pot that the Detroit 3 had to micturate in.The dramatic failure of any of the Detroit Three would destabilize the industry - and make Toyota the villain. "The most important management task at Toyota these days," says auto consultant Jim Womack, "is to manage the decline of the domestics."